Musharraf Or Worse?

"After me, the fundamentalist deluge in Pakistan."  

That is the fear Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the military dictator of Pakistan, has successfully planted in theminds of many policy-makers and moulders of public opinion in the USA, by skilfully projecting before themcarefully cultivated images of himself as an anti-terrorist warrior, who has taken  upon himself, attremendous risk to himself and his political future, a courageous fight against religious extremism andinternational terrorism and by waving before them the spectre of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-wieldingterrorists assuming control of Pakistan were he to be thwarted in his efforts to continue in power by hook orby crook and were he to be pressurised to totally give up his use of terrorism as a weapon to achievePakistan's strategic objective of annexing Jammu & Kashmir.

That is the over-all impression in my mind after a short visit to the US last week, the second sinceFebruary, 2002.

I was reminded of another military dictator who held American political and public opinion to ransom foryears by creating in them the fear of "after me, the Communist deluge".  His name was Gen.Pinochet. Apprehending a Communist take-over were he to be discarded, the USA blindly supported his massacreof democracy in the name of saving democracy from Communism.

Similarly, one could discern an anxiety to support Musharraf right or wrong, lest undue pressure on himweaken his perceived (in US eyes) contribution to the war against terrorism being waged by the internationalcoalition led by the US.  The creator and the creation of WMD-threatening terrorism in Afghanistan andPakistan continues to be supported in the name of thereby saving the civilised world from religious terrorism.

The man, who contributed enthusiastically to the creation of  Pakistan's WMD-threatening Army of Islamin the 1980s  under the pretext of saving the Islamic world from Communism, is now being supported in thehope that he is the only Pakistani who can help the USA in getting rid of this pernicious Army, which hastaken its jehad right into the USA and has started dreaming of the day when it could replicate Bosnia in theUSA by successfully waging a jehad for the creation of a "Muslim homeland" in the USA through thesurrogates of American Muslims recruited and trained in the terrorist camps of Pakistan in increasing numbers.

However, the support to Musharraf, though  still as strong as in February, 2002, is no longer as blindas it was then.  During my discussions with my interlocutors in February, I had said: "You arefighting the war against terrorism with your eyes half-closed.  You are afraid of opening your eyesfully, lest you start seeing Musharraf for what he really is--the fomentor, the instigator and the sponsor ofterrorism in the name of freedom-struggle.  Unless and until you open your eyes fully, you will gonowhere in your war against terrorism."

It was gratifying to see the eyes opening, but not yet fully and not as rapidly as they should.  Thereis now a greater convergence of views between India and the USA on the real dimensions of themilitary-sponsored terrorism radiating from the hub of Pakistan. Before February, 2002, India's arguments thatwhat one is witnessing in Jammu & Kashmir is no longer Kashmiri militancy, but pure and simple PakistaniPunjabi terrorism in the name and under the guise of the Kashmiris fell on deaf ears.

Now, the ears are no longer as deaf as they were before.  One is heard---patiently, attentively andwith much greater understanding than before February.  One could sense a  realisation, stillhesitant, that Jammu & Kashmir is the victim and not the cause of terrorism of the most brutal kindinfecting the world from Pakistan.

One is gratified by a willingness--- not yet whole-hearted--- to admit in tete-a-tete discussions that thewar against terrorism cannot be decisively won unless and until the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistaniterritory--whether directed against India, the USA, Israel or the rest of the world-- is destroyed truly andpermanently and not in a make-believe manner as Musharraf did after his televised address of January 12, 2002.

Unfortunately, however, this greater openness and receptivity to India's case has not yet led to arealisation that in its charge against terrorism, the USA is riding the wrong horse.  Despite all hisdeformities, Musharraf is still the best horse available.  That  continues to be the prevailingwisdom in the USA.

How to end permanently the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan by working through Musharraf and not bydiscarding him? That is the question often posed, whomsoever one met.  The alternative to Musharraf canor will be worse. That is the fear still influencing opinion and decision-making in the US.  Despite hispost-January 12 perfidy, there is still a readiness to see him as a genuinely-reformed man who wants to put anend to terrorism in Pakistani territory.

It is pointed out that Pakistan is not Afghanistan and that what the US did in Afghanistan, it cannot inPakistan.  One has to find a different way of dealing with the problem, it is said.

Arguments that there will be no end to terrorism without an end to the pernicious role of theInter-Services Intelligence (ISI), that no military dictator will voluntarily defang the ISI, that only agenuinely-elected political leadership, free from the stranglehold of the military-intelligence establishmentand fully backed by the US and the rest of the democratic world, can be expected to rid Pakistan of this eviletc  are heard, but not yet accepted.

The argument that if Pakistan has to be decontaminated of the virus of terrorism, the Army has to go backto the barracks and Musharraf sent on his long overdue superannuation does not have many takers. Statistics toshow that Pakistan-sponsored terrorism goes up when the military is in power, that all the seven hijackingsagainst India were carried out by Pakistan-sheltered terrorists when the Army was in power and thatdemocratically-elected political leaderships have co-operated more genuinely with the rest of the world indealing with terrorism and narcotics smuggling than military leaderships are noted, but without anydiscernible  impact on the minds of many interlocutors.

Despite this, India should keep up its efforts to make the USA see the reality that is Pakistan and that is Musharraf.  The brutal murder of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, the grenade attack in anIslamabad church, the murder of 11 French experts and the latest explosion outside the US Consulate in Karachihave caused  the incipient signs of an unease in the USA over Pakistan and Musharraf.

At the same time, there is still considerable reluctance to come to terms with reality.  To make thathappen should continue to be the principal objective of Indian diplomacy. 

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently,Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai)