Still At Sea Against Terror

The Indian peninsula has got most of its vital nerve centres, including ports, oil installations, power grids, nuclear reactors, defence establishments, trading and manufacturing hubs, and a number of major urban settlements, located along, or in close proximity to, its 7,516 kilometre long coastline. The ill-protected seashore has, over the decades, made this high priority infrastructure vulnerable to maritime subversion, resulting in a wider sense of insecurity that has currently enveloped the strategic and economic underpinnings of the country. 

While there have been only two major terrorist attacks (the serial bomb blasts of March 1993 and multiple terrorist attacks in November 2008, both of which in Mumbai) orchestrated principally using the sea route so far, the scale and magnitude of these two attacks have made them the worstthat the country has been witness to. What adds greater concern is that both these attacks targeted the country’s commercial capital. 

On March 12, 1993, 13 bombs of high intensity ripped through Mumbai, killing 257 persons and injuring above 700. The RDX used in the serial explosions was smuggled in a consignment through the sea route and eventually landed at Shekhadi in the Raigad District of Maharashtra. 15 years later, on November 26, 2008, ten Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorists came from the Pakistani port city of Karachi by boat, breaching three layers of security – Navy, Coast Guard and Coastal Police – and again attacked the county’s commercial capital, killing 166 civilians and 20 soldiers, and injuring 304 persons. 

Even as India looks to augment its internal security apparatus, including coastal security, intelligence agencies have warned that there is ample scope for replication of another terrorist attack via the sea route, with significant perceived threat to vital installations. November 2008 intelligence intercepts of cross-border communications of the LeT revealed that Pakistan-based terrorists havenow shifted focus from traditional infiltration routes through Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Nepal and Bangladesh to India’s maritime boundaries. 

In addition, global intelligence agencies have also been warning of terrorist attacks on India through the sea route. A declaration, in February 2007, inal-Battar, an online journal associated with Al Qaeda, issued an exhortation for maritime strikes. While there was no mention specifically of South Asia, Indian officials said there are already increasing fears of anti-India groups infiltrating into or carrying out an attack along India's extensive coastlines, especially after the reduction in militant infiltration and attacks in J&K. Beyond the Indian waters, the threat emanates across the seas in the Indian Ocean region. The maritime threat perception to oil supply remains high in the country, with intelligence agencies warning that militants could attack oil supplies to India, through pipelines beneath the sea water coming from West Asia or at Bombay High. 

Since 26/11, there have been repeated intelligence warnings that terrorists may target vital installations from the sea. In February 2009, for instance, intelligence agencies had warned sixstate governments against LeT strikes on power grids and hydro-electric projects across the country. In March 2009, intelligence sources again warned that the Bhakra Nangal Dam, located on the Punjab-Himachal Pradesh border, was on the radar of terrorist outfits, including that of the LeT. While the dam faces no direct threat from the sea, it is likely that the huge amounts of explosives required to blast the dam would likely be smuggled through the sea, as the land borders in the region are well fenced and amply patrolled. Consequently, security was beefed up around the vital installation. 

But these threats are not new. In November 2006, the then home minister, Shivraj Patil, had alerted security agencies that Indian nuclear power plants were highly vulnerable to attempts by terrorists to occupy some uninhabited islands and use them as bases for attacks along the coasts. Patilhad also said that some LeT operatives were being specifically trained for sabotage of oil installations and these militants had decided to use sea routes to infiltrate into India. Saying that his assessment was based on intelligence outputs, Patilhad added that the terrorists "planned to induct arms and ammunition through the sea route and installations of oil and natural gas sector, defence, communications and IT sector are equally vulnerable." He disclosed that terrorists were reportedly collecting information about the location of various refineries on or near the Indian coastline in a new strategy of widening their spheres of influence. He confirmed that the targets also included the Nagarjuna Sagar Dam and Goa Shipyard. 

Addressing the issue in the Parliament, defence minister A.K. Antony said in March 2007 that there were "reports about terrorists of various tanzeems (groups) being trained and (the) likelihood of their infiltration through sea routes". Again, addressing the Rajya Sabhain May 2007, the then minister of state for home,  Sriprakash Jaiswal, stated that Pakistan-based terrorist groups, particularly the LeT, were exploring possibilities of infiltrating their agents, arms and ammunition into India through the sea route. 

