Pakistan-US Relations

Pakistan-US Relations

K. Alan Kronstadt
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service,
The Library of Congress
Updated August 26, 2002

CONTENTS

Summary

Most RecentDevelopments

Background andAnalysis

Historical Background
Pakistan-IndiaRivalry
The China Factor
PakistanPolitical Setting
Background

Pakistan-U.S. Relations andBilateral Issues

Security

Nuclear Weapons and MissileProliferation
U.S.Nonproliferation Efforts
Congressional Action
Pakistan-U.S. Military Cooperation

Democratizationand Human Rights

DemocratizationEfforts
Human Rights Problems

Economic Issues

Trade and TradeIssues

Narcotics
Terrorism

Summary

The major areas of U.S. concern in Pakistan include: nuclear nonproliferation;counter-terrorism; regional stability; democratization and human rights; and economicreform and development. A potential Pakistan-India nuclear arms race, fueled by rivalryover Kashmir, continues to be the focus of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in South Asia anda major issue in U.S. relations with both countries. This attention intensified followingnuclear tests by both India and Pakistan in May 1998. South Asia is viewed by someobservers as a likely prospect for use of such weapons. India has developed short-andintermediate-range missiles, and Pakistan has acquired short-range missiles from China andmedium-range missiles from North Korea. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since1947.

U.S.-Pakistan cooperation began in the mid-1950s as a security arrangement based onU.S. concern over Soviet expansion and Pakistan’s fear of neighboring India.Cooperation peaked during the 1979-89 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. U.S.-Pakistan tiesweakened following the October 1990 cutoff of U.S. aid and arms sales, which weresuspended by President Bush under Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (theso-called “Pressler amendment”). Further U.S. sanctions were imposed onPakistan (and India) as a result of their 1998 nuclear tests. The see-saw Pakistan-U.S.relationship has been on the upswing following Pakistan’s enlistment as a frontlinestate in the U.S.-led war on terrorism resulting from the September 2001 attacks on NewYork and Washington. Nuclear sanctions on Pakistan and India have been waived; Congressalso has given the President author-ity to waive, for two years, sanctions imposed onPakistan following its 1999 military coup.

Both Congress and the Administration consider a stable, democratic, economicallythriving Pakistan as key to U.S. interests in South, Central, and West Asia. Althoughruled by military regimes for half of its existence, between 1988 and 1999 Pakistan haddemocratic governments as a result of national elections in 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997.During that time, Benazir Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People’s Party, and NawazSharif, leader of the Pakistan Muslim League, each served twice as prime minister. Neitherleader served a full term, being dismissed by the president under constitutionalprovisions that have been used to dismiss four governments since 1985.

In October 1999, the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was ousted in abloodless coup led by Chief of Army Staff Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who suspended theparliament and declared himself chief executive. In June 2001, General Musharraf assumedthe title of President, a move ostensibly legitimized by an April 2002 referendum. TheUnited States has strongly urged the Pakistan military government to restore the countryto civilian democratic rule. President Musharraf has scheduled national elections forOctober 10, 2002. The Musharraf government has begun to address Pakistan’s manypressing and longstanding problems, including the beleaguered economy, corruption,terrorism, and poor governance. Pakistan will receive well over one billion dollars inU.S. assistance and several billion dollars from international organizations to helpstrengthen the country as a key member of the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition.

Most RecentDevelopments

Tensions between Pakistan and India have stabilized at moderate, but still dangerouslevels over the summer, as both the U.S. and Indian governments acknowledged thatPresident Musharraf has been partly successful in curtailing the cross-border movement ofmilitants in the Kashmir region. However, insistent that infiltration is ongoing, theIndian government has maintained its military mobilization along the shared border, and avirulent war of words between the two countries has continued since the current crisisbegan some nine months ago.

Various foreign governments, including that of the United States, have urged mutualrestraint along the Pakistan-India border, and requested that President Musharraf stopKashmiri militants from crossing the border into India. During a late-July visit to theregion, Secretary of State Powell indicated that the regional situation has improvedconsiderably, and a mid-August visit by Deputy Secretary of State Armitage confirmed theeasing of tensions, and sought to bring the two countries closer to bilateral dialogue. AU.S. military commander has indicated that as many as 1,000 Al Qaeda fighters may beoperating within the borders of Pakistan. On August 12, hundreds of Pakistani securitytroops launched a search for Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives in the country’ssemi-autonomous, tribal-dominated North-West Frontier Province.

Anti-Christian violence in Pakistan surged during August, with grenade and machine gunattacks on two Christian schools causing at least 10 deaths and 30 injuries, the largemajority of these being women and children. The Pakistan government calls the attacksexpressions of anti-Western sentiment in the face of President Musharraf’sparticipation in the anti-terror coalition. Many ordinary Pakistanis are becomingincreasingly dissatisfied with what they view as Islamabad’s overly quiescentrelationship with the United States.

On August 21, President Musharraf announced major changes to the country’sconstitution. Many of these changes – imposed unilaterally and without the approvalof any judicial or legislative bodies – will have the effect of greatly augmentingthe President’s already considerable powers, and will institutionalize a permanentrole for the military in governing the country. The United States has expressed concernthat these changes will make the path to restore democracy in Pakistan more difficult, andhas urged the Pakistani President to ensure that upcoming October elections are free andfair.

Background AndAnalysis

Historical Background

The long and checkered U.S.-Pakistan relationship has its roots in the Cold War andSouth Asia regional politics of the 1950s. U.S. concern about Soviet expansion andPakistan’s desire for security assistance against a perceived threat from Indiaprompted the two countries to negotiate a mutual defense assistance agreement in May 1954.By late 1955, Pakistan had further aligned itself with the West by joining two regionaldefense pacts, the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central TreatyOrganization (CENTO). As a result of these alliances and a 1959 U.S.-Pakistan cooperationagreement, Pakistan received more than $700 million in military grant aid from 1955 to1965. U.S. economic aid to Pakistan between 1951 and 1982 totaled more than $5 billion.

