I have repeatedly emphasised the fact that Pakistan's Inter-ServicesIntelligence -- as an organ of the country's military and politicalestablishment -- has been, and remains, the principal source of the impetus, theinfrastructure and the organisational networks of what is inaccurately called 'Islamist'terrorism across the world. The ISI's sinister shadow looms heavy across theattack on India's Embassy at Kabul on July 7. This has been confirmed at thehighest levels in Afghanistan, among others, by the Interior Ministry, whichissued a statement asserting that "the Interior Ministry believes thisattack was carried out in coordination and consultation with an activeintelligence service in the region" -- an obvious reference to the ISI.
It must be abundantly clear, and as clearly recognised by our policy makers andstrategists, that such attacks by Pakistan's terrorist proxies will continue --and will intensify -- against Indian targets in Afghanistan till this war hasarrived at a definitive conclusion. Many have written about Pakistan'smisconceived quest for 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan as the motive and sourceof the ISI's persistent mischief in the region. There is truth in this, but onlypart of it. The reality is, perpetuating instability and weakness in Afghanistanis an existential imperative for Pakistan -- and the reason for this lies, amongother elements, preponderantly in the defunct Durand Line.
Legally, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North-West FrontierProvince lapsed back into Afghan territory after the termination of the Treatybetween Mortimer Durand (on behalf of the British Empire) and Amir Abdur RahmanKhan of Afghanistan, signed in 1893, relinquishing control of these regions tothe British for 100 years. Since 1993, consequently, FATA and NWFP are de jureAfghan territory, though they continue to be illegally occupied by Pakistan.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has described the Durand Line as a "line ofhatred separating two brothers", and in June 2008 threatened to send Afghanforces into Pakistan to "rescue the Pashtuns in Pakistan from... crueltyand terror". Successive Afghan Governments have, in fact, rejected theDurand Line since 1949 -- but even the legal foundations of continued Pakistanioccupation of FATA and NWFP have dissipated since 1993. This confronts Islamabadwith the terrifying possibility of losing one of its four Provinces the moment astable and strong Kabul consolidates its capacities to press home its legalclaim. Consequently, promoting instability in Afghanistan is, and will remain, acritical strategic goal for the establishment in Pakistan.
India, on the other hand, remains irrevocably committed to Afghan stability andstrength, and is backing a multiplicity of development projects that impactdirectly on the country's reconstruction and on the welfare of its people. Moresignificantly, several of these projects directly impact on the Pakistanistranglehold over Afghanistan. The Zaranj-Delaram Road project, which willeventually link Afghanistan to the Iranian Port of Chabahar, is one suchcritical initiative and will relieve Afghanistan of its complete dependency onPakistan for the transit of goods -- and provide India a route to channel reliefand developmental materials to Afghanistan, currently denied by Pakistan'srefusal to concede trade and transit rights across Pakistani territory. Pakistanand its Taliban proxies also remain intractably opposed to road andinfrastructure projects because these automatically act as force multipliers forcounter-insurgency formations, improving their response time and capacities.
The conflict between the Pakistan-Taliban position, on the one hand, and theAfghan-Indian perspective, on the other, is, therefore, irreducible and no'peace processes' or 'confidence-building measures' are going to diminish thestructural contradictions that underlie violence and terrorism in the region.Nor is any diminution of India's engagement in Afghanistan a credible option.Indeed, if anything, on both humanitarian and strategic considerations, India'sinvolvement in Afghanistan can only increase.
What is required is a hard-headed look at the security of projects and theIndian presence in the country. Two aspects must dominate these concerns --first, the general security situation in the country, which has shown signs ofsteadily worsening; and, second, the security of particular areas where Indianprojects and establishments are located. It must be recognised that guaranteeingsecurity of all personnel and establishments against the possibility of bomb ormissile attacks (the Zaranj-Delaram project has been repeatedly targeted inmissile attacks) -- and particularly of suicide bomb attacks -- is extremelydifficult. Nevertheless, there are a wide range of protocols and structuralconsiderations that can enormously enhance the protection and safety ofpotential targets. The principal considerations, here, will be space andtechnology -- and no mere enhancement of manpower can suffice.
The location and construction of particular buildings and structures needs to beexpertly evaluated, and where these are found wanting from the securityperspective, necessary adjustments, and in some cases, relocation, will benecessary. The location of critical institutions -- including the Indian Embassyand Consulates -- must be evaluated in terms of available space for effectivesanitisation of the approach and perimeter. A wide range of technologies arealso available for surveillance and protection of targets, and these canenormously enhance the capacities of the security forces deployed to protectIndian institutions and installations. A measure of proactivity must also beachieved in the security arrangements, allowing a certain degree of peripheralcontrol wherever our people are located, and depending on the strategicrequirements of particular projects.
A number of detailed protocols need also to be adopted and strictly enforced.Some already exist, and most Indians working on various projects in Afghanistanhave their movements strictly curtailed to ensure protection. In some cases inthe past, these protocols have been wilfully ignored with the most unfortunateconsequences. This is what happened in the case of the telecommunicationengineer, K Suryanarayan, who ignored protocols against travelling alone, andwas kidnapped and killed by the Taliban.
In other cases, there may be actual deficiencies in protocol -- and a thoroughexamination is necessary to determine vulnerabilities. Particularly, it is notclear whether Embassy staff follow regular and easily predictable patterns ofmovement -- especially when entering or leaving the Embassy premises. From mediareports on the Embassy attack it would appear that senior officers were arrivingfor work at a fixed time, possibly in easily identifiable vehicles, which mayhave been under observation for some time.
It is necessary that policy-makers understand that when we send men intoconflict situations, there is an inevitable risk of loss of life, whateverprecautions we may take. This should not discourage us, but should, in fact,make us all the more determined to help a friendly nation and its people out oftheir present distress.
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K.P.S.Gill is former director-general of police, Punjab. He is alsoPublisher, SAIR and President, Institute for Conflict Management