A number of arrested LeT terrorists have also revealed the infiltration of militants using the sea route to target vital economic and strategic installations. On July 13, 2006, Police at Kutch in Gujarat arrested two LeT cadres, identified as Abdul Khaliq Tayyab and Abdul Gafoor Qasim Chaba, both Pakistani nationals, withRs 2.4 millions in fake currency and a Global Positioning System device. The duo confessed during interrogation that their trip was part of a series of dry runs on the Karachi-Mandvi and Karachi-Jhakhau sea routes being conducted by their handlers. They also disclosed that their handlers had established a network of local fishermen who were paid INR 500,000 each time they landed a consignment on Indian shores. 

The defence of the coast in India is the responsibility of the Navy and Coast Guard operating under the Ministry of Defence, but, as one commentator notes,

…formulating maritime policy is lost in a bureaucratic labyrinth. In addition to the eight coastal states and four Union territories, there are currently 12 ministries and eight departments of the Central Government involved in maritime-related policy formulation and implementation. This results in overlapping responsibilities and inability to provide quick decisions and responses. 

After 26/11 exposed such gaps in coastal security, the union government, on February 28, 2009, designated the Navy as the central authority responsible for the country's overall maritime security. "The Navy will be assisted by Coast Guard, state marine police and central agencies for the coastal defence of the nation,"defence minister A.K. Antony said at Kochi, "Against the backdrop of multiple agencies involved in coastal security, and the resultant problems of coordination, the Navy has been designated as the authority responsible for maritime security." 

The government has also reportedly decided to set up Joint Operation Centres at Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Kochi and Port Blair under the charge of Naval commanders-in-chief. Antony also said a national command control communication and intelligence network, for real time maritime domain awareness between the operations rooms of Navy and Coast Guard, would be established at both the field and the apex levels. 

It is not clear whether these steps will address the glaring weaknesses in the implementation mechanism of coastal security. Reports indicate that theunion government has tried to enforce the Marine Fishing Regulation Act (MFRA) since 1993-94, allocatingRs 251 million between 1995 and 2007, to procure 26 patrol boats for patrolling exclusive fishing zones in the first 12 miles of the coastline of eightstates. After 15 years of the launch of the MFRA plan, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), in its report submitted to theunion government in October 2008, declared that the plan had been largely unfruitful. 

The CAG report stated that centre gave Rs 44 million to Maharashtra for four patrol boats in 1995. Boats were constructed but not used for surveillance due to thestate government’s unwillingness to bear the costs of operation and maintenance. And in May 2006, the boats were declared un-seaworthy. 

Further, the centre gave funds for two boats, at Rs 5 million each, to Goa in 1998. The work order for one boat was awarded in October 2001 but no boats have been delivered so far. In the last 10 years, Andhra Pradesh acquired "Sagar Rakshak-I and II" for surveillance of its coast, spending INR 18 million. The boats were, however, not used for the intended purpose and, in February 2006, thestate government sought the centre's permission to dispose off the boats, citing lack of funds for operation. 

The centre released Rs 22 million for two patrol boats to Karnataka in between 1994-95 and 1996-97, but thestate refunded the money in March 2003, expressing inability to bear the operational and maintenance cost. Kerala received INR 63 million for six boats, and constructed five, but has kept theunion government unaware of their use for the purpose of surveillance. Rs 18 million was given to Orissa in three phases between 1993-94 and 2006 for construction of two boats, but thestate government expressed inability to bear the running and maintenance cost. Tamil Nadu spentRs 45 millions to construct five patrol boats, which were lying unutilised at the Chennai harbour. In 2006, three of these were declared un-seaworthy while two had earlier been destroyed in the Tsunami in 2004. West Bengal receivedRs 36 million for four patrol boats but, after construction, refused to deploy them for surveillance, pleading a lack of operational funds. The State also approached the Border Security Force (BSF) and Coast Guard to take the boats for their operations, a proposal that was rejected by the BSF. 

