Uneasy Quiet

Compared to past standards of violence during elections in Bihar, the first phase of elections to the Legislative Assembly on October 18, 2005, was peaceful. This is the more significant since the 57 constituencies in which elections were held are spread across 12 Maoist (Naxalite) affected Districts in central and South Bihar. One person was killed amidst sporadic clashes during the elections.

Preliminary reports indicated that an estimated 43 per cent of the 1.23-crore electorate exercised their franchise. The Deputy Election Commissioner, Anand Kumar, stated that polling in the 12 Districts of Patna, Kaimur, Rohtas, Aurangabad, Bhojpur, Buxar, Gaya, Arwal, Jehanabad, Nawada, Jamui and Banka was largely peaceful. Bihar is to witness a four-phased polling (October 18 and 26; November 13 and 19) for a total of 243 seats, out of which at least 50 constituencies are regarded as being vulnerable to Maoist violence.

According to the union ministry of home affairs, Bihar was the worst affected state in 2004, with Maoists active in 30 out of its 38 districts, and with 155 Left Wing extremist-related killings between January and November 30, 2004, up from 128 in 2003. A total of 72 people, including 21 civilians, 21 security force (SF) personnel and 30 Maoists, have died in year 2005, till September 30 [data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management]. 

In addition to their traditional stronghold Districts of Patna, Gaya, Aurangabad, Arwal, Jehanabad, Rohtas, Jamui, Bhojpur and Kaimur in South and Central Bihar – in the vicinity of the affected Districts of the neighbouring Jharkhand state – the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) is increasingly establishing its presence in the north Bihar Districts of West Champaran, East Champaran, Sheohar, Sitamarhi, Muzzaffarpur and Darbangha, abutting Maoist-affected areas in Nepal.

Before polling commenced on October 18, a CPI-ML activist, Musafir Paswan, was shot dead in the Warsaliganj constituency of Nawada District, considered to be highly-affected by Left Wing extremism. Incidentally, during the February 2005 Elections, 15 people, including 11 police personnel, had died on the first day of polling.

On September 18, the ‘Bihar-Jharkhand Special Area Committee’ of the CPI-Maoist had given a call to boycott the elections. In a two-page appeal, it stated that the People’s Guerrilla Army was ‘fully geared’ to enforce the boycott. The Maoists had followed up the boycott call with attacks on a railway station at Chakand in Gaya district during the night of September 26, and on the newly constructed Parasbigha Police Station in the Jehanabad district on September 28.

However, in some of the areas of Maoist dominance or presence, initial reports indicate that there was a high turnout of voters, thus suggesting a defiance of the Maoists’ diktat. For instance, at Imamganj, the ‘secretary’ of a Maoist sub-zonal committee had issued a statement asking people not to vote. In defiance, a large number of voters in the Latua, Kharar and Kothilwa villages, under Imamganj Assembly constituency, which is on the Bihar-Jharkhand border, are reported to have exercised their franchise. During the February 2005 elections, even SF personnel feared to reach these villages, dotting the ‘red belt’ of Gaya district. However, such defiance could prove costly, since the Maoists will, as in the past, retaliate, and this could mean anything from tonsure, lashes, chopping off nose and ears, or in extreme cases, even death.

The administration had taken various security-related decisions to ensure a free and fair election in Bihar, a state infamous for violence on polling day or otherwise. The Election Commission (EC) ordered the sealing of Bihar's borders with the neighbouring states of Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh in order to block the movement of Maoist cadres. The Maoists have always used the contiguous borders with these states to their advantage and the run-up to the current round of elections was no exception.

Prior to the first phase of polling, Indian Air Force (IAF) choppers patrolled the sky and approximately 90,000 security force personnel were deployed in the Maoist-affected region. The fact that security was given top priority was evident when Chief Electoral Officer N. K. Sinha told reporters in the state capital Patna that the EC had made it clear that polling, which is through Electronic Voting Machines, would not be held in booths where security was not provided. Officials of the Bihar government reportedly claimed that all booths had been protected in the light of the EC's decision. The vast security network also reportedly included commandos on an aerial vigil aboard two M-18 choppers of the IAF, giving cover and assistance to the security forces’ deployed on the ground. The SFs, unlike earlier occasions, were also provided with anti-mine vehicles and mine detectors.

The EC also re-scheduled elections in four Assembly constituencies of Gaya district after reports of heightened Maoist activity. The four, Gaya town, Gaya Mofussil, Belaganj and Bodh Gaya, went to the polls on October 21 and security forces were deployed on a massive scale. Superintendent of Police Sunil Kumar Jha said that 65 companies of central para-military forces comprising over 6,000 personnel had been deployed at 1,005 polling stations in the four constituencies.

