The Escape Routes

The escape of three committed terrorists involved in one of the country's most high profile politicalassassinations is not something that was simply worked out between corrupt jail staffers and the conspiringprisoners. Vast sums of money, as well as a pattern of internal and external intimidation would have beenrequired to create the conditions for the eventual breakout, and a significant network of support would alsobe needed to ensure that the escapees could evade the police dragnet once they were out. 

There is someevidence that the jail break was arranged as part of a conspiracy that involved US based elements of theBabbar Khalsa International and the Akhand Kirtani Jatha, whose coordinators provided funds and arrangedcommunications between the terrorists and their mentors in Pakistan. Simply put, it is clear that, despite theapparent absence of terrorist violence in Punjab, a surviving network of terrorism and of its supporters andsympathisers continues to exist, both within the state, and outside the country.

It is, of course, true that the ideology that inspired a decade-and-a-half of terrorism in Punjab has beenentirely rejected by the masses, and there can be no revival of the scale and intensity of terrorism thatafflicted the State through the 1980s and the early 1990s. It is nevertheless, necessary to realise that,given modern technologies of destruction, it takes very few to initiate or revive a lethal and substantiallydisruptive terrorist movement, particularly, when strong support structures for such movements exist abroad.

Despite the complete absence of popular support, it may be recalled, Pakistan was able to engineer a rashof bomb attacks on soft targets by Khalistani terrorists, which killed 55 persons between March 14 and July10, 1997. The scope for such mischief, though it constitutes no immediate and overwhelming threat to thesecurity of the state, is substantial, and can cause tragic loss of civilian lives. 

Even today, severalKhalistani terrorist leaders and some of their cadres continue to be provided safe haven in Pakistan in theexpectations that domestic circumstances would, at some point, create opportunities for the revival ofterrorism in Punjab. These include, Lakhbir Singh Rode of the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF),Paramjit Singh Panjwar, Chief of the Khalistan Commando Force - Panjawar faction (KCF-P), Gajinder Singh,Chairman, Khalistan Commando force, Ranjit Singh Neeta of the Khalistan Zindabad Force, and Wadhawa SinghBabbar of the Babbar Khalsa International. 

At no stage has Pakistan given up in its efforts to revive themilitancy in Punjab, and, for instance, over the past five years, at least five tunnels have been discoveredacross the international border, cutting under the elaborate border fence, to facilitate infiltration into thestate. The ISI is also known to have designed an automatic folding ladder to cross over the fence, and hasspecific plans to encourage infiltration of trained terrorists into the Punjab. 

There is also informationthat, in the absence of Sikh recruits, Pakistan has taken to recruiting Pakistani Punjabi Muslims, andfamiliarising them with Sikh culture, to collaborate with the various Sikh militant groups currently hosted inPakistan. There is also some intelligence on the training of Sikh youth by the ISI at huge private farmhousesin Muscat, Thailand, Dubai and Iran. Reports were also received regarding efforts by the ISI to help the BKIand the KCF-P establish bases in China, but these initiatives were reportedly thwarted by the Chinese, whowere not enthused by the project.

The problem does not end with Pakistan. The "defeated rump" of Khalistani terrorist organisationshas been widely dispersed across the world, and continues to engage in a range of activities, includingpropaganda, international political mobilisation, mobilisation of funds, and recruitment. Despite the eventsof 9/11 and the relatively hostile international environment for such enterprises, these activities continueto thrive. The BKI and the ISYF have now both been placed on the US list of terrorist organisations, but theycontinue to operate under different identities.

A significant number of listed Punjab terrorists are currently known to be residing in the US and Canada,and a number of 'Khalistani' front organisations are extremely active in lobbying, propaganda and mobilisationof funds. These organisations include the Council of Khalistan, headed by Gurmeet Singh Aulakh; the KhalistanAffairs Centre, headed by Amarjit Singh, who has a close association with the ISYF; the Sikh Youth of America,under the leadership of JS Kang, John Gill, Jasjit Singh Fauji, and others; the American Gurdwara PrabandhakCommittee, headed by Pritpal Singh, a terrorist who was involved in several operations, including the Ludhianabank robbery; the Dal Khalsa International, coordinated by Ajit Singh Pannu; the Nankana Sahib foundationTrust, headed by Ganga Singh Dhillon, who was closely associated with the Pakistan Gurdwara PrabandhakCommittee; and the World Sikh Organisation. 

Links between such elements and Sikh terrorist leaders in Pakistanhave retained their vibrancy, and these have been consolidated through linkages between the American SikhGurdwara Prabandhak Committee and the Pakistan Sikh Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee. Linkages have also beenforged between Kashmiri militant fronts in the US, and the Sikh Youth of America and Babbar Khalsa, with thelatter organisations paying out sums of money to the Kashmiri groups to target individuals identified by theSikh extremists.

A rash of similar organisations and activities extends across Europe. The two factions of the BKI (headedby Wadhawa Singh and Talwinder Singh Parmar, respectively) for instance, have a presence in UK, France,Norway, and Germany. In the UK, Mohan Singh Dhillon floated the Sikh Muslim Federation and was reported tohave visited Pakistan to arrange meetings of Muslim militants of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) with Sikhmilitants, to wage a "guerrilla war" against India. These activities and interactions are supported,encouraged and facilitated by the ISI. Top Khalistani terrorists in Indian jails maintain active contact withmany of these foreign-based groups.

Complacency and the inability to pursue and punish those who engage in terrorist activities against theIndian state has been a chronic failure in this country, and there has been little sustained effort to bringto book the many listed terrorists and their associates who operate abroad. A revival of militancy in Punjabis improbable, but not impossible, and the Indian state must constantly guard against such a possibility.Bringing the guilty of the long years of terror to justice is a necessary element of such a defence. A statethat fails persistently to punish even the worst of its criminals will eventually come to be ruled by them.

KPS Gill is President, Institute for Conflict Management and Publisher, SAIR. This article was originallypublished in The Pioneer.