The Perils of Transition

Bhutan has embarked on a process of historical transformations, and, as is the case with all great shifts in the destiny of nations, this will be fraught with tensions. The initial steps towards democracy and a realignment of relations with India have been smooth, but great challenges, uncertainty and a potential for conflict dog the future. As an editorial inKuensel, Bhutan’s government-controlled newspaper, expresses it: 

…it would be unrealistic to believe that we will maintain a harmony of views throughout the process (of democratization) and avoid conflict. We already know that there will be differences in political views among the potential leadership and among voters. The challenge is to accept those differences as a necessary and useful element of democracy… We understand today that democracy is not just elections but an entire system of values that places the responsibility of governance on the people. Our goal is not to introduce the structure of democracy but to establish a democratic government that will function well. Introducing democracy is the first step. The real goal is to make it work… 

Bhutan’s impending transformation from a monarchy to a parliamentary democracy, with the first national elections slated for 2008, will have tremendous implications for security and stability in the region. With its transformation into a democracy, the country is bound to witness a power play where both internal and external forces will seek to exercise influence on the domestic equations of power, and foreign interests could try and back political parties or manipulate electoral behaviour. Optimists would obviously like to dismiss such fears as exaggerated, but realists cannot ignore the security implications that might arise out of these rather fast-paced changes in governance in this pristine Buddhist nation of 700,000 people.

India is helping Bhutan hold its first election through a formal tie-up between the Election Commission of India and the nascent Election Commission of Bhutan. Up to 400,000 electors are to choose their representatives from 47 parliamentary constituencies, which have been defined after the completion of the delimitation process. India is set to export its ideology of democracy to Bhutan, but it remains to be seen whether the murky add-ons of Indian electoral politics – money and muscle power – also find roots in the landlocked Himalayan nation. 

In July 2006, the National Assembly passed the Bhutan Information, Communications and Media Act 2006. The Bill is expected to bring information and communication technology and media policy to help the people make informed decisions and participate in the development of the country. The Act was formulated to regulate new information and communications technologies and the media industry. It also covers privatization and competition to the establishment of media services. With private newspapers already coming up, a heady cocktail of media, politics and governance is certainly in the offing. That, too, is something that needs close monitoring.

At the same time, Bhutan is being freed to pursue its own foreign policy as well, with Indo-Bhutanese relations undergoing momentous adjustments. ‘Closest friend’ Bhutan is finally coming out of India’s shadow, with the two traditional allies signing a new India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty in New Delhi on February 8, 2007. Further, after the twogovernments exchanged the Instruments of Ratification of this Treaty in Bhutan’s capital Thimphu on March 3, 2007, the Himalayan kingdom has finally secured more autonomy in deciding its foreign and defence policies, which were tightly controlled by India for nearly 60 years in accordance with the 1949 India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty.

Bhutan’s new Oxford-educated King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, soon after signing the Treaty with India’sforeign minister Pranab Mukherjee, declared: "From a guiding role upon Bhutan's first step to modernization, we now stand as close friends and equal partners in the global arena." True, the two nations talk about a further consolidation of their friendship with this new Treaty, but matters of ‘national security’ have already come to figure on the road map of this relationship.

Media reports quoted an Indian external affairs ministry spokesman as saying after the agreement was reached that the updated treaty removed provisions that had become "obsolete" over time. "The treaty commits both countries to cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests, and not allow the use of territories for activities harmful to the national security interest of the other," the spokesman stated. Thanks to the open admission by Bhutan (unlike Bangladesh), it had become common knowledge that Northeast Indian separatist groups operated from well-entrenched bases in Southern Bhutan for more than 12 years, until they were expelled in December 2003 by a Bhutanese military assault with active support from Indian forces on the Indian side. New Delhi obviously would not like Bhutan to ignore any fresh forays by Indian separatists into the country and their operation from bases there in the future.

The most important thing to watch will be the political forces that will come into play as the 2008 elections in Bhutan draw near. A politically stable Bhutan is obviously in the interests of the country and the region. It is pertinent to recall, here, that the Indian and Bhutanese security establishments were stung when they learned about the launch of the Bhutan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) on April 22, 2003, the 133rd birth anniversary of Lenin. The BCP circulated pamphlets in the Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal and in areas inside Bhutan that revealed that the new party’s objective was to ‘smash the monarchy’ and establish a ‘true and new democracy’ (‘new democracy’ is an euphemism for one-party communist democracy) in Bhutan. This led both New Delhi and Thimphu to put the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), one of the three Indian separatist outfits operating from Bhutan at that time, under the scanner. Security agencies soon came to the conclusion that the KLO, a pro-Maoist outfit, was active and had pockets of influence in the strategic North Bengal areas of West Bengal and could act as a bridge between the Maoists guerrillas in Nepal and the newly emerging Maoist force in Bhutan. Formed on December 28, 1995, by some radical members of the Koch-Rajbongshi tribe, the KLO has been fighting to achieve a separate Kamtapurstate by carving out territories from Assam and adjoining West Bengal, where the community has a sizeable population. 

Ultimately, it could have been the emerging Maoist threat to Bhutan that may have been the key factor that provoked the then King Jigme Singhye Wangchuck to shake off his long dilemma and act decisively against Northeast Indian insurgents in the winter of 2003. Bhutan’s Ambassador in India, Dago Tshering, told this writer after military operations that he had ‘not heard of the Bhutan Communist Party.’Tshering, however, thought there was a ‘distinct possibility’ of the rebels having had a nexus with ‘certain people’ in Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal or the Maoist rebels themselves. Against this background, it would be interesting to watch if a Maoist-backed or Maoist-linked political party emerges in Bhutan or even takes part in the country’s electoral exercise. 

That would, indeed, be a drastic transformation of a nation ruled by kings for so long. 

Now that Bhutan is technically freer than before to pursue an independent foreign policy, it will also be interesting to watch thecourse of Sino-Bhutan relations in the time to come. Bhutan does not have any diplomatic ties with China, despite sharing a contiguous 470 kilometre northern boundary. Although Bhutan never had a policy of 'equi-closeness’ or 'equi-distance' vis-à-vis China, in recent years, there has been an exchange of several high-level visits. This is due largely to the direct border talks that commenced in 1984 to try and resolve several disputes. Bhutan’s border issues with China, until the 1970s, were incorporated within the scope of the Sino-Indian border dialogue. Bhutan and China have also been talking of exchange of territories for some time. It remains to be seen what the Sino-Bhutan relations lead to. For the record, Bhutan and China had signed an agreement to ‘maintain peace and tranquility’ in 1998, during the 12th round of bilateral border talks. This, incidentally, was the first Sino-Bhutanese agreement to have been inked. With China’s frenetic bid to spread its influence and establish its hold in the whole of South Asia (including building the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, although that is outside the Chinese ‘energy sea lanes’), India cannot help but keep a close watch on Beijing-Thimphu relations in the days ahead.

External factors and influences may, consequently cause significant internal strains in Bhutan, and also strain its crucial ties with India. India would also have valid concerns if hostile forces were to begin their activities from the soil of a neighbour as close as Bhutan, even if these are not even remotely supported or patronized by Thimpu. The sensitivities with which these emerging internal and external challenges are handled will determine the ease (or otherwise) of Bhutan’s transition from an idyllic kingdom to an ideal democracy. 

Wasbir Hussain is a Guwahati-based political analyst and Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal