Polarised Vote

The results of Sri Lanka's presidential election of 17November 2005, as officially announced on the following day, indicated thatMahinda Rajapakse, the Prime Minister, had edged out his rival RanilWickremesinghe, the leader of the parliamentary Opposition, by a margin of lessthan two percentage points, having secured a bare 0.29 per cent above themandatory 50 per cent of the total of valid votes required for a contestant tobe declared the president.

Rajapakse, nominated by his party, the People’s Alliance(PA) which is headed by the outgoing President Chandrika Kumaratunga, had thebacking of the Janathâ Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, the main ‘Left’party in Parliament); the Jâthika Hela Urumaya (JHU, theparliamentary representation of which consists entirely of Buddhist monks); theEelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP), the arch rival of the LiberationTigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Tamil segment of Sri Lankan politics; and amedley of other organisations claiming to represent Left-oriented orethnicity-related interests.

Similarly, Wickremasinghe, the nominee of the United NationalFront (UNF), headed a broad coalition of parties that included the Sri LankaMuslim Congress (SLMC, the largest party of the Muslim community thatconstitutes seven per cent of the total electorate); and the Ceylon Workers’Congress (CWC) and one of its splinter groups, the leaders of which mobilise thesupport of the so-called ‘Indian Tamils’ (the ethnic sub-group accountingfor about 6 per cent of the electorate, living mainly in the highland plantationareas). The overall voter turnout was 73.7 per cent. The campaign and the pollwere remarkably free of electoral malpractices and violence.

The campaign themes of both contestants had an almostexclusive focus on the ‘national question’ and the ‘economy’ – theformer embracing a variety of issues that converge on the quest for a solutionto Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict, and the latter focusing on the main challengesof development among which acceleration of growth, alleviation of poverty,reduction of unemployment and curtailment of inflation were accorded highpriority. It was in respect of the ‘national question’ that there were morepronounced contrasts in the stances of the two candidates.

Rajapakse, while declaring commitment to a search for an"honourable peace", pledged to safeguard the unitary nature of the SriLankan state. He maintained that the peace efforts must involve broad-basedparticipation and not be confined to bilateral negotiations between the governmentand the LTTE, and refuted both the LTTE claim of being the sole representativeof the Tamils of Sri Lanka, as well as the notion of an ‘exclusive Tamilhomeland’ comprising the country's Northern and Eastern provinces.

On prominent controversies of the recent past, Rajapakserejected the Norway-authored blueprints for an ‘Interim Self-governmentAuthority’ for the north-east, and for a Post-Tsunami Operations ManagementStructure (P-TOMS), on the grounds that their implementation would bestowofficial recognition and formal powers of government on the LTTE to the negationof the tenets of democracy.

On the frequently violated terms of the government-LTTEceasefire of February 2002, Rajapakse stressed the need to re-negotiate theterms of that agreement. These, while conforming to the policy stances that hadbeen advocated all along by the JVP and the JHU, with which Rajapakse hadentered into electoral agreements at the commencement of his campaign for thepresidency (evidently without the formal sanction of his own party), deviated inmany respects from those advocated by President Kumaratunga, the leader of hisparty.

"Defeat Secessionism" was the misleadinglybelligerent rubric Wickremesinghe adopted for his essentially pacifist approachto the ‘national question’. Making a distinction between a ‘unitary’ anda ‘united’ Sri Lanka, the prime objective he claimed to pursue was that ofunifying the nation already divided. For this he sought a popular mandate tooffer the LTTE scope for extensive power-sharing within the framework of afederal constitution. He premised this policy stance on the belief (disregardingevidence to the contrary) that the LTTE leaders have indicated their willingnessto accept devolved power as an alternative to secession.

Throughout his election campaign, Wickremesinghe ardentlydefended the ceasefire agreement forged during his tenure as Prime Minister(December 2001 to April 2004), trivialising the increasingly frequent violationsof that agreement by the LTTE. His campaign rhetoric concerning the quest forpeace, though intended to persuade the ‘nationalists’ in the Sinhalesesegment of the electorate to his view that Sri Lanka has no option other thanthat of seeking a compromise with the LTTE, was also primarily aimed atattracting the support of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA, a group of partiesrepresented in parliament by 18 members operating under LTTE control), Tamilvoters in mainstream politics, and, hopefully, the endorsement of the Tigerleadership.

The economic policies advocated by the two candidates hadcertain differences at least in relative emphasis. For example, the JVP platformthat backed Rajapakse often promoted the concept of a "balancedeconomy" (as distinct from an "open economy") which probablymeant the imposition of government restrictions on the private sector, areversal of processes that had hitherto been associated with economicliberalization (such as privatisation of state-owned enterprises and curtailmentof government sponsorship of social welfare), and the enhancement of governmentsponsorship of community-based economic activities of the peasantry.

The policy package offered by Wickremesinghe, in contrast,emphasised the need for greater orientation of the economy towards the freemarket, modernising peasant agriculture, promoting advanced technology, andattracting foreign aid and investment. For the elevation of living standards andfor poverty alleviation, the pledges of both candidates were similar in thatthey offered more jobs, higher wages and employment benefits, better publicutilities and welfare services, doles, subsidies, price controls, productionincentives etc., all of it in a frenzied effort to outbid each other for votersupport.

The results of the election suggest that it was thecontrasting stances of the two candidates on the ethnic conflict (rather thantheir economic pledges) that had an overwhelmingly decisive impact on voteralignments. The overall pattern discernible in the related data could besketched out as follows:

• In the predominantly Sinhalese-Buddhist rural areas of the country, voter turnout approximated or exceeded 80 per cent, and Rajapakse usually secured the support of a clear majority, often of over 60 per cent.
  
  
• In areas of mixed ethnicity, and/or where the Tamil voter turnout was high, Wickremesinghe obtained a distinct majority of the vote. Thus, for instance, in the five electorates of the ‘Colombo City’ constituency, where Tamils and Muslims account for 58 per cent of the population, in all electorates of the main plantation areas of the central highlands (where the CWC controls the alignment of plantation workers who constitute 25-50 per cent of the total of voters), and in the predominantly Tamil electorates of the eastern littoral, Wickremesinghe’s share of the vote exceeded 60 per cent, reaching, in several instances, proportions in excess of 70 per cent.
  
  
• The relatively higher levels of support for Wickremesinghe in urban areas could also be attributed to the favourable response of those in trade and commerce (which includes a large segment of the Muslim community) to his economic policies. Colombo's ‘Business Moguls’, including those controlling private media firms, remained fiercely opposed to the ‘radical’ elements of Rajapakse’s economic policy package and hence gave strong support to Wickremesinghe.

A week before the election the LTTE/TNA called for itsboycott. On the day of the poll, the LTTE proceeded further along this courseand prevented the inhabitants of the areas under its control from exercisingtheir vote. There was, consequently, no polling in Jaffna District, and a lowvoter turnout in the districts of Vanni and Batticaloa. The disruption ofelections by insurrectionary groups is, of course, not a novel phenomenon in SriLanka . ........

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[Note: At the presidential polls of 1994 and 1999, the voterturnout in other districts exceeded 75%. In 1988, low turnout rates were alsorecorded in the southern districts of Hambantota, Matara and Galle as a resultof disruptions caused by the JVP-led insurrection of that time.]

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Indeed, since the early 1980s, there has never been acountry-wide poll free of such disruption. Nevertheless, in the context ofWickremesinghe’s policy of appeasement (which had involved, among otherthings, the maintenance of silence on any atrocity committed by the Tigers, andpermitting foreign benefactors of the LTTE to violate Sri Lanka’ssovereignty), its boycott decision was not merely an unexpected adverse turn ofprospects, but the decisive factor in the eventual outcome of the poll. Had itnot been for the LTTE sabotage in the north, Wickremesinghe would certainly havebeen elected the President.

Spokesmen for the LTTE have rationalised the boycott on thebasis of their dissatisfaction with the policy pronouncements of bothcandidates. A somewhat more plausible explanation lies in the propaganda valueof the boycott, representing as it does both a show of power as well as areiteration of their dissociation from the politics of Sri Lanka. Some criticshave also attributed the boycott to the Tigers’ uncertainty about theircapacity to rig the election in favour of their preferred candidate in the waythey did at the parliamentary elections of April 2004. According to yet anotherinterpretation the boycott was intended to ensure Wickremesinghe’s defeat andthus undermine his increasing personal popularity among the Tamils.

The aftermath of the election is unlikely to be featured by amajor change in the state of the ethnic conflict unless there is a majorcalamity which, given past experiences, can never be ruled out. The probablescenario of the period ahead is a continuation of the uneasy truce and thestalemate in peace negotiations, alongside brinkmanship and sporadic acts ofterrorism. Nor is it realistic to anticipate significant changes in the state ofthe economy.

In the political scene, however, one could expect someinteresting changes, one of which is the possibility of presidentKumaratunga’s exit marking the end of the Bandaranaike dynasty. In the courseof the election campaign, relations between the President and her Prime Ministerwere less than cordial. Following her failure to mobilise support from withinthe PA for an anti-Rajapakse onslaught (making an issue of his alliance with theJVP and the JHU), Kumaratunga made several moves to jeopardise Rajapakse’scampaign.

In these she received the fullest cooperation of her brother,Anura Bandaranaike, whom she had manoeuvred into a hypothetical party post of‘Prime Minister designate’ and, thus, Rajapakse’s "runningmate". With these estranged relations, it now seems improbable that Anurawill be appointed Prime Minister or even retained in his present post of ForeignMinister. Among the other possible casualties in the formation of the newcabinet is the Minister of Finance.

The UNF has yet to recover from the stunning LTTE blow thatdenied Wickremesinghe the presidency. When the party does take stock, it seemslikely that sympathy and commiseration for the defeated leader will drownpossible criticism for his culturally incongruous persona and blunders ofcampaign strategy. In the absence of leaders of comparable stature in its ranks,the party will also ignore the fact that, despite the enormous resources at hisdisposal, the exclusive support from the country’s economic elite, and thestrong external endorsement, Wickremesinghe has led the party to defeat at fournational polls. Hence there will be no purges within the UNF, and Wickremesinghewill continue as the leader of the party. It will also persist with the myth ofits own making about the LTTE’s willingness to abandon secessionism and accepta federal solution.

The role of the SLMC and the CWC in the period ahead haselements of uncertainty. Throughout the recent decades, their leaders have had arecord of making successful deals with the leaders of one or the other of themain parties in office and securing for themselves enormous personal benefit andpositions of power.