Differing expectations of the security relationship have long bedeviled bilateral ties.During the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, the United States suspended militaryassistance to both sides, resulting in a cooling of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. In themid-1970s, new strains arose over Pakistan’s apparent efforts to respond toIndia’s 1974 underground test of a nuclear device by seeking its own capability tobuild a nuclear bomb. Limited U.S. military aid was resumed in 1975, but it was suspendedagain by the Carter Administration in April 1979 in response to Pakistan’s covertconstruction of a uranium enrichment facility.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Pakistan was againviewed as a frontline state in the effort to block Soviet expansionism. In September 1981,the Reagan Administration negotiated a $3.2 billion, 5-year economic and military aidpackage with Islamabad. Pakistan became a funnel for arms supplies to the Afghanresistance, as well as a camp for three million Afghan refugees.

Despite the renewal of U.S. aid and close security ties, many in Congress remainedconcerned about Pakistan’s nuclear program. Concern was based in part on evidence ofU.S. export control violations that suggested a crash Pakistani program to acquire anuclear weapons capability. In 1985, Section 620E(e) (the so-called Pressler amendment)was added to the FAA, requiring the President to certify to Congress that Pakistan doesnot possess a nuclear explosive device during the fiscal year for which aid is to beprovided. The Pressler amendment represented a compromise between those in Congress whothought that aid to Pakistan should be cut off because of evidence that it was continuingto develop its nuclear option and those who favored continued support for Pakistan’srole in opposing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. A $4 billion, 6-year aid package forPakistan was signed in 1986.

With Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan beginning in May 1988, Pakistan’s nuclearactivities again came under closer U.S. scrutiny. In October 1990, President Bushsuspended aid to Pakistan. Under the provisions of the Pressler amendment, most economicand all military aid to Pakistan was stopped and deliveries of major military equipmentsuspended. Narcotics assistance of $3-5 million annually was exempted from the aid cutoff.In 1992, Congress partially relaxed the scope of the aid cutoff to allow for P.L.480 foodassistance and continuing support for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

One of the most serious results of the aid cutoff for Pakistan was the nondelivery ofsome 71 F-16 fighter aircraft ordered in 1989. In December 1998, the United States agreedto pay Pakistan $324.6 million from the Judgment Fund of the U.S. Treasury – a fundused to settle legal disputes that involve the U.S. government – as well as providePakistan with $140 million in goods, including agricultural commodities.

Pakistan-IndiaRivalry

Three wars – in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971 – and a constant state of militarypreparedness on both sides of the border have marked the half-century of bitter rivalrybetween India and Pakistan. The acrimonious nature of the partition of British India intotwo successor states in 1947 and the continuing dispute over Kashmir have been majorsources of tension. Both Pakistan and India have built large defense establishments at thecost of economic and social development. The Kashmir problem is rooted in claims by bothcountries to the former princely state, divided since 1948 by a military line of controlinto the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan-controlled (Free) Kashmir. Indiablames Pakistan for supporting a separatist rebellion raging in the Muslim-dominatedKashmir Valley that has claimed 30,000 lives since 1990. Pakistan admits only to lendingmoral and political support to the rebellion, while accusing India of creating dissensionin Pakistan’s Sindh province. (For further discussion, see pp. 9-10.)

The China Factor

India and China fought a brief border war in 1962, and an oftentimes tense borderdispute remains unresolved. A strategic rivalry also exists between these two largenations. Pakistan and China, on the other hand, have enjoyed a generally close andmutually beneficial relationship over recent decades. Pakistan served as a link betweenBeijing and Washington in 1971, as well as a bridge to the Muslim world for China duringthe 1980s. China’s continuing role as a major arms supplier for Pakistan began in the1960s, and included helping to build a number of arms factories in Pakistan, as well assupplying complete weapons systems. In September 1990, China agreed to supply Pakistanwith components for M-11 surface-to-surface missiles, which brought warnings from theUnited States. Although it is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR), China agreed to abide by the restrictions of the MTCR, which bans the transfer ofmissiles with a range of more than 300 kilometers and a payload of more than 500kilograms. In August 1993, the United States determined that China had transferred toPakistan prohibited missile technology and imposed trade sanctions on one Pakistan and 11Chinese entities (government ministries and aerospace companies) for two years. There havebeen reports that the U.S. intelligence community has evidence of the PRC provision ofcomplete M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan. In February 1996, the U.S. press reported onleaked U.S. intelligence reports alleging that China in 1995 sold ring magnets to Pakistanthat could be used in enriching uranium for nuclear weapons. Pakistan denied the reports.

On November 21, 2000, the United States imposed 2-year sanctions on the PakistanMinistry of Defense and Pakistan’s Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Organization,as well as on Iranian entities, as a result of past Chinese assistance to Pakistani andIranian missile programs. In September 2001, the U.S. State Department again imposedtwo-year sanctions on a PRC company and Pakistan’s National Development Complex. ThePRC company reportedly delivered 12 shipments of components for Pakistan’s Shaheenmissiles in early 2001. (For background and updates on China-Pakistan technology transfer,see CRS Issue Brief IB92056, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: CurrentPolicy Issues.)

PakistanPolitical Setting

On June 26, 2002, President Musharraf’s government made public a document entitled“The Establishment of Sustainable Federal Democracy Package.” The document– along with a second released July 14 – proposes sweeping changes in thePakistani constitution, changes that would provide the office of President with amounts ofpower previously unseen in the country’s constitutional history. These amendmentswould include provisions for Presidential nomination and dismissal of the Prime Ministerand his or her cabinet, dissolution of the National Assembly, and appointment of the ArmyChief and provincial governors, among others. The Supreme Court recently upheld aprovision requiring all candidates for National Assembly seats to be college graduates.This amendment would disqualify more than 98% of all Pakistanis (and more than half of thepoliticians who served in the last parliament) from holding national office, and will makeit difficult for opposition parties to field candidates for the scheduled Octoberelections.

While the Musharraf government states that such changes will “lay the foundationfor real democracy in Pakistan” and that no action will be taken until“open-ended debate” has occurred, critics contend that such amendments will makea “near puppet” of the Prime Minister and almost certainly “ring the deathknell of democracy in Pakistan.” All major political parties, including those of apro-government bent, have registered their opposition to the package of proposedamendments. The country’s two main political parties have recently called onMusharraf to resign and allow a caretaker government to oversee parliamentary electionsscheduled for next October.

On April 30, 2002, Pakistanis went to the polls in a national referendum to extendPresident Musharraf’s term by five years. The referendum question was, “For thesurvival of the local government system, establishment of democracy, continuity ofreforms, end to sectarianism and extremism, and to fulfill the vision of [Pakistan’sfounder Mohammed Ali Jinnah], would you like to elect President General Pervez Musharrafas president of Pakistan for five years?” The president won 98% of the vote from anofficially reported 50% voter turnout. The Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy, acoalition of political parties that are opposed to the election, claimed that turnout wascloser to 5%. These parties denounced the referendum as fraudulent and urged Pakistanis toboycott the poll. Post-referendum protestations were such that in May President Musharrafpublically acknowledged and apologized for irregularities in the voting.

In a post-October governmental structure likely to be instituted by Musharraf, thePrime Minister is not to have control over Pakistan’s National Security Council– an institution that is to be dominated by the President and the military. Asenvisaged, the Prime Minister would not cast a binding vote. The current National SecurityCouncil has a wide range of authority and advises the president on issues relating tonational security, sovereignty, Islamic ideology, and the integrity and solidarity of thecountry.

There is also concern about the legitimacy of the scheduled October 2002 elections.President Musharraf has refused to allow former prime ministers and leading politiciansBenazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to participate in the elections, issuing decrees that makeillegal their candidacy and threatening both with imprisonment should either return toPakistan. Senior government sources have also stated that Pakistan’s politicalparties will face crucial reforms under the Political Parties Act, which could see a purgeof their senior leaders. To replace them, President Musharraf apparently plans to groom anew generation of political leaders under his patronage.

At the same time, there has there has been an easing of pressure on Islamicfundamentalist groups in Pakistan. The leader of the pro-Taliban Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam wasreleased from prison, while the head of the banned terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammadwas released from prison and placed under house arrest. On Pakistan’s national day,the Jamaat-i-Islami was allowed to hold a public gathering in Rawalpindi, seat of thearmy’s General Headquarters. Leaders and activists of the moderate and secularAlliance for the Restoration of Democracy were arrested in Lahore when they tried toexercise their right of association.

Background. 

Military regimes have ruledPakistan for half of its 55 years, interspersed with periods of generally weak civiliangovernance. After 1988, Pakistan had democratically elected governments, and the armyappeared to have moved from its traditional role of power wielder or kingmaker to one ofpower broker or referee. During the past decade, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif eachserved twice as prime minister. Bhutto was elected prime minister in October 1988,following the death of military ruler Mohammad Zia-ul Haq in a plane crash. General Ziahad led a coup in 1977 deposing Bhutto’s father, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,who was later executed. Despite the restoration of democratic process to Pakistan in 1988,the succeeding years were marred by political instability, economic problems, and ethnicand sectarian violence. In August 1990, President Ishaq Khan dismissed Bhutto for allegedcorruption and inability to maintain law and order. The president’s power to dismissthe prime minister derived from Eighth Amendment provisions of the Pakistan constitution,which dated from the era of Zia’s presidency.

Elections held in October 1990 brought to power Nawaz Sharif, who himself was ousted in1993 under the Eighth Amendment provisions. The 1993 elections returned Bhutto and the PPPto power. The new Bhutto government faced serious economic problems and, according to someobservers, performance also was hampered by the reemergence of Bhutto’s husband, AsifAli Zardari, in a decision-making role. In November 1996, President Farooq Legharidismissed the Bhutto government for “corruption, nepotism, and violation of rules inthe administration of the affairs of the Government,” and scheduled new elections forFebruary 1997.

Nawaz Sharif’s PML won a landslide victory in the February 1997 parliamentaryelections, which, despite low voter turnout, were judged by international observers to begenerally free and fair. Sharif moved quickly to consolidate his power by curtailing theChanges have also taken place in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. In an effort to assuageinternational concerns, President Musharraf has moved away from direct support of thebanned Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba groups. Instead, it is expected that he willcall for the people of Kashmir to determine their own future without the support of thePakistan-based Islamic jihadi network. A recent meeting in Azad Kashmir reflectsPakistan’s changing Kashmir policy: the meeting was attended by the All-PartiesHurriyat Conference (an umbrella organization of 23 separatist groups), leading Kashmiriintellectuals, and three Pakistani brigadiers. Participants concluded that the policies ofKashmir fighters should represent Kashmiri interests rather than those of Pakistan.powersof the President and the judiciary. In April 1997, the Parliament passed the ThirteenthAmendment to the constitution, deleting the President’s former Eighth Amendmentpowers to dismiss the government and to appoint armed forces chiefs and provincialgovernors. The new amendment was passed unanimously by both houses of parliament andsigned by President Leghari. As the result of a power struggle, Sharif replaced theSupreme Court Chief Justice in November; Leghari resigned; and Sharif chose Mohammad RafiqTarar as president. As a result of these developments and the PML control of theParliament, Nawaz Sharif emerged as one of Pakistan’s strongest elected leaders sinceindependence. Critics accused him of further consolidating his power by intimidating theopposition and the press. In April 1999, a two-judge Bench of the Lahore High Courtconvicted former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and her husband of corruption and sentencedthem each to 5 years in prison, fined them $8.6 million, and disqualified them fromholding public office. Bhutto was out of the country at the time. Some analysts believethat Sharif acted out “political vindictiveness.” In April 2001, the PakistanSupreme Court ruled that former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s 1999 conviction forcorruption was biased and ordered a retrial.

Pakistan-U.S. Relations andBilateral Issues

U.S. policy interests in Pakistan encompass a wide range of issues, including nuclearweapons and missile proliferation; South Asian regional stability; democratization andhuman rights; economic reform and market opening; and efforts to counter terrorism andnarcotics. These concerns have been affected by several developments in recent years,including: 1) the cutoff of U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990, 1998, and 1999 over nuclear anddemocracy issues; 2) India and Pakistan’s worsening relationship over Kashmir since1990, and their continuing nuclear standoff; 3) Pakistan’s see-saw attempts todevelop a stable democratic government and strong economy in the post-Cold War era; and,most recently, 4) the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington.

