Pokhran II And After

Whether or not the Indian tests are as significant as the collapse of the Berlin wall,they undoubtedly changed the nature of the international non-proliferation game as well asthe structure of international security, especially Asian security. It undermined thesmugness of the 'international community'-- more than 170 states and the P-5 nuclearpowers -- which felt secure in the belief that the NPT with its indefinite extension hadput the nuclear proliferation issue to rest in the world. India's testing was a rude shockto those who felt that further proliferation could be contained by aggressivenon-proliferation measures. India's tests brought out the reality that the Westernattitude of marginalizing India in world affairs was wrong, as well as patronizing andarrogant, and nuclear testing as well as nuclear weaponry was still a currency ofinternational power and prestige. The fault line all along in the NPT system was that thetreaty was publicized as a bargain between t renunciation of nuclear arms by thenon-nuclear states and the eventual disarmament of the nuclear powers. Given a choicebetween nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence, the P-5 powers were inevitably likelyto choose the latter, and use the fig leaf of nuclear arms reduction as a sign of a moveto 'eventual disarmament'. India's tests exposed the fraud inherent in the publicrelations of the P-5. So even though India's test did not alter the distribution ofmilitary power between, say, India and the USA, it exposed the carefully orchestratedarchitecture of deceptive Western diplomacy which had accompanied the projection ofnon-proliferation as a shared value and interest of the 'world community'. By creating anew situation, India's tests enlarged the number of nuclear weapon states. The new groundreality became a source of permanent friction with the provisions of the NPT. By openlychallenging the NPT norm against further proliferation, India also showed that the nucleartaboo against further proliferation --which had lasted from 1964 to 1998 -- could bebroken by a poor, marginal, post-colonial state. The outrage in international reactionsreflected an understanding of the psychological impact of the Indian challenge to theauthority of the P-5 nations. At issue in the condemnatory international reactions was theability of India to revisit the international non-proliferation agendas by widening thecracks in the existing fault lines. Furthermore, India was rewriting the strategic agendathrough bilateral negotiations with the US, China, Pakistan, and others. Here the emphasiswas on a 'security dialogue' rather than the 'global non-proliferation norm'. India wasnot rejecting non-proliferation. It was insisting that Indian nuclear restraint could notbe taken for granted, and it could not be achieved unless Indian strategic interests wereaccommodated by the P-5 states, especially China and the US. This way, India wasreaffirming nuclear non-proliferation but it was also making it difficult for the P-5states and their associates (for example Canada and Japan) from fencing off securityinterests of others from the global non-proliferation norm. Thus, the outrage ininternational reactions reflected the discomfort the practitioners felt about being boxedinto a set of two dilemmas: (1) the deterrence-disarmament dilemma; and (2) the globalnon-proliferation-national security dilemma. The international reactions showed thestruggle in dealing with these dilemmas.

One set of reactions showed a preoccupation with the building of a globalnon-proliferation regime. This is a favourite activity and a source of employment for manywestern arms controllers who have life-long investments in this area, and hence havepersonal and institutional stakes in non-proliferation and proliferation. Another set ofreactions, especially by China, showed a preoccupation with the breakdown of its carefullylaid strategic plan to contain and encircle India and to win without fighting.

The proactive, forward-looking international reactions as well as the negativereactions pave the way for our assessment of the real impact of the Indian tests. Theseelements make up the balance sheet. This is emerging as the basis of the strategicdiscourse between India and the powers, and among Indians. The P-5 and the G-8condemnations are not the last word on the subject from the world community. The negativereactions could not undo the reality of two new nuclear powers. At the same time, thenegative reactions created an opportunity for India and her international interlocutors tofence off the nuclear bomb controversy and to find ways to secure Indian (and Pakistani)nuclear restraint. In this sense, the negatives and the positives should not be viewed aspolarized dichotomies. The two polarities were interactive and dynamic. The likelihood ofa shift in the balance from the negative to the positive side of the equation depended onthe strategic interests and the skill of the Indian and foreign practitioners. Our reviewof the negatives and the positives is based on this perspective. The first negative wasthe public condemnations by the P-5 and G-8 countries and some NAM countries (especiallySouth Africa) of India's tests. This revealed that international opinion did not have apositive view of India in general and it lacked an understanding of Indian strategicproblems and dilemmas. Even though India had a good case for its nuclear and missile testsin view of the Pakistani, Chinese, and American provocations vis-a-vis India, and eventhough the 'world community' had failed in the past fifty years to achieve real nucleardisarmament (as opposed to arms reductions), the negative effects of regional andinternational developments on Indian security were either ignored or they were dismissedor downplayed. A contributory element to the build-up of the negative international stancewas that the Indian diplomacy and Indian information service did not develop an effectivepublic relations strategy since the Nehru years. Indian diplomatic and politicalpractitioners constantly spoke about peace, disarmament, and non-violence rather thanmilitary power and economic strength as the twin pillars of Indian security. Byoverplaying the theme of Indian utopianism in international relations and byoveremphasizing the importance of NAM, the Third World, and North-South issues, Indiaeffectively dealt itself outside the global power game. The world routinely ignored theGovernment of India's utopian rhetoric because it lacked the power to engage and to ensureacceptance of Indian security goals and methods. Nehru and his successors had wrappedthemselves in the legacy of anti-imperialism and the Bandung spirit.This was projectednot only in speeches at the UN repeatedly as a ritualistic mantra, but it appeared as wellin proclamations about India's China policy. This was surprising because China and Indiawere (and are) rivals in Asian and international affairs. . There were (and are)fundamental conflicts of interest involving territory, distribution of power, and prestigein the subcontinent and in the regional neighbourhood that included Afghanistan in India'swest, Tibet and the Himalayan kingdoms in India's north, and Burma (Myanmar), South EastAsia, and the Indian Ocean area in India's East; and finally, the two had fought a war andwere engaged in military modernization with an eye to each other's activities and motives.Still, the ritual mantra of peaceful coexistence since the Nehru years, and the quest ofnormalization after 1962, has been kept in the diplomatic rhetoric of India. What exactlyis normalization, and is it a vital goal in interstate relations? As a minimum, it refersto an exchange of ambassadors. It does not necessarily mean a relationship of peace andharmony. If the existence of ambassadorial-level relations is the minimum requirement of'normalization', then it does not say much about the nature of the relationship. It couldbe a relationship of long term conflict or it could be a difficult relationship. In thelatter circumstance, the search for 'normalization' is neither a real goal nor a goodtactic because 'normalization' becomes a rhetoric which masks the mistrust, theanimosities, and the conflict of interests. At the saline time, if normalization expressesa search for normal international relationships and approaches, then one must recognizethat usually there are four types of normal relationships or approaches in the systems ofstates: hostile, difficult, friendly, and indifferent. Which of these expressed the Indianquest for normalcy with China (and Pakistan)? The Indian Ministry of External Affairsshould clarify this point.

Indian diplomatic rhetoric and diplomacy was also ignored by the internationalcommunity because India could not engage the world in the absence of an ability to eitherharm the interests of the major players or to facilitate their agenda. Nehru talked aboutan independent policy, defined as possessing the right to independence in thought andaction in diplomatic affairs. But this public stance masked India's dependence on foreigngoodwill as well as resources. Nehru and his successors were also dependent on foreigninput because of the absence of independent national means to acquire hard diplomatic andmilitary intelligence. As India was dependent on friendly powers for its economicsustenance and military security, these dependencies reduced India's wriggle-space ormanoeuvrability and capacity to achieve real independence in thought and action. TheIndian problem during the 1947-98 period was that India neither had the means nor the willto establish a specific strategic agenda and a strategic plan; and real independencerequires a demonstrated pattern of actions and decisions that would reveal India'sstrategic agenda and plan. In sum, the ritual mantra about India's independent policy wasbelied by the lack of economic and military power and leverage to engage and to bargainwith the outside powers.As Dasgupta points out:

The point to be stressed is that foreign policy is finally [1999] pursuing a definedIndian agenda. Since the Pokhran tests, the US administration has kept up sustainedpressure on India to toe the line. Apart from the insistence on NPT and CTBT, there hasbeen a torrent of gratuitous advice from Washington for Delhi to rapidly mend fences withIslamabad. It was a sensible suggestion that Americans never believed India was capable ofcarrying through. Therefore, when Vajpayee took up Nawaz Sharif's pre-arranged invitationto bus his way to Lahore, it was the American lobby that was stunned into incomprehension.It is, for example, bewildering that there has been few encouraging noises from theTrack-II wallahs [types] who routinely burnt candles at the Wagah (an Indo - Pakistaniborder post), border. Why is there not even a squeal from the great theological activistswho were so miffed by Indian 'hegemonism' after the Pokhran tests and who have lobbied theUS Congress and the European Parliament to pass strictures against India?

Their silence is a bit like the dog that didn't bark. As long as Indian diplomacy wasmired in effete Third Worldism and neighbourhood satire-rattling, there was a certainpredictability to life. The moment a government refined its priorities and beganconducting itself in a manner befitting its nuclear status, there is deathly silence.

In other words, a connection is being suggested between the lack of seriousness by theworld community about India's strategic agenda and a self-inflicted Indian problem:India's political leaders themselves repeated the ritual mantras rather than focus on astrategy of action and decision that revealed India's strategic agenda and methodology. Inother words, India was not taken seriously by outside powers because India's politicalclass itself did not take India's strategic interests seriously

If the diplomatic rhetoric is ritualistic and repetitive and if it is not backed up bya specific strategic agenda and plan of action, such rhetoric is dangerous: it projectsfalse expectations (which only fooled the Indians) and it projects high ideals. They didnot force others to take India seriously because the ideals were expressed without anysign of a commitment to back them up by military and economic measures; the signs ofcommitment and power were absent. A policy and a strategy is required continuously toengage and to contain the enemy, to develop pro-India international coalitions, to findways to convert enmities and difficult relationships into neutrality and better still,into friendship, to find ways to transform neutrals into friends, to expose secretenmities, and generally not to convert important neutrals into enemies. Without this, ifthe diplomatic rhetoric appears to be successful, that may be the result of luckycircumstances rather than diplomatic and military skill. For example, Nehru claimed thatIndia was protected by the international balance of power. India was protected byinternational circumstances up to a point, that is, until China decided to attack and tomilitarize the frontier. Up to 1962, Nehru was lucky, not skillful. That is, a successfulstrategy requires a combination of military, economic, as well as political (psychologicalwarfare) strategies that rely on skill rather than simply luck.Nehru and his successorsup to 1998 did not change many minds in India's favour -- either among India's immediateneighbours or on the world stage -- because the leadership lacked strategies thateffectively engaged the outside world in terms of specific Indian interests rather thanthe mantras. The change started with the BJP-led government in 1998. Then the Indianstrategic agenda began to crystallise and the world started to notice India and takeIndian interests seriously. The approach of the BJP coalition since 1998 has been toemphasize military and economic security and to discard the traditional emphasis on NAM,the 'Third World' and North-South dialogue. Two conclusions follow. The first is thatthe world did not take Indian interests seriously until Indian leaders started to takethemselves seriously. Secondly, there is a connection between the world's negative view ofIndia and India's poor psychological warfare strategy. A shift or improvement in thelatter, whose beginning we date to the rise of the BJP led government in 1998, produced apolarization in international and Indian reactions to India's new strategic agenda. Thislinked India's strategic activism to Indian strategic interests. It shed theNehru-Gandhis' utopianism in favour of a policy of engagement of the external environmenton the basis of military and economic strength. However, a caveat is in order. This majorcause of negativity in India's relationship with the outside world (that is, India's poorstrategies as discussed above), is now changing in the Indian body politic even though theCongress party and ex-Congress party types still cling to the old rhetoric. The speechesby Natwar Singh and Mani Shanker Aiyer reflect the old rhetoric and a faith that rhetoricequals strategy. They are still prisoners of their past. There is now a polarity betweenthe BJP and the Congress party approach to Indian strategic interests. The caveat isthat the change is ad hoc, not systemic. It is driven by the pragmatic personality andtemperament of the Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee, rather than a broad-basedrecognition in Indian party politics about the importance of psychological warfare inreducing the negativity about India in the international environment.

The second negative was that the emergence of two declared nuclear powers in thesubcontinent gave credence to the theory that Pakistan's nuclear and missile developmentwas an equalizer to India's edge in conventional armament. According to this view, Indialost its advantage in conventional armament vis-a-vis Pakistan because Pakistan'sdemonstrated nuclear and missile capability degraded the perception of India's advantagein conventional armament. The perceived change in the distribution of military powerbetween India and Pakistan meant that the rise of the nuclear factor was likely to dampenthe use of Indian conventional armament vis-a-vis Pakistan. This change was thought to bean Indian problem because it was a status quo power. Pakistan was anti-status quo and arevisionist power. India needed the edge in conventional military arms because a strategyof active defence requires a clear margin of strength in favour of the practitioner of adefensive strategy. The core premise is that a status quo-oriented defender must be ableto fight at a time and place of the enemy's choice -- as happened in the case of the armedinfiltrators from Pakistan who occupied strategic places on the Indian side of Kashmir inMay-June 1999. Conventional superiority is required to mount a successful active defence.Asymmetry in conventional arms favoured India before the Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests, butthis was negated after the tests. The new situation after May 1998 became a positive forPakistan and a negative for India according to this argument.

The third negative was that the Indo-Pakistani tests reinforced or entrenched the 'noprospects of a peace settlement, and the perpetually troubled ceasefire' situation betweenIndia and Pakistan and between China and India.