According to Sinha, 70 per cent of the polling stations would be covered by approximately 43,000 central paramilitary force personnel and the rest by the Bihar Military Police, District Armed Police and Home Guards. The central paramilitary forces had, in the run-up to the elections, undertaken an elaborate area domination exercise in Bihar. The Border Security Force (BSF) deployed 75 companies for area domination in 12 districts highly affected by Naxalite violence, from September 18, 2005. Since this deployment, BSF units arrested 114 miscreants, including Left Wing extremists, and seized 47 firearms and a large quantity of ammunition from their possession. Chief Secretary G.S. Kang released information in Patna on October 15 that, in the preceding three months, the police had seized 3,000 firearms and 10,000 cartridges, and unearthed over 100 illegal gun factories.

Under intense pressure from this drive, a majority of the state’s Maoist leadership is reported to have exited Bihar to relatively safer havens in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal. That adjoining states would be crucial to the Maoist strategy of subversion was evident when the Jharkhand Police, on October 14, seized 11 powerful landmines, each weighing 30 kilograms, near the Baniadih forest in Chatra district, which is approximately six kilometers from the bordering district of Gaya in Bihar.

While the CPI-Maoist is not reported to have given a call to vote in favour of any particular party in the current elections, it is widely known that they do impress upon the electorate not to vote for ‘class enemies’ and in particular, parties which seek the support of private armies of the landlords, like the Ranvir Sena. The Ranvir Sena, an outlawed militia of upper caste landlords, has decided to support the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance in the current elections. It claims to enjoy support in many areas of the state, particularly among the influential Bhumihar, a land-owing upper caste. From Bhojpur District, where it was formed over a period of time, the Ranvir Sena has spread its tentacles to the Jehanabad, Patna, Rohtas, Aurangabad, Gaya, Bhabhua and Buxur Districts. It mobilises the landed gentry in these districts against the CPI-Maoist and other left-wing extremist groups.

The role of the Maoists in past elections has been ambivalent. While they have issued poll boycott calls and at times even forcefully imposed these, there have also been reports of tacit support being extended to the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) led by Bihar supremo, our rail mantri Lalu Prasad Yadav. Support of the lower castes and the subaltern classes has been critical for the politics of both the RJD and CPI-Maoist. To that extent, there is a commonality in the social base of both these forces and this is reflected in their mobilisation strategies and organisational structure.

More importantly, after the September 2004-merger of the People’s War Group (PWG) and Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) leading to the formation of the CPI-Maoist, the Maoist leadership is reported to have split on caste lines in the state. This could have an impact on the emerging political map of Bihar, at least from the point of view of elections and the ubiquitous caste dynamics. Though still dominated by the Yadavs, there is now a sprinkling of chieftains from the Dushadh and Harijan communities with a following of their own. Bhageran Paswan and Sitaram Ravidas have emerged as senior leaders from these communities. While the Yadavs enjoyed the support of these communities and that of the ‘Most Backward Class’ in the pre-merger era, now the major caste groups have their own leaders who prefer to vote according to the emerging caste dynamics.

There are reports that the Maoists have used the President’s rule period to consolidate their presence in Bihar, and this would go some way in explaining the relatively low-levels of violence over the past six months (fatalities total a moderate 28 over this period). This period was used for a deeper penetration into society, with Maoist leaders seeking to impress upon people that the democratic experiment has been a failure. The inability of political parties to offer a stable government after the fractured mandate of the February 2005 elections has inadvertently helped the Maoist cause in Bihar’s interior areas. Bihar governor Buta Singh has already gone on record describing the Maoist problem as "quite alarming", and admitted in his August 15 speech that Maoist activities, especially at the Nepal border, had witnessed an increase.

The decrease in Maoist violence during the Assembly elections should not be viewed as a sign of weakening of the Maoists in the state. On the contrary, the Maoists have been discerning enough not to risk their armed cadres against a massive deployment of central paramilitary forces, who were on a high alert. Any operation against the security forces during this period would negate the principle element of Guerilla warfare: surprise. The massive deployment of security forces, however, disguises certain facts with regard to policing in the state. Posts of about 200 constables and 35 Sub-Inspectors are reportedly lying vacant in almost each district of Bihar. A violence-free election is definitely a feather in the cap of the administration, but it should not lead to a false sense of security.

Saji Cherian is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal