Nuke Walmart Blues

According to well-informed sources in Pakistan of well-establishedcredibility, there is nervousness in Pakistan  that fresh enquiries by theUS into North Korea's nuclear capability might bring out hitherto unknown (tothe international community) information relating to co-operation betweenPakistan and North Korea in the nuclear and missile fields. These sources saythat Maj Gen (retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani, Pakistan's Ambassador to the US, who isa close personal friend of Gen Pervez Musharraf, has informed Gen Musharraf thatafter the North Korean nuclear test of October 9, 2006,, the US intelligence hasbeen asked to do an update of a National Intelligence Estimate of 2002 onPakistan-North Korea nuclear co-operation and to talk to Mrs Benazir Bhutto andMr Nawaz Sharif, former Pakistani Prime Ministers, about it. Details of thereported National Intelligence Estimate were given by Mr Seymour Hersh, thewell-known investigative journalist, in anarticle published by the New Yorker magazine on January 27,2003. 

While Pakistan's military relationship with North Korea in the field ofpurchase and joint development of conventional weapons dates back to the periodbefore the outbreak of the Indo-Pak war of 1971, the co-operation in the missileand nuclear fields dates back to the visit of Mrs Benazir Bhutto, the then PrimeMinister, to Pyongyang in 1993. The visit and the resulting discussions onbilateral co-operation in the field of missile purchase and development werefacilitated by China.

The Chinese entities, which were supplying the M-9 and M-11 missiles toPakistan, had come under intense scrutiny by the US during the tenure (1988-92)of Mr George Bush, the father of the present President, and the subsequenttenure of President Bill Clinton. This pressure partly contributed to theChinese decision to put Pakistan in touch with North Korea and facilitate theacquisition of North Korean missiles and related technology by Islamabad. Mrs Bhutto's talks in Pyongyang were successful and led to the signing of a formalagreement on this subject in 1995.

Pakistan's missile and nuclear relationship with North Korea since then hasproceeded as follows:

• 1993-97: The co-operation  was confined to missiles and missile-related technology.
  
  
• 1997-2003: The co-operation was expanded to cover the nuclear field. What was initially a missile for cash and wheat  deal became a missiles and missile know-how for nuclear material and nuclear know-how barter deal. This decision to convert it into a barter deal was attributable partly to the cash crunch faced by Pakistan, the difficulties faced by Pakistan in procuring wheat from abroad for supplying to North Korea and North Korea's decision to go nuclear and the reported Chinese reluctance to help it directly since the Chinese nuclear entities were under close watch by the US intelligence.The Pakistan-North Korea nuclear co-operation took the form of transfer of know-how, visits of North Korean nuclear scientists to Pakistani nuclear establishments, the presence of North Korean nuclear scientists during the nuclear tests carried out by Pakistan at Chagai in May,1998, and the supply of centrifuges for uranium enrichment to North Korea.

This led to a re-examination by Pakistan and North Korea—with the reportedknowledge of China—of the mode of a transport used till then and to thedecision to transport the material thereafter by train via China and by roadfrom the Xinjiang Province of China via the Karakoram Highway, initially builtwith Chinese assistance in the 1960s and the 1970s and now being upgraded, alsowith Chinese assistance.

The policy of General Pervez Musharraf has been to accept only those aspectsof the co-operation about which the US has obtained credible evidence and denythe rest and to put all the blame on Dr.A.Q. Khan, the nuclear scientist. Till2003, Musharraf denied the supply of centrifuges and admitted it only after ithad been established by the US. He has not so far admitted any Pakistani role inassisting North Korea in the field of plutonium re-processing and the use of theoverland route for the proliferation activities.

The nervousness in Islamabad after the North Korean nuclear test  is dueto, firstly, fears that fresh enquiries by the US might bring out hithertounadmitted (by Pakistan) aspects of its co-operation  with North Korea;secondly, fears that the pressure on it to hand over A.Q.Khan for interrogationby US investigators might increase; and, thirdly, that Mrs Benazir Bhutto and MrNawaz Sharif, who were considerably  in the picture about this c-operation,might reveal the details to the US because of their anger over Musharraf'srefusal  to let them return to Pakistan and contest next year's electionsto the National Assembly. If rightly approached by the US, Mrs Bhutto and MrSharif might be inclined to speak about the role of the Army---particularlyMusharraf--in this co-operation, but not about their own role. According tothese sources, Musharraf is particularly nervous that Mrs Bhutto, who is moreknowledgeable than Mr Sharif, might start talking about this co-operation withthe Americans. It is to pre-empt her doing so that he has reportedly been tryingto make some political overtures to her.

The present visit to the US of Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, the head of Pakistan'sStrategic and Plan Division, who oversees the nuclear and missile programme onbehalf of Musharraf—whether the visit  it is at his instance or inresponse to a summons from the US—is being utilised by him to remove anymisperceptions in the US about Pakistan's role, explain its reluctance to handover Khan and to project Pakistan as willing to co-operate with the US in anyfurther investigation. He has been meeting Congressional aides—since mostCongressmen are busy with the Congressional elections—research scholars ofthink-tanks and proliferation experts. He also held an unattributable (to him)briefing for the media in the Pakistani Embassy in Washington.

During his interactions, Lt Gen Kidwai has reportedly been making thefollowing points:

• A.Q.Khan gave the centrifuges to North Korea for the low grade enrichment of uranium for the production of electricity and not high grade enrichment for military purposes.
  
• A.Q.Khan has had no role in helping North Korea in respect of the plutonium reprocessing technology or weapon design.
  
  
• However, if the US wants fresh enquiries to be  made, Pakistan will be willing to co-operate without handing over Khan.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai.