The recent incidents of Naxalite (left-wing extremist) violence in Orissa has once again highlightedthe expansion and consolidation of extremist movement in the state. Ten security forces (SF) personnel werekilled and eight others were injured in a landmine blast triggered by the People's War Group (PWG) nearBhijengiwada village under the Kalimela police station-limits, Malkangiri district, on the Orissa-AndhraPradesh border, on July 30.
The incident occurred when the SF personnel were on a combing operation to flush out Naxalites during the'martyrs' week,' observed every year by the PWG between July 28 and August 3, to commemorate Naxalites who hadlost their lives in the protracted conflict. On the same day, alert Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and statepolice personnel foiled an attempt by the Naxalites to attack the Motu police station in the same district. OnAugust 1, Naxalites of the PWG killed a panchayat samiti (local body) member of the Teleraj panchayat,Kasa Madhi, again in the Malkangiri district.
These attacks have not only exposed the vulnerability of inter-state border districts to Naxalite violence,but also the lack of preparation on the part of the state government to fight Left Wing extremism. In fact,even before the beginning of the 'martyrs' week', there were reports of an increase in Naxalite activities inMalkangiri, Rayagada and Koraput districts bordering Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. Over the past few weeks,the Naxalites had held several meetings in these districts to mobilize tribals and plan future strategies.There were apprehensions that - as in the past - the Naxalites could attack government properties and policestations to mark the occasion, and the government had sounded a 'red alert' and launched combing operations inthese districts. On July 23, the Police arrested 17 hardcore Naxalites in Rayagada and Malkangiri districtsand recovered a huge quantity of explosives from their possession.
Over the years, Naxal groups such as the PWG and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) have established theirpresence in districts in Orissa that border Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. While the PWG isactive in the Malkangiri, Rayagada, Gajapati, Ganjam, Koraput and Nabrangpur districts bordering AndhraPradesh, the MCC is steadily increasing its presence in Sundergarh, Mayurbhanj and Keonjhar districtsbordering Jharkhand and West Bengal. A careful examination of the growth of the Naxalite movement in Orissawould demonstrate that, apart from internal factors such as underdevelopment, poor functioning of institutionsof civil governance, the persistence of traditional structure of exploitations in rural and tribal areas, andan ill-equipped police force, growing Naxalite violence in the neighbouring states has influenced the courseof events in Orissa.
The Naxalbari movement in the late 1960s had a significant impact on the neighbouring districts of Koraput andGanjam on the Andhra Pradesh border and Mayurbhanj on the West Bengal border. A state Coordination Committeehad been constituted on March 14, 1968, with D.B.M. Patnaik as its Convenor. In 1969, the CoordinationCommittee was dissolved and the different regions of the state were attached to the Naxalite organizations ofthe neighbouring states. Thus, the Koraput and Ganjam districts of South Orissa were put under thejurisdiction of the Srikakulam regional committee in Andhra Pradesh, while Mayurbhanj and Balasore districtsof North Orissa were linked to the West Bengal coordination committee. The Sambhalpur and Sundergarh districtsof North West Orissa were attached to the South Bihar committee.
Over the years, as the Naxalite groups intensified their activities in the neighbouring states, theyincreasingly began using territories in Orissa for hideouts, maintenance of training camps and the recruitmentof tribals into their cadres. For some time now, Naxalite groups have been attempting to form a corridor ofstrongholds running through Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar and West Bengal, up to SouthNepal.
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The expansion of Naxalite activities in Orissa intensified after the PWG formed the Andhra-Orissa BorderSpecial Zonal Committee (AOBSZC) in 2001. The AOBSZC covers the four north coastal districts of Andhra Pradesh- East Godavari, Visakhapatnam, Vijayanagaram and Srikakulam - and the five districts of southern Orissamentioned above. After the formation of the AOBSZC, there has been a spurt in Naxalite activities in thebordering districts.
The biggest ever strike of its kind in Orissa took place on August 9, 2001, when approximately 230 armedNaxalites of the PWG launched simultaneous attacks on Kalimela and Motu police stations in Malkangiridistrict. They killed six police personnel and injured approximately 22 others, and took away a huge quantityof arms and ammunition. Two Naxalite 'commanders' were also killed in the incident. Official sources disclosethat, while 30 of the Naxalites were suspected to have come from the bordering East Godavari district ofneighbouring Andhra Pradesh, the rest were local activists.
