The Black Widows Rule

It was a case of bargaining that went dreadfully awry. On June 4, Purnendu Langthasa and his colleague Nindu Langthasa, both politicians of the ruling Congress Party in Assam’s southern North Cachar Hills (NC Hills)district, abandoned their 16 armed guards and moved into the remote settlement of Langlai Hasnu, 65 kilometres from thedistrict headquarters town of Haflong. Their mission was to persuade the Black Widow (BW) militants to scale down an extortion demand served on the party before the June 12 AutonomousDistrict Council (ADC) polls. Discussions were held inside the house of the village headman. However, following altercations, in a completely unanticipated move, militants led Purnendu, the Chief Executive Member (CEM) of the outgoing ADC and Nindu, a former Executive Committee member of the Council, to a slope behind the house and shothim dead. In a separate development the same day, the dead body of Ajit Boro, Vice Chairman of the ADC, abducted a day earlier by unidentified militants, was recovered from the Kalajan area. In yet another case, hours before the Congress duo’s murder, BW militants shot at two civilians near a Congress office in Maibong town, mistaking them for political activists. Elections to the ADC have since been postponed.

Official sources in Haflong maintain that the killing of the Langthasa duo was a fallout of the failure to meet BW monetary demands. While the outfit had demandedRs 150 million, the slain politicians had actually carried suitcases containing currency notes amounting toRs 10 million. The BW, in a statement, on June 5, linked the killings to politics in the hillydistrict. While claiming responsibility for the killing of Purnendu and Nindu, and not that of Boro, BW ‘publicity secretary’ Phaiprang Dimasa indicated that both had offered money after failing to adhere to the demand for reservation of constituencies in the ADC polls. On April 26, the outfit had apparently asked the party to reserve three of the five newly created constituencies for BW representatives and had warned against making any attempt to "buy peace". The Congress had decided to ‘allot’ only two.

Spread over 4,890 square kilometres (6.24 percent of Assam’s total area) and with a population of 186,189 (seven percent of Assam’s population), this sparsely populateddistrict is the third largest in Assam. With a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.363, NC Hills remains part of thestate’s extended dark underbelly. Ranking a poor 11 on the HDI, among 23 districts, according to the Assam Human Development Report, 2003 (Assam now has 27districts). Geographical remoteness (the district headquarters at Haflong is 370 kilometres away fromstate capital Dispur], poor communication and a lack of infra-structural facilities continue to afflict thedistrict. The ADC, formed under Articles 244(2) and 275(1) of the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, which enumerates special provisions for administration of tribal areas, looks after the revenue administration of thedistrict. However, since its creation in 1952, personal as well as political rivalries have not allowed the ADC to realise its potential as an engine for growth and development.

Six reserve forests and vast stretches of unclassified forest areas, accounting for 4,630 square kilometres, roughly 95 percent of thedistrict’s territory, make NC Hills a veritable nightmare for the security forcesdealing with the militants. The utter lack of policing facilities has only compounded the challenges posed by nature. While Assam has a police to population ratio of 181 per 100,000 (the corresponding national average is 122) and a police density (policemen per 100 square kilometres) of 66.4 (India: 42.4), the NC Hillsdistrict has 175 police personnel per 100,000 population but, crucially, less than seven police personnel per 100 square kilometres. Incidentally, Assam, among the eight north-easternstates, has the worst police population ratio in the region.

The entire district is administered by only four Police Stations and seven ‘non-sanctioned’ police outposts. Three of these Police Stations (Haflong, Maibong and Mahur) are located in the lower half of thedistrict within a 53 kilometre radius. The fourth police station at Umrangso is in the north-western part, 93 kilometres from Haflong. Vast stretches of thedistrict’s territory thus remain entirely unpoliced, serving as free hunting grounds for the militants. Village Defence Parties function in about 400 of thedistrict’s 552 villages. However, little resistance is expected to be put up by these groups of unarmed villagers against militants brandishing an arsenal of sophisticated weapons.

Crucially, there is no police presence along NC Hills’ eastern border with both Manipur and Nagaland, allowing militants from either side several points of ingress and egress. The border outposts along the borders were withdrawn in 1994 vide astate government order. For the militants, exiting westwards to Meghalaya and southwards to the Cachardistrict, are also viable options. Intelligence sources indicated that the BW chief Jewel Garlossa could be hiding with his top lieutenants in the Meghalaya capital Shillong, after the June 4 incident. Official sources indicate that the Assamgovernment is considering a proposal to establish at least five or six new police stations in thedistrict.

Three battalions (about 3,000 personnel) of the Army and six companies (about 600 personnel) of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) are also engaged in counter-militancy operations in thedistrict. However, since, as a matter of practice, operations of all the three Forces are limited to the same areas where thedistrict Police is present, and are complementary to each other, the presence of Army and CRPF, in spite of their experience and proven superior capability, adds little to the area domination capabilities across thedistrict. Achievements in the operations, thus, remain modest. According to districtPolice sources, 12 militants have been killed and another 58 have been arrested this year, till mid-June.

Militancy, on the other hand, appears to suffer from no such shortcomings. The BW, formed in March 2003, is led by the erstwhile leader of the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD), which entered into an official ceasefire with thegovernment in January 2003. With a cadre-strength of about 300 militants, 100 of whom are believed to be armed with AK series rifles and a handful of Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) launchers, the BW has been responsible for a majority of the militancy related activities in thedistrict. About 300 DHD cadres, who are lodged in four designated camps following the ceasefire, have also often been found to have moved out of the camps to engage in extortion. Among the targets of both the BW and the DHD are the gauge conversion project of the railways, the National Highway project, projects of the North Eastern Electric Power Corporation (NEEPCO), a number of tea gardens, traders andgovernment servants.

The BW, whose strength lies in the legacy it inherited from the DHD, has been courted by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), operating in the neighbouringstate of Nagaland. Reports indicate that in exchange for a share of its funds, the Naga outfit trains and arms BW cadres. NSCN-IM facilities in Nagaland have also been used by the BW cadres during security force raids in NC Hills. Apart from the flow of finances, links with the BW help the NSCN-IM maintain a crucial level of influence in thedistrict, which forms a part of its Greater Nagaland (Nagalim) project.

The greatest advantage for militancy in NC Hills remains its localised nature. While, on several occasions, both the DHD and the BW cadres have clashed with each other and also with outfits operating in neighbouring areas, their activities have largely been restricted to the limits of three contiguousdistricts of NC Hills, Karbi Anglong and Cachar. The dominant militant outfits operating in Assam, including the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), too, do not operate in NC Hills. As a result, counter-insurgency operations in thedistrict, seen to be directed against few a hundred militants, in the absence of any larger repercussions on the security of Assam, are characterised by a certain measure of tedium and indifference, unless aggravated by a ‘major’ incident such as the one on June 4.

NSCN-IM’s shadow appears to hang heavy over the June 4 incident. Two NSCN-IM militants, ‘sergeant major’ Colombus alias Jangjing Newmai and ‘corporal’ Ango Lotha, who were arrested on June 5 in connection with the killing, not only provided details of the incident, but also of the linkages between the BW and the Naga outfit. In fact, both Colombus and Ango Lotha were overseeing the entire operation for which the BW had constituted a nine-member team. The NSCN-IM, however, has denied its involvement in the killing.

Following the June 4 killings, the Assam government rushed in additional Central Para-military Force companies into thedistrict. Such moves have become far too predictable and, given the unaltered geographical and infrastructural drawbacks that have aided militancy over the years, are not expected to deliver any significant results. Similarly, thestate government is reportedly mulling over a full-scale Army flush-out operation in the NC Hills and the neighbouring Karbi Anglongdistrict. Opinions in the Police establishment, however, favour an increase in the Police strength and infrastructure, rather than such intermittent operations by Central Forces.

The June 4 killing, according to authoritative sources in Haflong, confirmed the nexus between the local political establishment and the militants. The Police, on the other hand, complain of an absolute lack of intelligence on the militants and the problems of operating in a vacuum. With little help, apart from the customary deployment of additionalforce, coming from the powers that be, the war on militancy in this remote and neglected corner of the country, remains un-winnable.

Bibhu Prasad Routray is Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal.