SNAFU Station

"In the face of a more powerful enemy a war could nevertheless be wonif one has the patience to avoid seeking decision until the enemy's frustrationand exhaustion robs him of the chance of victory."

Mao Tse Tung

The charade of peace talks has finally ended in Andhra Pradesh after nearlyten months of a purported truce, with just one unsuccessful round of talksbetween the Naxalites (Left Wing extremists) and the state government on October15, 2004. Finally, on April 4, 2005, emissaries of the Left Wing extremistgroups in Hyderabad announced their decision to pull out of the process. 

Addressing a Press Conference, Kalyan Rao, Gaddar and Varavara Rao, whom theCommunist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist) had nominated, and Chandranna,the CPI-ML-Janashakthi representative, accused the Andhra Pradesh government ofexecuting 'fake encounters' and of carrying out combing operations, and statedthat the atmosphere was no longer conducive for peace talks. 

This announcement was just a formality. On January 17, 2005, Ramakrishna andAmar, 'state secretaries' of the CPI-Maoist and Janashakthi respectively, hadalready declared they were no longer keen to continue with the talks.

On June 16, 2004, the Congress Party led Andhra Pradesh governmenthaddeclared a ceasefire with the declared intention to end bloodshed and reachcommon ground with the extremists who were depicted as 'homegrown boys','prodigal sons' and 'our own people'. There was every indication throughout thistruce period that the extremists continued to work to bolster their strengthvis-à-vis the state, while the state committed 'tactical harakiri'.

Open source data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Managementdemonstrates that, in year 2004, fatalities in Naxalite violence totaled 88 [42civilians, 3 security force (SF) and 43 Naxalites] as against where 280 in 2003;191 in 2002, and 311 in 2001. The first three months of 2005, however, havealready seen 116 deaths (50 civilians, 11 security forces and 55 Naxalites); atrend that threatens to escalate as the year goes by. There have been 27encounters reported between security forces and Naxalites in this period alone,with incidents involving Naxalites reported from 19 out of the State's 23districts. All 23 districts in the state have, for some time now, been affectedby Naxalite activity.

Naxalite consolidation through the period of the talks has been confirmed byofficial quarters. In March 2005, Andhra Pradesh Director General of Police (DGP)Swaranjit Sen stated that the hardcore fighting strength of the Naxalites in thestate was an estimated 700; through the ceasefire, it grew to between 1,100 and1,200. 

In addition to cadre augmentation, the CPI-Maoist has been judiciouslyaltering its political and military structure to streamline its functioning. K.Srinivas Reddy noted in The Hindu on February 25, 2005, 

"Having succeeded in 'reclaiming' domination over several areas in Telengana districts during the 'peace time', the Maoists are now putting in place a comprehensive plan to make Telengana the beacon of revolutionary movement again… Plans are also afoot to galvanize the otherwise dormant militant network in Telengana in addition to formation of front organisations to mobilise women, students, coal miners and the peasantry. On the military side, the Maoists have already formed at least eight Local Guerrilla Squads (LGSs) in the five North Telangana districts, which had (earlier) been wound up as part of a tactical withdrawal of forces in view of a severe crackdown by the police." 

Another commentator, M.V. Subramanyam, observes, 

"the CPI-Maoist has formed 30-member 'platoons' in the State, by re-organising Special Guerrilla Squads. Ten-member dalams (squads) have been re-organised into sections and a strategy has been evolved to organise mass attacks by platoons and individual attacks by sections."

The March 11 Naxalite attack on the Chilakaluripet Police Station in Gunturdistrict (seen as revenge for the March 7 encounter at Manali in Nizamabaddistrict in which 10 Maoists were killed) highlights the strategy being preparedover the months to target police stations. Documents seized from Naxalites,during the ceasefire period, including the January 16 seizure at Kamaram villagein Warangal District, first exposed the plans to attack police stations.

The recent attacks have also shown the emergence of greater co-operationamong the erstwhile People's War Group (PWG) and Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)cadres after their merger in September 2004. A new trend is now emerging, withexceptional brutality involved in the killings, which intelligence officialsbelieve is the consequence of increasing numbers of MCC cadres from Bihar beinginvolved in the local teams. 

Thus, a senior Police official in Hyderabad was quoted by the DeccanChronicle: 

"in the Chilakaluripet incident, they axed police personnel to death apart from firing at them. The barbaric nature of the killing is the trademark of the MCC's violent activities. Also, MCC is given to attacking others apart from targets, which is not a common practice by the People's War."

There is also reciprocity in this functioning as, prior to the assemblyelections in Bihar and Jharkhand in February this year, reports citing BiharHome Department sources stated that a group of armed Naxalites from AndhraPradesh were camping in Bihar to help their counterparts.

This 'outsourcing of terror' is not just limited to Bihar and Jharkhand, butalso to the neighbouring states of Orissa (the Koraput attacks on February 6,2004) and to Karnataka, with the recent killing of seven police personnel andone civilian at Venkammanahalli under Pavagada Revenue Division of the TumkurDistrict on February 11, 2005. 

The Karnataka governmenthas reportedly identified 33 police stations spreadacross 10 districts in the state as "hypersensitive and vulnerable" toattack by the extremists. Of these, 23 are spread across seven districts thatborder Andhra Pradesh. Meanwhile, on March 8, 2005, Tamil Nadu Chief MinisterJayalalitha stated that security had been strengthened along the state's bordersto stop infiltration of Naxalites from Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka into TamilNadu.

The extremist threat is no longer confined to rural areas, as the Naxaliteleadership appears to have set its eyes on major cities as well. Reports suggestthat the CPI-Maoists are planning a 'big action' in New Delhi to capture thenation's attention. Senior CPI-Maoist leader, K. Seshagiri Rao alias Gopanna,arrested on March 8 at Rajahmundry, revealed that the group's 'centralcommittee' had entrusted this mission to Patel Sudhakar Reddy alias Suryam andTakkelapalli Vasudeva Rao alias Ashanna, both prime suspects in the October 2003assassination attempt on the then Andhra Chief Minister, Chandrababu Naidu, atAlipiri.

The police have not been idle over this period, and their strategy in AndhraPradesh has ranged from strengthening the informer network, surrender schemesfor freshly-recruited Naxalites, and the merging of police stations to make themstronger and more effective. In reply, the Naxalites have targeted Policeinformers as well as surrendered Naxalites; in the first three months of 2005,of the 50 civilians killed, at last 10 were former Naxalites and eight were'informers'.

In a radical departure from the past, the Indian Army at its CommandersConference on April 6-7, 2005, discussed the threat of Naxalism for the veryfirst time. The Army Chief, General Joginder Jaswant Singh, asserted, "Anyindication of something not going well in the country concerns us directly. Wewill try to nip the evil in the bud." He added further that the Army waslikely to extend support to the police and paramilitary forces in counteringNaxalite violence.

The folly of Indian policy makers, however, lies in not recognizing thedifference between a 'bud' stage and a 'bloom' stage! In November 2003, thenumber of districts affected by Naxalism was stated to be 55 across nine states.This increased to 170, spread across 15 states by February 2005. If this is the'bud' stage, it is difficult to imagine what would happen when Naxalism'blooms'. 

This lack of vision and clarity in policies has percolated down to the groundlevel, incapacitating and confusing the footsoldiers, who bears the brunt ofanti-state violence. An example of this strategic incoherence was played out inthe Nallamala forests in Andhra Pradesh on February 3, 2005, when about 2,000elite Greyhound commandos cordoned off a CPI-Maoist hideout and zeroed in on 'statesecretary' Ramakrishna and a number of other leaders and cadre, but refrainedfrom opening fire as Home Minister Jana Reddy ordered the troops to 'exerciserestraint'. Ramakrishna was subsequently allowed to escape the dragnet.Ironically, the state governmenthas now ordered major operations in theNallamala forest to 'flush out' Ramakrishna, and a major exercise is currentlyongoing.

Surprisingly, DGP Swaranjit Sen on March 24, 2005, ruled out any possibilityof re-imposing the ban on the Naxal groups in the State, saying it would becounterproductive. "It does not alter the basic situation. What will happenin a ban situation is that the Maoists will go into a cocoon. We won't know moreabout them as we are getting to know now….Ultimately it is possible that theymay strengthen themselves. So I feel a freer atmosphere is better," hesaid.

On February 13, 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, speaking at Ranchi inJharkhand, had stated that the centre would soon come out with a 'comprehensivestrategy' to cope with the Naxalite problem. Even as the centre and stategovernments like Andhra Pradesh grope for strategy in their self-inflictedperplexity, the CPI-Maoist has articulated a succinct plan of action. In theNovember 2004 edition of the People's March, Ganapathy, 'General Secretary' ofthe CPI-Maoist, reiterated in an interview,

"Depending on the specific characteristics of the Indian revolution, we decided that the path of revolution is that of protracted people's war. That is by first setting up Base Areas in the backward areas and spreading these to the other areas and thereby ultimately encircling the cities from the countryside. So, it is according to this strategic understanding alone that work must be done in any area, whether forest, plain or urban."

As clarity confronts confusion, the current year threatens to be thebloodiest in the unending 'People's War', both in Andhra Pradesh and other partsof the country. It is India's irresponsible political leadership - with theAndhra Pradesh Chief Minister's ill-conceived 'peace initiative', encouragedenthusiastically by the Home ministry at Delhi as the most visible exemplars ofits suicidal blindness - that has created the grounds for this tide of violence.

Regrettably, as more and more lives - including those of civilians and SFpersonnel - are lost, there is no reason to believe that anyone in the politicalleadership is ever going to be called to account.

Saji Cherian is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal