Making A Difference

A Distant Peace

Legal and political propriety force Delhi to downplay the Oslo do <a href=pti_coverage.asp?gid=30>More Coverage </a>

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A Distant Peace
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On Monday, November 25, as the Norwegian foreign ministry hosts a meeting at Oslo's Holmenkollen Park Hotel Rica to facilitate funding for the Sri Lankan peace process, many there would have preferred India to play a more high-profile role than sending officials from the local mission to attend it. Much of last week, New Delhi kept debating on whether or not it should participate in the conference, boxed into a corner because of its position on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). But many other countries, including those who have taken a hard line on terrorism, were quick to announce their intention to participate. For instance, the US has the LTTE on the State Department's list of foreign terrorist organisations, yet its assistant secretary of state, Richard Armitage, was scheduled to attend the meet, as was the UK secretary of state for International Development, Claire Short, and EU commissioner Margot Wallstrom. Ditto Japan, Germany, Sweden and Denmark (EU Presidency).

As New Delhi mulled over the request, from both Norway and Sri Lanka, to attend the meeting, Sri Lanka sent two emissaries—Milinda Moragoda, its minister for economic reforms, and Rauf Hakeem, of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, to canvass Indian support for the donor process. According to a Lankan diplomat, Moragoda, who met foreign minister Yashwant Sinha, finance minister Jaswant Singh as well as national security advisor Brajesh Mishra, "emphasised to all three the need for the Indian government's involvement in the donor process, that India has a stake, that India's absence would send wrong signals all over."

At the crux of the debate is India's stance on the LTTE. If India had attended the meet, diplomats said last week before the decision was taken, it would virtually "legitimise the LTTE," an organisation that has remained proscribed since it was accused of assassinating former PM Rajiv Gandhi. An Indian representative in Oslo, argue diplomats, would have raised questions of political and legal propriety, and also raised the hackles of the Congress party.

Realising this, Colombo even suggested, "If you can't send anybody from Delhi, send your man in Oslo (Gopal Gandhi)—he can come." India comprehensively ruled out its participation at a political level (symbolised by a senior minister or a headquarter-level delegation). Instead, New Delhi will merely ask its local embassy staff to fill in.

This modest approach of India satisfies many. For one, the US has been keen on India's participation. Secondly, this gives New Delhi a notional involvement in the Lankan peace process, enabling it to override legal and political complexities. The domestic reaction to this decision will now fashion what New Delhi plans next. Sri Lanka's interest in having India on board is understandable. For one, it would stave off criticism that PM Ranil Wickremasinghe failed to secure India's participation at this crucial phase.

This testing of waters is a distinctly more modest role from the days when Rajiv Gandhi pledged the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) with the condition that Colombo show political initiative to devolve powers to the minority communities, which comprise 18 per cent of Sri Lanka's population. The IPKF effort came unstuck almost before it could take off, becoming embroiled in the domestic political processes of the country and leading to Rajiv Gandhi's assassination. The LTTE, on its part, is very keen on India's participation in the current processes.

The larger Oslo-driven peace process, as distinct from the meet, does not allow any formal observers nor any participants other than the principal parties—Colombo, the LTTE and Norway. While not going out of the way to embrace the LTTE, India did welcome the memorandum of understanding between Colombo and the LTTE, and assured Colombo of economic cooperation.

The situation, however, has its downsides too. Government sources say the LTTE's possible ulterior motives remain a major cause for concern. It may well be that the LTTE, which finds itself strapped for funds after September 11, will use the donor route to access funding for buying arms and bolster its military profile. In the LTTE view, the donors' conference, more importantly, will be a major step towards legitimising itself. This could lead to easing of restrictions on LTTE leaders and cadres in Europe and elsewhere.

India's low-key presence in Oslo, however, also highlights New Delhi's inability, one way or another, to engage strategically in the neighbourhood, whether it is Sri Lanka, or even Nepal. As other powers parachute into South Asia, India could become a bystander on its own turf.

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