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A Systems Failure?

An Armyman blames Rajiv's death on a communications lapse

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A Systems Failure?
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FOR the first time, a former telecommunications expert of the Indian Army holds the complete failure of the communication network of Indian security agencies primarily responsible for Rajiv Gandhi's assassination. This failure, says Major General (retd) Yashwant Deva, was prompted by "political pressure" from successive Tamil Nadu governments. While he takes no names, he may be referring to both the AIADMK and the DMK—political rivals but united in their support to the LTTE.

The most reliable version of this fiasco comes from Deva, former chief signal officer, southern command, who was responsible for establishing communications in Sri Lanka during the IPKF operations in the '80s. Deva, whose in-camera version before the Jain Commission is regarded as 'vital', wrote a report in Telematics India saying that an elaborate system of communications, manned by the LTTE in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka, had existed for years.

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 "It is not that the police and intelligence agencies are unaware of the existence of highly powerful and sophisticated high frequency and very high frequency sets; they simply did not react because of political pressure. There is a nagging doubt that government agencies sheltered militant cadres and turned a blind eye to criminal activities of Sri Lankan Tamils, most serious of which were operating clandestine radio stations, stockpiling explosives, tampering with the army's communications systems, sabotage and subversion," writes Deva.

According to him, when the IPKF was actively combating the LTTE in Lanka, their hideouts along the coastline were buzzing with radio messages. Deva quotes a senior IPKF official as saying: "We have our logistic and communications bases in Tamil Nadu; ironically, so has the LTTE."

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Deva estimates that even now there are several "safehouses" for militants in Tamil Nadu, a majority of whom run "electronic workshops". These workshops house receivers, relay stations and sophisticated radio receivers tuned to the frequencies of security forces and government agencies. In 1987, security agencies carried out a spate of raids and recovered a huge haul of radio sets. After that, they remained inactive for four years and woke up only after the assassination. Investigators now say that within 15 minutes of Rajiv's assassination, a message was intercepted from Kadungiyar (on the outskirts of Madras) to Jaffna, saying that the "operation massacre was over and the leader was dead."

 According to Deva, the RAW was fully aware that the LTTE was using a citizens' band radio; that India had constructed a microwave network linking Rameshwaram with Colombo and Jaffna and that the equipment supplied for this network was manufactured by Indian Telephone Industries (ITI). Yet, he says, more information on LTTE activities came from the Sri Lankan army rather than Indian intelligence agencies.

The wisdom of communications surveillance was lost on Indian agencies even when V. Prabhakaran went on a hunger strike in Madras in 1987 protesting against the seizure of their communications system by security agencies. Prabhakaran told a LTTE leader that "communications is our lifeline". Clearly, when his line of command was disturbed, he exited to Jaffna.

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When the IPKF launched a spectral surveillance on sensitive equipment, the results weren't surprising. A signal commander wrote on October 29, 1987: "The LTTE has been using the citizens' band radios." He pointed out that the sale of this brand was going up along the coast. "Although the IPKF's apprehensions of the abuse of amateur and citizens' band for political and military purposes were widely circulated, there were no efforts at monitoring," claims Deva.

Depositions before the Jain Commission say there was a total communications failure days before the killing. Intelligence agencies were aware of wireless messages being exchanged in complicated codes between Jaffna and Tamil Nadu. Some crucial intercepts of March 1991 had a direct bearing on LTTE preparations to kill Rajiv. Two coded messages between militants in Tamil Nadu and LTTE headquarters were intercepted on March 21 and 22, 1991. The first message stated: "Rajiv Gandhi is coming to Madras this 30." The second stated: "Should attempt at Madras or at the capital? If in capital, it requires strenuous efforts and sufficient time. If to attempt on (date), give reply." None of the two messages was decoded until the assassination.

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Deposing before the Jain Commission, then joint director (IB) N.V. Vathsan, stationed in Madras, said: "All intercepted messages were sent to the IB headquarters for decoding as we did not have the required expertise...wireless communications were monitored physically and the transactions recorded. Subsequently, the tape records were transcribed on paper... and sent to the IB HQ. During my tenure, nothing was decoded to my knowledge and I did not get any feedback from the IB HQ...."

 Vathsan says a few months before the assassination, "we noticed quite an increase in the traffic on the intelligence network of the LTTE and as there was no response from the IB headquarters, we tried our best to study the coded messages ourselves."

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If there is a chapter on intelligence ham-handedness, it would have to be this.

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