The Moscow View Of Musharraf

There is understandable elation in Governmental and non-Governmental circles in New Delhi over many of theobservations of President Vladimir Putin of Russia relating to Pakistan and terrorism. These observations arecontained in his interviews given to a group of Indian journalists invited to Moscow before his arrival in NewDelhi, in his statements made during his visit to New Delhi from December 3 to 5, 2002, and in the jointdeclaration issued at the conclusion of his talks with the Indian leaders.

Amongst his observations which have given the most satisfaction to New Delhi are:
 

• His support to India's demand for the complete stoppage of cross-border infiltration of terrorists fromPakistan into India and the winding up of the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory, includingPakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and the Northern Areas (NA), directed against India.
  
  
• His expression of concern over the possibility of Pakistan's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) gettinginto the hands of  international terrorists and over the dangers of leakage of knowledge and expertiserelating to WMD to the terrorists, even if they don't get from Pakistan the actual weapons.

"What we are worried about is not only the fact that weapons of mass destruction could fall into thehands of bandits and terrorists.  Not only that is dangerous, but we also have concerns they (terrorists)could obtain information concerning production techniques of even simple means that could be equal to weaponsof mass destruction in their destructive potential.  We take note of the statements made by PresidentMusharraf that the military potential of his country is safely protected, strictly under control.  But,to be frank, our concerns, our anxiety still persist."

Pan-Islamic Mullahs of Pakistan such as Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, the head of the Binori madrasa ofKarachi, have had a strong influence on the thinking of  Osama bin Laden.  He and his Al Qaeda andInternational Islamic Front (IIF) have adopted as their own the disconcerting ideas and rhetoric of thepan-Islamic Mullas of Pakistan such as the Muslims' extra-territorial loyalty, non-recognition by Muslims ofnational frontiers, the need for an Islamic atomic bomb at the disposal of the Ummah, and the right and thereligious obligation of the Muslims to acquire and use WMD to protect their religion, if necessary.

The international community ought, therefore, to be concerned over the dangers of Pakistan's nucleararsenal falling into the hands of these pan-Islamic terrorists or of pro-fundamentalist elements in Pakistan'sscientific community transferring knowledge and expertise to the terrorists. 

Such fears cannot be dismissed lightly after the arrest and interrogation of two retired nuclear scientistsof Pakistan by the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) earlier this year.  The interrogationreportedly established that they had visited Kandahar before 9/11 and met bin Laden.  However, there wasno evidence to establish that their visit was in connection with bin Laden's attempts to acquire a WMDcapability.

One has some knowledge of the extent of the penetration of pro-bin Laden terrorist organisations into thePakistani Army, particularly after the arrest of Maj. Gen. Zaheer-ul-Islam Abbasi, former chief of the ISIstation in New Delhi in the late 1980s, and some other officers by the Pakistan Army in 1995 on a charge ofplotting to overthrow the Government and setting up an Islamic Government with the co-operation of theHarkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami ( HUJI), a member of the IIF.

However, one has very little idea of the extent of any penetration of pro-bin Laden elements intoPakistan's scientific community. The Pakistani media had reported in the past, without mentioning names, aboutthe presence of Pakistani scientists at the annual conventions of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), another member ofthe IIF.

The clandestine transfer of military nuclear technology from Pakistan to North Korea, with or without theknowledge of its military-intelligence establishment, underlines the dangers of a similar transfer to thepan-Islamic terrorist elements.  Moscow has particular reasons to be concerned over the dangers ofnuclearisation of terrorism because of the ruthless nature of the Chechen terrorists, who have in the pastshown a readiness, like bin Laden, to commit any act of terrorism, whatever be the number and nature ofcasualties, in order to achieve their objective. 

In 1995, they had threatened to capture a nuclear power station in Russian territory and blow it up, iftheir demands were not met.  However, they did not carry out the threat.  Their recent capture of aMoscow theatre and their threat to kill the spectators (about 800) indicated how ruthless they could be.

While taking note of Putin's fears and reservations relating to Pakistan, it has to be underlined, at thesame time, that his references to Musharraf were not without a positive note.  He was evasive toquestions from the Indian media as to whether he would characterise Pakistan as a State-sponsor of terrorismas desired by India.  He told The Hindu in his interview as follows when asked whether he wouldlabel Pakistan as a State-sponsor of terrorism:

"In recent times, President Musharraf has taken a number of resolute steps to combat terrorism. My position is that we should not put all the burden, all the blame on him for negative developments, but weshould, rather, try to stimulate him to continue this policy.  We have the right to hope that his actionswill be sincere and effective.  Otherwise, all talk on this matter would make no sense."

The fact that since 9/11, while continuing to extend strong support to India on the question of terrorismemanating from Pakistani territory and refusing to start any military supply relationship with Pakistan,Moscow has been increasing the frequency and level of its interactions with Islamabad on various issues suchas counter-terrorism, regional peace and security and exploitation of the energy resources of the CentralAsian Republics (CARs) has remained unhighlighted, if not unnoticed, in India. 

There is an increase in the exchange of official-level visits between the two capitals, there has beenspeculation of a possible visit by Musharraf to Moscow early next year, there have been reports of a Russiancompany selling dual-use helicopters to Pakistan and the two countries, without much fanfare, have set up twojoint working groups for regular interactions on terrorism and other matters of strategic interest.

On the eve of Putin's arrival in New Delhi a team of Pakistani officials led by an Additional Secretary ofits Foreign Office was in Moscow for the first meeting of the joint working group on terrorism.  Thejoint working group on strategic matters is expected to meet shortly.  Moscow's evident interest in abetter working relationship with Islamabad could be attributed to the following reasons:
 

• Pakistan's co-operation would be necessary for controlling terrorism in Chechnya and Dagestan.
  
  
• The Russian oil companies have evinced an interest in participation in the various projects presentlyunder discussion for the exit of oil and gas from the CARs through Afghanistan and Pakistan.
  

The previous Governments of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto and Mr. Nawaz Sharif and the Musharraf regime itself before9/11 had failed to act effectively against the activities of Chechen terrorists from Pakistani territory. Pakistan's Islamic fundamentalist parties had been hobnobbing with Chechen terrorist leaders and the jihadisof the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), both members of bin Laden's IIF,had been participating in the jihad in Chechnya. 

But, since 9/11, Musharraf has been more attentive to Russian concerns on this subject and some of theoperations of the Pakistani Security Forces in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) earlier thisyear were directed against the Chechen and Uzbeck dregs of the IIF.

Moscow has reasons to be concerned over the re-appearance of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar and his Hizbe-Islami inAfghanistan and over reports of their operating jointly with the Taliban and Al Qaeda against the alliedtroops in Afghanistan and the Hamid Karzai regime.  There are strong grounds for believing thatPakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), or at least sections of it, have been helping Gulbuddin, theirblue-eyed Mujahideen of the 1980s.

Moscow has equally strong reasons to be concerned over the emergence of a Government of the Islamicfundamentalist coalition in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the participation of thefundamentalists in the Government of Balochistan. 

In its election manifesto, this fundamentalist coalition had promised to step up assistance to theso-called independence movements in Palestine, Jammu & Kashmir, the Arakan area of Myanmar, southernPhilippines and Chechnya.  Many of the leaders of the coalition had in the past maintained close contactwith the Chechen terrorist leaders and given them shelter and hospitality in their madrasas.

Despite all this, Moscow does not as yet doubt Musharraf's sincerity about his commitment to acteffectively against terrorists posing a threat to Russian interests, but it does have misgivings about hisability to carry out his commitment.  In its view, in the prevailing situation in theAfghanistan-Pakistan hub, Musharraf is the best bet in the efforts of the international community to eliminateterrorism. 

It does not want to pre-judge Musharraf without giving him a chance to carry out his commitment. Moscow'sperception of Musharraf is not far different from that of Washington DC.   Despite Mr. Putin's pleasantstatements, it is apparent that Russia does not fully share India's distrust of Musharraf.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently,Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.)