Making A Difference

Two Elections: New Hopes And Old Frustrations

Full text of the report in The South Asia Monitor, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a leading US think-tank, on the US interests after the recent elections in J&K and Pakistan.

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Two Elections: New Hopes And Old Frustrations
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The two recent elections on the subcontinent, in Pakistan and in the Indian state ofJammu and Kashmir, were conducted in environments of skepticism and uncertainty. Both yielded upset victories.In Pakistan, a hung parliament and the unexpectedly strong showing of the religious parties raise questionsabout how the government will deal with a political force that is hostile to its ties with the United Statesand will push a hard line toward India. The Kashmir elections, on the other hand, are an opportunity forpositive change in the state, though their ultimate results will depend on how willing the governments inDelhi and Islamabad are to create a real peace process. For the United States, the main message from theballot box is that South Asia will remain volatile, but that the stakes for U.S. interests are higher thanever.

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Pakistan: Handicapped Process, Surprising Results
The shifting and controversialground rules of the Pakistani election produced a fragmented parliament. The Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam(PML-QA), favored by Musharraf, emerged on top, with 77 out of 268 directly elected seats. In second place isthe Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians (PPPP), the electoral version of Benazir Bhutto's party. Thesurprise, however, was the performance of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), an alliance of six religiousparties. Their 11 percent share of votes cast was in line with their best previous performance. But thefirst-past-the-post system and their disciplined approach earned them 45 seats, an unprecedented 18 percent ofthe National Assembly, plus control of one provincial government and participation in a second. This makesthem a major political player rather than the marginal party they have been in the past.

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The MMA campaigned against the U.S. war on terrorism and the U.S. presence in Pakistan.It dominated the voting in areas bordering Afghanistan, with a substantial Pashtun population deeply concernedabout Afghanistan. The MMA accounts for 80 percent of the parliamentary seats from the Northwest FrontierProvince (NWFP) and will control that provincial government. In Baluchistan, the MMA will lead a provincialcoalition government.

A fragile coalition? 
Three weeks after the election, Musharraf is stillnegotiating to form a government. His most likely options are a government based on the PML-QA or an alliancebetween them and the MMA. Either would involve cooperation between parties that do not see eye to eye, andwould yield a fragile government and fractious National Assembly. Since the "King's Party" has noclear leader, Musharraf is also looking for a prime minister who will fit in with his own desire to maintaincontrol. The likelihood of some kind of showdown within the new government or between the elected leaders andMusharraf within the next two years is high.

Policy impact in Pakistan
The elections pose little threat to Musharraf'sdominance of decisionmaking. The main thrust of his economic reform policies will also survive, though soaringpoverty rates and an elected parliament will bring new pressures for public spending. In other areas, theoutlook is more troublesome. Whether or not the MMA joins the government, and even if it tones down itsstridently anti-American campaign rhetoric, its members will do their best to soften government restraints onthe country's Islamic militants and encourage continuing Pakistani support for the Kashmir insurgency. Theywill push Musharraf to restrict the role of U.S. law enforcement agencies in hunting down Taliban and Al Qaedaremnants, especially in areas where the MMA is in the provincial government. If the United States goes to warin Iraq, that will be a potent source of new opposition to U.S. policy extending well beyond the MMA.

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This election will encourage Musharraf to try to revive the old alliance between thearmy and the religious right, at least in limited form. Such an effort may not eliminate the threat he facesfrom the most extreme militant elements, however. Violence against foreigners and Christians is likely tocontinue, and Pakistan's internal security will remain troubled.

Institutions and "checks and balances"
Musharraf established theNational Security Council (NSC) by decree before the election "to serve as a forum for consultation onstrategic matters pertaining to the sovereignty, integrity and security of the State; and the matters relatingto democracy, governance and inter-provincial harmony." This institution is central to his and the army'sstrategy for keeping control over national security and foreign policy, and over major aspects of domesticpolitics. It is still unclear exactly what political parties will be represented among the eight civilianmembers of the NSC, but Musharraf and the four military commanders on the council are likely to have thedecisive say.

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The electoral results are not a promising backdrop for broader institutional reform. Theplatforms of most parties other than the MMA did not engage issues, but focused on running either with oragainst the army. The steady decline in voter turnout in the past decade is a depressing indication that fewpeople have faith in the abilities of either the army or political representatives to address their needs. Theparliament is unlikely to emerge as a strong institution. Its parties remain largely subservient to theirindividual leaders. The parties that form the MMA have deep sectarian differences. The reorganization of thecountry's local institutions, launched with such fanfare by Musharraf, is likely to take a back seat tobuilding coalitions and managing a volatile policy environment.

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A ray of hope in Kashmir
The run-up to the Kashmir elections, like thecorresponding period in Pakistan, was far from auspicious. The leaders of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference(APHC), the umbrella group of political activists in the Valley of Kashmir, were imprisoned, and the groupboycotted the elections. Election violence claimed over 700 lives, including 84 political workers and 2candidates. Moderate Kashmiri leaders feared for their lives after the assassination of the widely respectedpolitician Abdul Ghani Lone. Nonetheless, over 40 percent of the electorate turned out and voted to end ageneration of rule by Farukh Abdullah's National Conference (NC), allied with the national government in Delhiled by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

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A move away from divisive politics
Most observers believe that the NC's loss ofits majority reflected anti-incumbency sentiments and frustration over local issues. The NC-led government wasknown for corruption and high-handedness, and development in the state had been at a standstill. The state-runpolice had been a spoiler in previous peace initiatives between the Indian government and the Kashmiris.

The new government is a coalition headed by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's Popular DemocraticParty (PDP), which won primarily in the Valley of Kashmir, the heart of the state and the heart of the disputewith Pakistan. The PDP's major partner is the Congress Party, which won heavily in the Hindu-majority Jammuarea. The Congress showing was seen as a reaction against the BJP's communally divisive politics. This is thefirst time in six years that the Kashmir government has had a coalition partner connected with the oppositionto the central government. This may complicate its dealings with Delhi.

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Who speaks for the Kashmiris? 
Because the major separatist groups did notparticipate, the elections did not really resolve the question of who speaks for Kashmiris. The Hurriyat seesitself as the representative of the Kashmiris and has sought to represent them in dialogues with the centerand Pakistan. It is also engaged in track-two efforts, such as the one with the Delhi-based Kashmir Committeeheaded by former minister Ram Jethmalani. The Hurriyat will press the new state government to include it inany future dialogue. The state government, for its part, wants to start direct talks with the centralgovernment on the state's future governance. If the central government impedes the ability of the stategovernment to function, this will put the Hurriyat in the foreground once again. And the NC remains thelargest party in the assembly. The role it chooses to play in the opposition will be critical.

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The social and politicalagenda
The PDP-Congress "common minimumprogram" calls for the release of political prisoners, strengthening of protections for human rights,investigation of custodial killings, and the return of the Kashmiri Hindus forced out of their homes in thestate, along with progress on a host of economic, development, and social issues. The Indian government hasnot blocked the state government's first moves, such as announcing the disbanding of special operations troopsin the valley. Continued central-government help and funding will be crucial.

The trickiest issue, however, is shaping the future governance of the state-therelationship of Kashmir to Delhi and, behind it, the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. Movement on talks inthe next six months is key, before the BJP becomes preoccupied with forthcoming state elections and theprospect of national elections in 2004. The concept underpinning the talks should be changing politicalrelationships, not the map.

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Starting a dialogue
Three levels of dialogue need to start. The first is betweenthe various constituencies and political parties in Kashmir. The internal structure of this coalition shouldproduce a long-needed dialogue among the different sub-regions within Kashmir. The chief minister has reachedout to the Hurriyat, and this needs to continue. The second level is between the state and the centralgovernment. The state government will carry out this discussion at the official level, but there will be acontinuing need for an unofficial channel, as a forum for candid and wide-ranging discussion. The third levelinvolves Pakistan. The Kashmiris would like to be direct participants in this, though it remains unclear whoin Kashmir would take the reins. The Hurriyat would like to be the bridge builder and an active participant.The national government, however, will insist on maintaining full control of any discussions with Pakistan.

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Spoilers
Pakistan and the externally based militant groups have been alienatedby the Kashmir elections. Neither will welcome progress in relations between the state and the government ofIndia, and both will be tempted to play the spoiler's role. The political situation in Kashmir is veryfragile, and the peace constituency is passive. These are factors that militant groups can easily exploit.

Impact on the UnitedStates
In Pakistan, the long-term interests of the UnitedStates are tied to long-term stability in the country, which in turn requires viable political institutions.The path to a more stable democracy may involve messy politics in the short-term. The United States needs toengage the elected representatives and the new government and formulate a farsighted policy toward Pakistan,keeping the interplay with India and Kashmir in mind.

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In Kashmir, the United States will want to encourage India and Pakistan to createconditions in which dialogue can move forward. This will require creativity and restraint from both. The twindangers that threaten this much-needed, quiet U.S. role are the looming war in Iraq, which will absorbWashington's entire attention, and the wild card represented by the MMA's strong showing in Pakistan.

published bythe Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). 
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