Since then, the Andhra-Orissa border areas have become increasingly vulnerable. On December 5, 2002, anestimated 18 police personnel belonging to the Orissa Special Armed Police (OSAP) were injured in a landmineblast triggered by the PWG near Kolnara on the Rayagada-Behrampur state highway. On November 26, 2002,Naxalites of the PWG killed the district secretary of the Biju Janata Dal (BJD), Jajati Sahu, in Naira villageunder Gunupur subdivision, Rayagada district. On September 25, 2002, Naxalites beat to death an activist ofthe Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) at Malyamkunda village, bordering Chhattisgarh. On August 11, 2002, sevensecurity force personnel were killed and another five injured in a landmine blast triggered by the PWG in theGunupur sub-division of Rayagada district.
Similarly, there has been a spurt in Naxalite activities in the Orissa-Jharkhand border areas as well. InApril 2003, Naxalites of the MCC looted approximately 550 kilograms of explosives in the Sundergarh districtin Orissa and sneaked into the dense Saranda forests in the West Singhbum district of Jharkhand. Theexplosives were intended for the Steel Authority of India's Meghahatuburu mine in West Singhbhum. Earlier, thevulnerability of the Saranda forest area had come to light on December 20, 2002, when Naxalites laid an ambushon a Police convoy, killing 18 and injuring 20 at Bitkilsoya in the Manoharpur police station-limits. Theyalso looted an unspecified quantity of arms and ammunition and set ablaze 11 vehicles in the convoy. On April20, 2003, Naxalites of the MCC set three houses on fire in Karamapada village in Jharkhand, two and halfkilometers from the Orissa border. In the last week of March 2003, a BJP worker was killed at Siding villagein Jharkhand, about 6 km from Jareikela, Orissa.
In most of these districts, a host of local factors such as poverty and exploitation of the tribals, havegiven the PWG an opportunity to consolidate its base. Naxalite groups have made concerted efforts to sharpenthe economic differences in the countryside, aggravating local problems and widening their recruitment base.In the month of December 2002, Naxalites of the PWG conducted a series of attacks on houses of rich farmers, governmentgodowns, private granaries and even Panchayat stocks, and looted approximately 1,000 quintals of rice.
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Later, the rice was reportedly redistributed among poor tribals. On December 16, 2002, PWG cadres lootedapproximately 100 quintals of rice from a government godown in Malavaram village, Kalimela block, Malkangiridistrict. The PWG had also looted food grain from a godown in Koimetla village under the Kalimela policestation limits in Malkangiri district on December 15, 2002. The Naxalite groups had been mobilizing localtribals against local government officials, including police and forest department officials as also electedrepresentatives, through their front organizations Chasi Mula Mukti Sangha and the Krushak-MuliaMukti Sanhga in areas bordering Jharkhand as well. They had also launched a drive to recruit youngsters inthe 15-19 age group.
To curb Naxalites activities, the state government has relied more on concerted police action and jointcombing operation with the Police Forces of neighbouring Andhra Pradesh and Jharkhand. Speaking in the stateLegislative Assembly on March 27, 2003, Chief Minister Navin Patnaik claimed that the police had achieved'unprecedented success' in destroying Naxalite hideouts and training camps in the state. He disclosed that,during the preceding year, one India Reserve (IR) battalion and Orissa state Armed Police (OSAP) battalionseach had been raised to deal exclusively with Naxalite and extremist activities. Moreover, the policedepartment had also launched a public contact campaign in the districts of Rayagada and Malkangiri districtsto counter the anti-government propaganda carried out by Naxalites.
Surprisingly, the state government is still to ban the PWG. In fact, after the July 30-landmine blast, theOrissa Police Havaldar and Constable Association had demanded the proscription of the group, and hadthreatened a boycott of duties in the Naxalite-affected belt unless the government banned the outfit.Similarly, the Home Guards of the states have reportedly threatened to withdraw from anti-Naxal operationsafter August 15, 2003, if the government did not provide them with adequate facilities and benefits.
Speaking to media persons in Bhubneshwar on August 2, the President of the All Orissa Home GuardsKarmachari Mahasangha, Gangadhar Panigrahy, disclosed that the Home Guards were not even provided boots,though they worked in jungle terrain. "Let alone any fire arms, Home Guards are not even given lathis (batons)",he said. Moreover, unlike the neighbouring states, the Orissa government has yet to formulate a package forthe surrender and rehabilitation of Naxalites who seek to abandon violence.
Clearly, a coherent strategy to deal with the expansion and consolidation of Naxalite groups in backwardtribal areas of Orissa is yet to be formulated. An efficient and effective local administration, betterpolicing at the grassroots level, effective coordination with law enforcing agencies of neighbouring states,and the restoration of faith in democratic politics among the tribals will be necessary to counter the furtherexpansion of Naxalite violence in one of the most underdeveloped regions of the country
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Sanjay K. Jha is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management. Courtesy, South AsiaIntelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal.
