There is a strange if not bizarre paradox in Sri Lanka's peace process. More Coverage.
Twenty months after a fledgling ceasefire, the Tiger rebels made public their much awaited demands to endtheir near two-decade-long 'armed struggle'. They want autonomous self-rule in the North East, outside SriLanka's Constitution and laws.
A failure to heed their demands within five years, they made clear, would lead to elections. That it wouldlead to a separate state of Eelam is a certainty, even though the rebels have not said so.
One would have expected these demands, a solid foundation for a separate state, to cause a political storm, ifnot riots; a politically sensitive Sinhala south has been screaming over concessions, including a radiostation, already given to rebels. Yet they did not.
Instead, causing increasing uncertainty over the peace process is an entirely different issue - aconfrontation between the ruling United National Front (UNF) Government and the main opposition People'sAlliance (PA).
It was sparked off by President Chandrika Kumaratunga's decision last Tuesday to sack three Ministers - TilakMarapana (Defence), John Ameratunga (Interior) and Imtiaz Bakeer Markar (Mass Communications). She tookcontrol of the portfolios.
"Do you think the President did this to embarrass you whilst you are my guest?" asked US PresidentGeorge W. Bush, from Premier Wickremasinghe during a meeting at the White House. He was in Washington to seekUS support for the peace process. Prime Minister Wickremasinghe did much the same in New Delhi during talkswith Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee last month. He not only won Indian backing then, but also anassurance for a Defence Co-operation Agreement with Sri Lanka.
The Sri Lankan Premier was seeking these assurances as part of his 'international safety net.' That theseinitiatives came twenty long months after the ceasefire was both significant and important. They were notprompted by the tough rebel demands. Even before they were made public, he had appealed to India, and thevisit to the US followed shortly thereafter. The reason was mounting security concerns.
The rebels have dominated the northern Wanni since they were ousted from the Jaffna peninsula in 1995. Theyran their own administration, which includes courts, police stations, banks and a tax collection machinery.They have now extended this apparatus to the east under the ceasefire. They doubled their strength in theNorth East, and have recruited new cadres, including children. They have smuggled in state-of-the-art militaryhardware, including surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-air missiles, and have begun setting up an airwing using two micro-light aircraft.
In marked contrast, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces find themselves in a quandary. Desertions have been higherduring the ceasefire, and there was poor response to repeated recruitment drives.
The UNF has not tried to re-equip the Armed Forces for fear of offending the rebels. Training on a limitedscale led to dwindling ammunition stocks. When stocks reached alarming levels, India came to their aid bysending in emergency supplies.
This emerging scenario has led to an increasing change in the military balance. To the uninitiated, PresidentKumaratunga's move came as a surprise. To any discerning student of politics it was not. There have long beenstrengthening indications that such action was inevitable. The President had been writing stinging letters toboth Premier Wickremasinghe and Defence Minister Marapana over these developments. Some of her concerns havebeen made public, such as the LTTE build-up in the North Eastern port district of Trincomalee, where a threathas emerged, not only to the strategic port there, but also to Indian investments, including the World War IIvintage oil tanks leased out to the state-owned Indian Oil Corporation (IOC). Other correspondence, however,still remains private.
For the Wickremasinghe Government, the lessons learnt over last week's events arise out of a neglect of theintelligence services and the Armed Forces in the misguided belief that the rebels would be offended if theGovernment emphasised the perceptions and agendas of these state agencies.
Indeed, just a month after the UNF was voted to power, the Police raided a forward operations cell of theDirectorate of Military Intelligence. This unit in a city suburb was the centre from where deep penetrationunits infiltrated rebel areas in the East and assassinated their leaders. It was mistaken for a hide out fromwhich military officers had purportedly planned to assassinate ruling party leaders. When the Navy sank tworebel cargo vessels, one in March and the other in June, state run media reports publicly chided them fortheir action. The same fate befell the Army when it was involved in actions against the rebels.
President Kumaratunga, interestingly enough, is acting under a Constitution whose chief architect is PremierWickremasinghe's mentor, the late President J.R. Jayewardene. Under that, she is the Head of State, Head ofthe Executive, Head of the Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Force.
Premier Wickremasinghe's Government, which took office in December, 2001, set up an Interior Ministry for thefirst time and placed the Police within its fold. It was previously under the Ministry of Defence.
With the takeover of the state media, a major propaganda effort is being made to explain PresidentKumaratunga's actions. Premier Wickremasinghe, returning to Colombo to a crowded reception, declared that hehad the support of the US and the international community. He vowed to continue his campaign for peace. He hasrejected a public appeal made by President Kumaratunga for a 'National Government', and added that thePresident, who has taken over defence, should also conduct the peace process. Otherwise he wants both mattersto be placed in his hands.
President Kumaratunga is yet to respond. The Norwegian facilitators arrived this week for talks to carry thepeace process forward. The choices left to the President are severely limited. If she does not yield toPremier Wickremasinghe's demands, she would have to talk to the rebels. They may not agree.
Time is limited. When Parliament meets after prorogation ends on November 19, 2003, in theory, if the UNFhands in a motion to impeach President Kumaratunga, it would debar a dissolution and polls thereafter. IfParliament continues to sit, with a majority in his favour, Wickremasinghe could block funds for the runningof the Presidency.
Sri Lanka is again on the threshold of a major political crisis.
Advertisement
Iqbal Athas is Consultant Editor and Defence Correspondent, The Sunday Times, Colombo. Courtesy,the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
