National

A Sandcastle Blueprint

The under-wraps National Security Review is a report full of hard talk, glaring gaps and doubtful efficacy

Advertisement

A Sandcastle Blueprint
info_icon

The government is, for the moment, keeping the first-ever review of the country's security environment under wraps. The first avatar of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) submitted this 131-page report, called the National Security Review (NSR), to the government towards the end of last year. Outlook has obtained a copy of the recommendations. The summary comprises 36 points, divided into six parts: on military capability building, diplomatic initiatives, internal security management, social reform, technology issues and economic security. Set up in November 1998, the high-profile 30-member board comprised distinguished personalities outside the government with expertise in foreign affairs, external security, defence, strategic analyses, economics, science and technology. K. Subrahmanyam was the convenor of the board which had former foreign secretaries Jagat Mehta, M.K. Rasgotra, Muchkund Dubey, J.. Dixit, Lt Gen (retd) Afsir Karim, former principal secretary to the PM .. Vohra, as well as Gen S.F. Rodrigues, Admiral V.S. Shekhawat, Air Chief Marshal S.K. Mehra and many others.

Advertisement

Among other things, the NSR has made the following recommendations: "If the level of Pakistan-sponsored violence in Kashmir doesn't decline, we must adopt a strategy to raise Pakistan's costs (e.g. by an occasional, thoroughly prepared raid on carefully chosen targets in PoK." The NSR is of the opinion that this "will be a useful prelude to the resumption of dialogue with Pakistan." It has further determined that the "new military regime in Pakistan is inherently unstable and may act in irrational ways" and recommends moves to isolate Pakistan economically in the SAARC framework.

The review calls for deterrence as well as defence preparedness against possible use of chemical and biological weapons and for establishment of "necessary Biological Level 4 facilities and other defensive measures allowed under international conventions." (Biological Level 4 facilities refers to infrastructure and procedures, in terms of precautions, necessary to handle extremely communicable exotic viruses and pathogens). The NSR calls for a "result-oriented" China policy. In this context, it pointedly mentions that "India hasn't been able to persuade China to halt its strategic encirclement of this country through its activities in Pakistan, Myanmar and Tibet."

Advertisement

The review exhorts the government to press China for full implementation of the 1996 "agreement on confidence-building measures in the military field along the line of actual control in the China-India border areas" as well as the 1993 "agreement on maintaining peace and tranquility along the line of actual control." The NSAB feels that China's penetration of Myanmar and its search for naval facilities in the Bay of Bengal "is a threat in more than one sense." But as far as the China policy is concerned, the review does have some good news for Washington. It has put forward the proposition that "there's a marked ambivalence in Sino-American ties, foreshadowing future difficulties. For the foreseeable future, the US is the only effective counterweight to China in Asia. Despite our continuing differences in nuclear issues, the US will find attractive an Indian policy of deliberate and sustained opening up of the economy to American investments."

Another recommendation is that the defence ministry be reorganised "on modern lines where the services are part of the policy-making process. Its civilian wings have to be more responsive to the armed forces' needs; its senior levels better aware of the developments and trends in the international field. " At the same time, the recommendations don't provide illustrations where such gaps of knowledge impacted adversely on the conduct of our defence policy.

The document declares that India's intelligence apparatus has proved inadequate and calls for a "drastic reorganisation". It recommends setting up of a "National Intelligence Board to oversee all aspects of intelligence production, prioritise objectives, allocate resources and monitor performance." Further, the NSAB feels that the new arrangement be placed "within a statutory framework in order to ensure full answerability and accountability." This is significant as the PM, the defence minister as well as the home minister have all along maintained that there has been no intelligence failure.

Advertisement

The NSR doesn't recommend a rush to sign the CTBT, adding that a national consensus on the subject is "indispensable." It further says that: "The sanctions issue does not have much relevance; some will be lifted before long due to American business reasons; others of the 1971 or earlier vintage will remain. India's signature should be considered only on the basis of firm assurances of its being treated as a de facto, if not de jure, nuclear-weapon state, at par with other nuclear weapon states in matters of technology transfers, sub-critical tests, participation in verification regimes etc." The document further declares that our "existing nuclear, missile and space technology programmes will have to be stepped up." It recommends "necessary action" be taken to reduce the country's vulnerability to technology denial regimes in lasers, computers, communications and related hardware. In a related recommendation, the point is made that an Armament and Technology Review Board has to be set up to prioritise various industry programmes. It may be relevant to point out that all of India's prestigious projects, like the Light Combat Aircraft and the Main Battle Tank, suffer seriously from time and cost over-runs.

Advertisement

On aspects of internal security management the NSR blames "poor governance due largely to the nexus between corrupt politicians and civil servants and criminal elements" for communal disturbances, caste conflict, politically motivated violence and breakdown of law and order. The suggested cure: "Clean leadership can break this nexus; the nation expects this to happen under the present government." Prime Minister Vajpayee may be pleased to note that no time limit has been set for this to happen. The review also projects the feeling that the authority and responsibility of the Union home ministry has eroded and that this should be restored by establishing "an interdisciplinary task force involving state governments to identify all areas requiring attention, propose a corrective action plan and ensure its expeditious implementation." One wonders what L.K. Advani will have to say about this!

Advertisement

While it's not clear if there were some experts on criminal law on the Board, recommendation 19 says "the country's criminal justice system is dilatory and non-performing. The necessary reforms should be put through urgently." What these reforms might be is left unsaid. The NSR also feels that currently, "border management is virtually non-existent" and that a "comprehensive" border management policy has to be put in place. One of the more interesting observations pertains to the social reforms sector. Noting that the nation -building process has lately degenerated into reservations of government posts - and in other institutions - on the basis of caste, the report declares: "This is by no means helpful in building India's bewildering diversity into a united and truly democratic society. " Having said this the review admits, rather frankly, that "this Board has not had the time to look into this vital aspect of India's internal security. The National Security Council may wish to have a special study made of the subject by the next NSAB." It is clear that when the new version of the NSAB finally gets down to business, it certainly cannot complain of a lack of brief.

It's not clear if it was a consensus document - as there are no divergences appended - or whether the government intends to make this interesting report a public document. While the Kargil Committee Report was made public, it was with security deletions and the annexures remain classified. It may be recalled that when the NSAB released its controversial draft nuclear doctrine in the midst of the Kargil-driven elections, the national security advisor, Brajesh Mishra, had lent a pronounced official colour to the occasion with his presence. Following adverse world reactions, foreign minister Jaswant Singh retreated in the Rajya Sabha behind the plea that the NSAB's maiden effort on its nuclear thesis did not represent the government's point of view. What precisely constitutes the government point of view still remains a mystery.

Advertisement

That there are large gaps in the NSR isn't in doubt. Considering its "advisory" role, the NSAB failed to foresee a Kargil-type situation. Despite this, the report has no hesitation in saying that: "Right upto Pakistan's Kargil adventure, our enemies have caught us unprepared." The summary of recommendations is also silent on the question of terrorism like the episode of the hijacking of IC-814. Sri Lanka, which now looms large as a foreign/domestic crisis, isn't even a strategic blip on the NSAB's radar screens.

There are many other areas that cry for attention. In the absence of official pronouncements as to the efficacy of the first NSAB experiment, it remains a matter of speculation how the government can persist with the same advisory architecture. It's also possible that having underwritten the entire exercise of the country's first-ever strategic defence review through an election manifesto promise, the government could well be left in a posture of a rigid embrace of this report, for whatever it is worth.

Advertisement

Tags

    Advertisement

    Advertisement

    Advertisement

    Advertisement

    Advertisement

    Advertisement