The Bush Administration has identified exiled Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden, who hadlong been harbored by the Taliban government in Afghanistan, as the prime suspect in theterrorist attacks on the United States. On September 13, President Musharraf – understrong U.S. diplomatic pressure – offered President Bush Pakistan’s“unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism.” Because of its sharedborder with Afghanistan and former close ties with the Taliban, Pakistan is considered keyto U.S.-led efforts to combat terrorism in the region. The Taliban and bin Laden enjoystrong support among a substantial percentage of the Pakistan population, who share notonly conservative Islamic views but also ethnic and cultural ties with Afghanistan. Amajor issue facing the Administration is how to make use of Pakistan’s support —including for military operations in Afghanistan — without seriously destabilizing analready fragile state that has nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

In an effort to shore up the Musharraf government, most sanctions relating toPakistan’s (and India’s) 1998 nuclear tests and Pakistan’s 1999 militarycoup were waived in September and October of last year. On October 29, 2001, a StateDepartment spokesman pledged well over one billion dollars in U.S. assistance for Pakistanand several billion dollars from international organizations to help strengthen it as akey member of the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition. Direct assistance programs willinclude aid for health, education, food, democracy promotion, child labor elimination,counter-narcotics, border security and law enforcement, as well as trade preferencebenefits. The United States also will support grant, loan, and debt rescheduling programsfor Pakistan by the various international financial institutions, including the WorldBank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank. In addition, Pakistan hasreceived promises of substantial aid, debt relief, and trade concessions from Japan andthe European Union in recognition of its support for the international anti-terrorismcoalition. Japan, Pakistan’s largest bilateral aid donor, announced on October 26,2001, that it was suspending sanctions imposed on Pakistan and India following their 1998nuclear tests.

On November 10, 2001, President Bush met with President Musharraf in New York, whereboth addressed the U.N. General Assembly. According to the White House, the two leadersdiscussed the anti-terrorism campaign, regional security issues, economic cooperation,human rights, the October 2002 Pakistani elections, and ways to strengthen theU.S.-Pakistan relationship.

Security

Nuclear Weapons and MissileProliferation.  

Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, U.S.and Pakistan officials have held talks on improving security and installing new safeguardson Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants. Fears that Pakistan couldbecome destabilized by the U.S. anti-terrorism war efforts in Afghanistan have heightenedU.S. nuclear proliferation concerns in South Asia. On May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducteda total of five underground nuclear tests, breaking a 24- year, self-imposed moratorium onnuclear testing. Despite U.S. and world efforts to dissuade it, Pakistan followed,claiming five tests on May 28, 1998, and an additional test on May 30. The unannouncedtests created a global storm of criticism, as well as a serious setback for two decades ofU.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. (See also CRS Report 98-570,India-Pakistan Nuclear Tests and U.S. Response and CRS Report RL30623, Nuclear Weapons andBallistic Missile Proliferation in India and Pakistan: Issues for Congress.)

On May 13, 1998, President Clinton imposed economic and military sanctions on India,mandated by section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), and applied the samesanctions to Pakistan on May 30. Humanitarian assistance, food, or other agriculturalcommodities are excepted from sanctions under the law. In November1998, the U.S.Department of Commerce published a list of more than 300 Indian and Pakistani governmentagencies and companies suspected of working on nuclear, missile, and other weaponsprograms. Any U.S. exports to these entities required a Commerce Department license, andmost license requests reportedly were denied. On the one hand, Pakistan was less affectedthan India by the sanctions, since most U.S. assistance to Pakistan had been cut off since1990. On the other hand, Pakistan’s much smaller – and currently weaker –economy was more vulnerable to the effects of the sanctions.

U.S. policy analysts consider the apparent arms race between India and Pakistan asposing perhaps the most likely prospect for the future use of nuclear weapons. Indiaconducted its first, and only, previous nuclear test in May 1974, following which itmaintained ambiguity about the status of its nuclear program. Pakistan probably gained anuclear weapons capability sometime in the 1980s. India is believed to have enoughplutonium for 75 or more nuclear weapons. Pakistan may have enough enriched uranium for 25nuclear weapons. Both countries have aircraft capable of delivering weapons. India hasshort-range missiles (Prithvi) and is reported to have inducted an intermediate-rangeballistic missile (Agni) with enough payload to carry a nuclear warhead. Pakistanreportedly has acquired technology for short-range missiles (Shaheen) from China andmedium-range missiles (Ghauri) from North Korea, both capable of carrying small nuclearwarheads.

Proliferation in South Asia may be part of a chain of rivalries — India seeking toachieve deterrence against China, and Pakistan seeking to gain an “equalizer”against a larger and conventionally stronger India. India began its nuclear program in themid-1960s, after its 1962 defeat in a short border war with China and China’s firstnuclear test in 1964. Despite a 1993 Sino-Indian troop reduction agreement and some easingof tensions, both nations continue to deploy forces along their border. Pakistan’snuclear program was prompted by India’s 1974 nuclear test and by Pakistan’sdefeat by India in the 1971 war and consequent loss of East Pakistan, now independentBangladesh.

U.S.Nonproliferation Efforts. 

Neither India nor Pakistan are signatories to the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India hasconsistently rejected both treaties as discriminatory, calling instead for a globalnuclear disarmament regime. Pakistan traditionally has maintained that it will sign theNPT and CTBT only when India does so. Aside from security concerns, the governments ofboth countries are faced with the prestige factor attached to their nuclear programs andthe domestic unpopularity of giving them up. Following the 1998 tests, the United Statesset forth five nonproliferation “benchmarks” for India and Pakistan. Theyinclude the following:

Halt further nuclear testing and sign and ratify the CTBT. U.S. and internationalpressure after the 1998 nuclear tests produced resolutions by the U.N. Security Counciland the Group of Eight (G-8) urging India and Pakistan to sign the CTBT. Japan – thelargest bilateral aid donor for both countries – made resumption of its aid programscontingent on signing the CTBT and assurances not to transfer nuclear technology ormaterial to any other country (last year Japan suspended sanctions against both countriesin recognition of their support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism). Although both Indiaand Pakistan currently observe self-imposed moratoria on nuclear testing, they continue toresist signing the CTBT – a position made more tenable by the U.S. Senate’srejection of the treaty in 1999.

Halt fissile material production; cooperate in FMCT negotiations. Both India andPakistan have agreed to participate in negotiations on the proposed Fissile MaterialControl Treaty (FMCT). Both countries, however, have expressed unwillingness to haltfissile material production at this stage in the development of their nuclear weaponsprograms.

Refrain from deploying or testing missiles or nuclear weapons. The United States hasurged India and Pakistan – with little success – to adopt constraints ondevelopment, flight testing, and storage of missiles, and basing of nuclear-capableaircraft. In April 1999, India tested its intermediate-range Agni II missile, firing it areported distance of 1,250 miles. Days later, Pakistan countered by firing its Ghauri IIand Shaheen missiles with reported ranges of 1,250 and 375 miles, respectively. Indiatested a longer version of its short-range Prithvi missile in December 2001. Mostrecently, and during a period of heightened tensions with India, Pakistan tested thelatest version of its short-range Hatf-3 missile, as well as a newer version of theGhauri.

In August 1999, India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government released a draftreport by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) on India’s nuclear doctrine.The report, although retaining India’s no-first-use policy, called for creation of a“credible nuclear deterrent ... based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-basedmissiles and sea-based assets....” The United States and other countries criticizedthe document as destabilizing. The Pakistani government has produced no documentcomparable to India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine, and it provides only ambiguousstatements regarding its own nuclear weapons policies. Thus far, these have tended to bead hoc responses to Indian actions, but President Musharraf has stated an intention toretain a minimum credible nuclear deterrent for Pakistan.

Maintain and formalize restraints on sharing sensitive goods and technologies withother countries. Both India and Pakistan apparently have good records on nonproliferationof sensitive technologies and have issued regulatory orders on export controls. Since May1998, both countries have continued to hold expert-level talks with U.S. officials onexport controls. U.S. concern was raised in late 2001 by disclosures that two retiredPakistani nuclear scientists had briefed bin Laden and other al Qaeda officials on severaloccasions. The war in Afghanistan also heightened fears of instability in Pakistan thatcould lead to Islamabad’s nuclear assets being compromised in the event of a radicalIslamist military coup. This has resulted in renewed U.S. policy debate on transfers ofnuclear weapons safeguards technologies to Pakistan and/or India. India also continues topress for ending of export controls on dual-use technologies that it needs for itscivilian nuclear and space programs, which has raised further U.S. policy debates onexport controls and technology transfer.

Reduce bilateral tensions, including Kashmir. Beginning in 1990 – with theincreasing friction between India and Pakistan over Kashmir – the United Statesstrongly encouraged both governments to institute confidence-building measures in order toreduce tensions. Measures agreed to so far include: agreement on advance notice ofmilitary movements; establishment of a military commander “hotline”; an exchangeof lists of nuclear installations and facilities; agreement not to attack eachother’s nuclear facilities; a joint ban on use and production of chemical weapons;and measures to prevent air space violations. In February 1999, Prime Minister Vajpayeetook an historic bus ride to Pakistan to hold talks with then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.The two leaders signed the Lahore Declaration in which they agreed to intensify efforts toresolve all issues, including Jammu and Kashmir and to take a number of steps to reducetensions between their countries.

The prospects for India-Pakistan detente suffered a severe setback in May-July 1999,when the two countries teetered on the brink of their fourth war, once again in Kashmir.In the worst fighting since 1971, Indian soldiers sought to dislodge some 700Pakistan-supported infiltrators who were occupying fortified positions along mountainridges overlooking a supply route on the Indian side of the line of control (LOC) nearKargil. Following a meeting between then Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif andPresident Clinton in Washington on July 4, the infiltrators withdrew across the LOC. (SeeCRS Report RS20277, Recent Developments in Kashmir and U.S. Concerns.)

Tensions between India and Pakistan remained extremely high in the wake of the Kargilconflict, which cost more than 1,100 lives. Throughout 2000, cross-border firing andshelling continued at high levels. India accused Pakistan of sending a flood of militantsinto Kashmir and increasingly targeting isolated police posts and civilians. Pakistan alsoaccused India of human rights violations in Kashmir. The United States strongly urgedIndia and Pakistan to create the proper climate for peace, respect the LOC, rejectviolence, and return to the Lahore peace process. In November 2000, India announced aunilateral halt to its military operations in Kashmir during the Muslim holy month ofRamadan. In December, the Pakistan government announced that its forces deployed along theLOC in Kashmir would observe maximum restraint and that some of its troops would be pulledback from the LOC. Indian army officials noted that clashes between Indian and Pakistaniforces along the LOC had virtually stopped since the cease-fire began and that there hadbeen a definite reduction of infiltration of militants from Pakistan. In February, PrimeMinister Vajpayee extended the cease-fire until the end of May 2001. Kashmir’s mainmilitant groups, however, rejected the cease-fire as a fraud and continued to carry outattacks on military personnel and government installations. As security forces conductedcounter-operations, deaths of Kashmiri civilians, militants, and Indian security forcescontinued to rise.

In May 2001, the Indian government announced that it was ending its unilateralcease-fire in Kashmir but that Prime Minister Vajpayee would invite President Musharraf toIndia for talks. The July summit talks in Agra between Musharraf and Vajpayee failed toproduce a joint communique, reportedly as a result of pressure from hardliners on bothsides. Major stumbling blocks were India’s refusal to acknowledge the“centrality of Kashmir” to future talks and Pakistan’s objection toreferences to “cross-border terrorism.” Since the Agra talks, tensions havecontinued to rise. According to Indian government reports, more than 2,000 people havedied since January 2001 as a result of the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir state, including618 civilians, 1,133 militants, and 228 security forces. According to AmnestyInternational, more than 1,100 people have disappeared in Kashmir since the revolt beganin 1990.

On October 16-17, 2001, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Pakistan and Indiain an effort partly aimed at easing the seriously escalating tensions over Kashmir. Indiaresponded to an October 1 terrorist attack by the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Muhammad, whichkilled 38 people in Kashmir, by resuming heavy firing across the line of control thatdivides the disputed territory. Cross-border firing between India and Pakistan had beenlargely suspended since November 2000. Powell urged both countries to seek a peacefulresolution of the Kashmir dispute. On October 29, the chief of the U.N. Military ObserversGroup in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) accused both countries of playing “politicalgames” on the issue of Kashmir. In reportedly the first instance of a publicstatement by the UNMOGIP in 50 years, Maj. Gen. Hermann K. Loidolt stated further:“My assessment is that the situation will become more tense in the time coming, notonly along the LOC [Line of Control] but also in the whole of Jammu and Kashmirstate.”

An attack against the Indian parliament on December 13, 2001, thought to have beencarried out by Pakistan-based Islamic militants, left 14 dead and brought India andPakistan to the brink of war. India blamed the suicide attack on two militant groups thatIndian leaders believe were sponsored by Pakistan: Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba.These two groups allegedly have been fighting from bases in Pakistan to end Indian rule inpart of the disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir. Following the attack, Indian PrimeMinister Vajpayee stated “We do not want war, but war is being thrust on us, and wewill have to face it.” Pakistani leaders, in turn, accused India of ratcheting uptensions between the two countries and said that Pakistan would make India pay “aheavy price for any misadventure.” In the weeks following the attack on the Indianparliament, both India and Pakistan have, in a “tit-for-tat” fashion, issuedthreats, conducted military maneuvers and repositioned missile batteries along theirborder, and levied sanctions against each other.

The events of May seemed to be pushing India and Pakistan to escalate the standoff ontheir border to a full-scale military conflict. The attack by Kashmiri militants on thearmy base in Kaluchak, Jammu was viewed as a serious provocation by the Indian governmentand it intensified war plans. In response, the Pakistani government began to reassigntroops from the Afghanistan border to the eastern border with India. It also recalled allPakistani troops engaged in international peacekeeping operations.

Pakistan tested three ballistic missiles, the intermediate range Ghauri and theshort-range Ghaznavi and Abdali, from May 25-28, 2002, sending a message to India that itwould not hesitate to use nuclear weapons in a forthcoming conflict. Pakistan’srepresentative to the United Nations also made it clear that in the event of a conflictthe country had not ruled out the first use of nuclear weapons. President Musharraf addedthat Pakistan would not start a war, but it would respond forcefully to aggression andcarry out “offensive defense” – take the war into Indian territory. Thethinking in Pakistan, reportedly, is that should a conflict take place, India’sMuslim minority would rise in rebellion – particularly in the state of Kashmir. Thiswould complicate Indian warfighting efforts.

Congressional Action. 

Through a series of legislative measures, Congress has incrementally lifted sanctions onPakistan and India resulting from their 1998 nuclear tests. In October 1999, Congresspassed H.R. 2561, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000, and it was signed bythe President as P.L. 106-79 on October 29. Title IX of the act gives the Presidentauthority to waive sanctions applied against Pakistan and India in response to the nucleartests. In a presidential determination on Pakistan and India issued on October 27, 1999,the President waived economic sanctions on India. Pakistan, however, remained undersanctions triggered under Section 508 of the annual foreign assistance appropriations actas a result of the October 1999 coup. The Foreign Operations Export Financing and RelatedAppropriations Agencies Act, 2001, provided an exception under which Pakistan could beprovided U.S. foreign assistance funding for basic education programs (P.L. 106-429;Section 597). The U.S. Agency for International Development request for FY2002 includes $7million for programs to strengthen civil society and reform public education in Pakistan.

After the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, and inrecognition of Pakistan’s cooperation with the U.S.-led coalition being assembled,policymakers searched for new means of providing assistance to Pakistan. PresidentBush’s issuance of a final determination on September 22, 2001, removed remainingsanctions on Pakistan and India resulting from their 1998 nuclear test, finding thatdenying export licences and assistance was not in the national security interests of theUnited States. Also, on October 27, President Bush signed into law S. 1465 (P.L. 107-57),which gives the President two-year waiver authority to lift sanctions on foreignassistance imposed on Pakistan following the 1999 military coup if he determines that sucha waiver would facilitate the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan and is importantto U.S. efforts to combat international terrorism. The law not only gives the presidentauthority to waive sanctions related to democracy but to waive sanctions imposed onPakistan for its debt servicing arrearage to the United States under the terms of theForeign Operations Appropriations Act. At the end of 2000, Pakistan’s internationaldebt was estimated at $38 billion. P.L. 107-57 allowed for an agreement of Pakistan toreschedule $379 million of its debt to the United States thereby enabling it to cancel itsarrearage. After President Musharraf’s visit to Washington D.C. in February 2002,President Bush wrote a letter to Congress stating that he had ordered $220 million inemergency funds that had been given to the Defense Department for warfighting and to theState Department for security upgrades, be reallocated to Pakistan “for costsincurred in aiding U.S. military forces in Operation Enduring Freedom.”

For FY2003, the Bush Administration has proposed increased funding for Pakistan thatincludes $50 million for development assistance (up from an estimated $15 million in2001), $200 million in the Economic Support Fund (up from $9.5 million in 2001), $1million for International Military Education and Training (same as 2001), $50 million forForeign Military Financing (up from zero in 2001), and $4 million for InternationalNarcotics Control (up from $2.5 million in 2001). (For details, see CRS Report RS20995,India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack.)

Pakistan-U.S. Military Cooperation. 

Theclose U.S.- Pakistan military ties of the Cold War era – which had dwindled since the1990 aid cutoff – are in the process of being restored as a result of Pakistan’srole in the U.S. anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. Pakistan also has been aleading country in supporting U.N. peacekeeping efforts with troops and observers. Some5,000 Pakistani troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as partof the U.S.-led Persian Gulf War efforts in 1990. Pakistani troops played an importantrole in the U.S.-led humanitarian operations in Somalia from 1992 to 1994. In November2001, there were 5,500 Pakistani troops and observers participating in U.N. peacekeepingefforts in Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, Congo, and other countries. In the wake ofthe September 11 attacks and President Musharraf’s participation in the anti-terrorcoalition, U.S. law enforcement agents have assisted in tracking and capturing Al Qaedaand Taliban fugitives that have sought refuge in Pakistani border areas and cities.

Democratizationand Human Rights

DemocratizationEfforts.  

The United States considers the October 1999 Pakistan military coup to be aserious setback to the country’s efforts to return to the democratic election processbeginning in 1988. National elections, judged by domestic and international observers tobe generally free and fair, were held in 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997. Pakistan democracybetween 1988 and 1999, however, was marred by wide-scale corruption, volatile mass-basedpolitics, and a continuing lack of symmetry between the development of the military andcivilian bureaucracies and political institutions. The politics of confrontation betweenparties and leaders flourished at the expense of effective government; frequent walkoutsand boycotts of the national and provincial assemblies often led to paralysis andinstability. The major political parties lacked grassroots organization and failed to beresponsive to the electorate.

There had been hopes that upcoming national elections in October 2002 would reverse thetrend and set Pakistan back on the path toward democratic governance. Such hopes have beeneroded by the passage of a number of highly restrictive election laws – includingthose that likely will prevent the country’s two leading civilian politicians fromparticipating – as well as President Musharraf’s unilateral imposition of majorconstitutional amendments in August, 2002. The United States has expressed concern thatthese developments may make the ultimate realization of true democracy in Pakistan moreelusive.

Human Rights Problems. 

The U.S. State Department, in its Pakistan Country Report on Human Rights Practices for2001 (issued March 4, 2002), noted that, although Pakistan’s human rights recordremained poor under the military government, there were improvements in some areas,including freedom of the press. The government bureaucracy continued to function but was“monitored” by the military. The judiciary continued to be subject to theexecutive branch but in May 2000, President Musharraf promised to abide by a Supreme Courtruling that national elections will be held no later than 90 days after October 12, 2002.The State Department report cited continuing problems of police abuse, religiousdiscrimination, and child labor. Security forces were cited for committing extrajudicialkillings and for using arbitrary arrest and detention, torturing and abusing prisoners anddetainees, and raping women. Political and religious groups also engaged in killings andpersecution of their rivals and ethnic and religious minorities. Politically motivatedviolence and a deteriorating law and order situation reportedly continued to be a seriousproblem.

In recent years, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and Amnesty International haveissued reports critical of abuses of the rights of women and minorities. According to thereports, rape is a serious problem, particularly rape of minors and gang rape. The StateDepartment human rights report also noted a high rate of abuse of female prisoners –including rape and torture – by male police officers. Women also sufferdiscrimination in education, employment, and legal rights. Discrimination against women iswidespread, and traditional constraints – cultural, legal, and spousal – havekept women in a subordinate position in society. The adult literacy rate for men inPakistan is about 50% and for women about 24%. Religious minorities – mainlyChristians, Hindus, and Ahmadi Muslims – reportedly are subjected to discriminatorylaws and social intolerance. A 1974 amendment to the Pakistan constitution declaredAhmadis to be a non-Muslim minority because they do not accept Muhammad as the lastprophet. The Zia government, in 1984, made it illegal for an Ahmadi to call himself aMuslim or use Muslim terminology. Blasphemy laws, instituted under the Zia regime andstrengthened in 1991, carry a mandatory death penalty for blaspheming the Prophet or hisfamily. Blasphemy charges reportedly are usually brought as a result of personal orreligious vendettas.

Economic Issues

Pakistan’s current military government inherited an economy in recession. Theperiod from July 2000-June 2001 saw the economy grow by only 2.7%, a significant declinefrom the previous year. A decade of political instability left a legacy of soaring foreigndebt, declining production and growth rates, failed economic reform policies, andpervasive corruption. Foreign debt totals more than $32 billion; foreign reserves are lessthan $1.5 billion (about 6 weeks of imports); and both agricultural and industrial growthhave dropped since 1998.

Over the long term, analysts believe Pakistan’s resources and comparativelywell-developed entrepreneurial skills hold promise for more rapid economic growth anddevelopment. This is particularly true for Pakistan’s textile industry, whichaccounts for 60% of Pakistan’s exports. Analysts point to the pressing need tobroaden the country’s tax base in order to provide increased revenue for investmentin improved infrastructure, health, and education, all prerequisites for economicdevelopment. Less than 1% of Pakistanis currently pay income taxes. Agricultural incomehas not been taxed in the past, largely because of the domination of parliament and theprovincial assemblies by wealthy landlords.

Successive Bhutto and Sharif governments made agreements with the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), promising austerity, deficit reduction, and improved tax collectionin return for loans and credits. The promised reforms, however, fell victim to politicalinstability and a host of other problems, including floods, drought, crop viruses,strikes, a bloated and inefficient bureaucracy, widespread tax evasion, weakinfrastructure, and a swollen defense budget. The Musharraf government has had somesuccess in putting economic reforms back on track, including expanding collection ofincome and sales taxes, trade liberalization, and improving transparency. In January 2001,the Paris Club of creditor nations agreed to reschedule $1.7 billion in repayments onPakistan’s foreign debt of $32 billion. On August 29, an International Monetary Fundteam cleared release of the final installment of a $596 million standby loan to Pakistanand confirmed “Pakistan’s solid macroeconomic performance, including lowerinflation, a strengthening of the balance of payments, and reduction of fiscalimbalances.”

Meetings between Pakistani government officials and representatives of the IMF, theWorld Bank, and the Asian Development Bank have been successful, as the financialinstitutions reportedly have been pleased with the progress made in stabilizing andreforming the Pakistani economy. The Pakistani government has stabilized thecountry’s external debt at $38 billion and the country’s hard currency reservesgrew to $6.41 billion by July 2002 — an increase of more than $4 billion sinceOctober 1999. At the same time, the IMF and the World Bank urged the Pakistani governmentto cut defense expenditures from the current 3.5% GDP to 3.3% of GDP by 2003-2004. TheWorld Bank said that if regional tensions subsided and the Kashmir dispute was resolved,this would provide a further fiscal cushion for a peace dividend. Most recently, a“structural adjustment credit” of $500 million and four projects totaling $237million were approved to support Pakistan’s ongoing reform program. A new arms racewith India, however, could be fiscally disastrous.

On the positive side, Pakistan’s economic reforms and a more prudent fiscal policyhave reduced the fiscal deficit from 7% of GDP to about 5.2% of GDP. Foreign remittanceshave exceeded $1.6 billion — $772 million more than in 2000. Exports exceeded $9billion for the first time in seven years, and inflation, at 3%, was the lowest in threedecades. Interest on public debt together with defense spending, however, consume 70% oftotal revenues, thus squeezing out development expenditure, including social spending. AJuly country report from the IMF indicates that progress toward macroeconomic andstructural goals is meeting program standards as of March 2002.

In the view of the International Financial Institutions — the World Bank, the IMF,and the Asian Development Bank – the major risk to economic reforms and to futureinvestment was the possibility that there might be a break in the continuity of policyafter the October 2002 elections for the national and provincial assemblies. PresidentPervez Musharraf’s victory in the April 30, 2002 referendum has had some effect ofboosting investor and international financial institution confidence that the economic andpolitical reforms will stay the course.

Trade and TradeIssues.

In 2001, U.S. exports to Pakistan totaled $542 million, an increase of 17.3%over 2000. Imports from Pakistan totaled $2.2 billion for 2001, up nearly 4% over theprevious year. The resulting trade deficit of $1.7 billion has remained static. The UnitedStates has been strongly supportive of Pakistan’s economic reform efforts, begununder the first Nawaz Sharif government in 1991. According to the report of the U.S. TradeRepresentative (USTR) for 2001, however, a number of trade barriers remain. Some items areeither restricted or banned from importation for reasons related to religion, nationalsecurity, luxury consumption, or protection of local industries. U.S. companies havecomplained repeatedly about violations of their intellectual property rights in the areasof patents and copyrights. Pakistan’s patent law currently protects only processes,not products, from infringement. A 1992 Pakistan copyright law that provides coverage forsuch works as computer software and videos is being enforced but has resulted in a backlogof cases in the court system. The International Intellectual Property Alliance estimatedtrade losses of $143.3 million in 2001 – a result of pirated films, sound recordings,computer programs, and books – and recommends that Pakistan be placed on the PriorityWatch List.

Narcotics

In recent years, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region has supplied a reported 20%-40%of heroin consumed in the United States and 70% of that consumed in Europe. The region issecond only to Southeast Asia’s Golden Triangle as a source of the world’sheroin. Opium grown in Afghanistan and Pakistan is processed into heroin in more than 100illegal laboratories in the border region. Although much of the heroin is smuggled by landand sea routes to Europe and the United States, a substantial portion is consumed byPakistan’s rapidly growing domestic market. The Pakistan government estimates the 4million drug addicts in the country include 1.5 million addicted to heroin. According tosome experts, Pakistan’s drug economy amounts to as much as $20 billion. Drug moneyreportedly is used to buy influence throughout Pakistan’s economic and politicalsystems.

Pakistan’s counter-narcotics efforts are hampered by a number of factors,including lack of government commitment; scarcity of funds; poor infrastructure indrug-producing regions; government wariness of provoking unrest in tribal areas; andcorruption among police, government officials, and local politicians. U.S.counter-narcotics aid to Pakistan, administered by the State Department’s Bureau ofInternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, totaled $3.5 million in FY2001, with$3.5 million requested for FY2002. The major counter-narcotics efforts engaged in by thePakistan government, some of which receive U.S. or U.N. support, include: improved lawenforcement; reduction of demand; opium crop destruction and crop substitution; andoutreach programs that include supplying roads, irrigation, drinking water, and schools toremote tribal areas.

In March 2001, President Bush submitted to Congress his annual list of major illicitdrug producing and transiting countries eligible to receive U.S. foreign aid and othereconomic and trade benefits. Pakistan was among the countries certified as havingcooperated fully with the United States in counter-narcotics efforts, or to have takenadequate steps on their own. According to the report, Pakistan almost achieved its goal ofeliminating opium production by reducing the poppy crop to a record low of 500 hectares,down from 8,000 hectares in 1992. A more recent State Department report showsPakistan’s poppy production dropping by 59% from 2000 to 2001. Pakistan, however,faces major challenges as a transit country, despite reduced production of opium inAfghanistan. Cooperation with the United States on counter-narcotics efforts was describedas excellent, including arrests, extradition, and poppy eradication.

Terrorism

After the September 11 attacks on the United States, Pakistan pledged and has providedsupport for the anti-terror coalition effort. According to the U.S. State Departmentreport on global terrorism for 2001, Pakistan has afforded the United States unprecedentedlevels of cooperation by allowing the U.S. military to use bases within the country,helping to identify and detain extremists, and tightening the border between Pakistan andAfghanistan.

In December 2001, President Musharraf announced a proposal to bring Pakistan’smadrassas (religious schools) – some of which have served as breeding grounds forextremists – into the mainstream educational system. Pakistan also began sweepingpolice reforms, upgraded its immigration control system, and began work on newanti-terrorist finance laws. Musharraf also began cracking down on“anti-Pakistan” extremists and, by January 2002, authorities had arrested morethan 2,000, although many have subsequently been released.

In May 2002, a bomb blast in Karachi killed 14 people (including 12 French militarycontractors) and raised fears that terrorist groups would complicate the law and ordersituation within the country. The blast was attributed to various groups including Indianintelligence and members of the Al Qaeda. In the war on terror, Pakistani troops, for thefirst time since independence, operated in tribal areas of the country – an area thatthey traditionally stayed out of for fear of antagonizing the local population. By lateMay, however, President Musharraf was beginning to pull some troops from the region tohelp strengthen the eastern border with India.

At the same time, the Pakistani government has been under pressure from various nationsto terminate the infiltration of insurgents from Pakistani Kashmir into Indian Kashmir. AsIndia increased its preparations for war – following the attack in the Kaluchakregion of Jammu – the United States, Britain, and Russia called upon Pakistan to stopmilitants from crossing into Indian Kashmir. President Bush challenged President Musharrafto show results in stopping militants from carrying out terrorist acts in Indian Kashmir.While expressing concern about Pakistan’s missile tests the president made it clearthat preventing terrorism was a higher priority. He said, “I am more concerned aboutmaking sure ... that President Musharraf show results in terms of stopping people fromcrossing the border.” He added, “Stopping terrorism – that is moreimportant than the missile testing.” President Musharraf, in an interview with theWashington Post, countered, “[T]here is nothing happening across the Line of Control.And I’ve also said that Pakistan is a part of the coalition to fight terrorism. Andwe will ensure that terrorism does not go from Pakistan anywhere outside into theworld.” Critics have charged, however, that President Musharraf has eased up onmilitants in the country by releasing some of the people he had jailed after September 11in his promised crackdown on Islamic militants.

President Musharraf asked the international community to credit Pakistan for having thecourage to send troops into the tribal areas to capture suspected Al Qaeda operatives. Hepointed out that Pakistani troops were the first troops to have moved into the area inmore than a century. The President continued that there were three elements of terror thatthe world was concerned with: Al Qaeda, Kashmiri militants, and the growing Sunnisectarian terrorism in Pakistan. He also pointed out that the Indian goal was todestabilize Pakistan: “[T]heir aim is to destabilize me, my government, and Pakistan.Destabilize us economically, and politically, and diplomatically. That is what they wantto achieve.”