The MFRA plan was followed by another coastal security scheme that was launched by theunion government for nine coastal states (Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal) and fourunion territories (Puducherry, Lakshadweep, Daman & Diu, and Andaman & Nicobar Islands) in 2005-06. After three years of the scheme, theministry of home affairs (MHA), in its review in January 2008, found that only 47 out of 73 sanctioned coastalpolice stations were operational. 

And in February 2008, another government assessment by the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) showed that infrastructure build up had been tardy and coastal patrolling-- "the core issue in the implementation of the Coastal Security Scheme" -- was yet to start, due to the unavailability of boats (204 were sanctioned). According to the NSCS, an interim measure to hire boats for a temporary period could not be implemented due to thestates’ unwillingness to pay for operational costs. 

In 2005, the union government approved another coastal security scheme called Operation Swan, envisaging a three-layered security blanket through joint patrolling along the most vulnerable coasts of Maharashtra and Gujarat by the Navy,state police and customs forces. The central objective was to safeguard India’s territorial waters along the nine coastalstates and four union territories. Operation Swan envisaged a three-layered security blanket:

The first involved joint patrolling along the coasts of Maharashtra and Gujarat by the Navy,state police and customs forces. The next was setting up 73 coastal policestations, 97 check-posts, 58 outposts and 30 barracks, with the cost to be borne by the omnibuscoastal security scheme. The third part was to be financing security support to littoral states by thecentre. 

The MHA’s outcome budget for 2007-08 conceded that there had been a delay in implementation of the scheme. The main cause was identified as the cancellation by thedefence ministry of the Goa Shipyard Limited’s contract for procurement of coast guard interceptor boats. "This was due to the high cost quoted by the shipyard," the MHA report noted. 

While no single coastal security plan has reached its target so far, the existing coastal security forces-- the Navy and Coast Guard -- have failed to secure the sea shore due to the acute insufficiency of men and material. The Coast Guard faces acute deficits, with an authorised strength of just 106 vessels and 52 aircrafts. A significant proportion of these are not operational, and currently seaworthy vessels are just 92 ships, while 45 aircrafts are in use. Several crucial procurements, including hovercrafts and fast patrol boats, remain pending with theministry of defence. 

In 2007, a parliamentary committee on defence blamed the ministry for not acquiring the requisite number of vessels over the years. Pointing out the most serious problem, aparliamentary panel noted that there was a gap in the surveillance capability of both the Navy andCoast Guard due to lack of aerial platforms and vital surveillance equipments, including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, long range surveillance aircraft and medium range maritime Dornier aircraft. 

The Coast Guard’s western region, which polices the sensitive 3,300 kilometre coastline between Gujarat and Kerala, has a fleet of just 14 ships of various sizes and eight surveillance aircraft while one report suggests that it actually needs at least 50 ships and 36 aircraft. Neither the Coast Guard nor the Navy, moreover, reportedly has the authority to stop and search merchant vessels-- that is the sole prerogative of the Director-General of Shipping, a shore-based bureaucrat with no personnel or ships. 

After 26/11, a series of new measures have been approved. These include: Multi Purpose National Identity Cards for all fishermen and people in coastal villages; development of special transponders for boats and trawlers by the Indian Space Research Organisation; a new uniform licensing system for boats across coastalstates; a Rs 68 billion plan envisaging a special 1,000-strong Sagar Prahari Bal (Sea Guarding Force) together with 80 fast boats for protection of Naval assets and other vital coastal installations. 

The plan also includes the establishment of a Coastal Command and a Maritime Security Advisory Board, with nine additional Coast Guard stations, static radar and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) chain all along the shoreline. AIS transponders are proposed for some 300,000 crafts below 300 tonnes at a cost ofRs one billion. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) only prescribes transponders for vessels over 300 tonnes. 

26/11 has prompted the union and state governments to announce a series of policy measures intended to modernise and improve the coastal security apparatus. Most of these are still to be implemented. Regrettably, past experience has shown that implementation remains tardy and inefficient, leaving many gaps which the terrorists have exploited. It can only be hoped that the biggest gap in India’s security-- the inefficiency of administration -- will be overcome this time around, and that a measure of urgency will attend the implementation of current plans for a stronger coastal security system. 

Asutosha Acharya is Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal