Lonely At The Top

Nothing perhaps says more about how the world has changed since Sept. 11, 2001 than the isolation in whichthe US finds itself today. It seems more like ages ago since students in Iran were holding candlelight vigilsfor the victims of the Sept 11 attacks and the Europeans unanimously voted to consider the attack on the US asattack on all NATO members.

With American casualties in Iraq mounting and weapons of mass destruction remaining elusive, Deputy DefenseSecretary Paul Wolfowitz told Congress recently that he is suspicious of United Nations offers of help becausethey might entail some constraints on US actions. The latest US call for UN support in Iraq should not bemisunderstood – help is welcomed, but only on American terms, and only so long as Washington retainsultimate control over Iraq's reconstruction.

Americans have been wondering why the world has not rallied to our side in the last two years on problemsfrom Iraq to North Korea, and our leaders have provided convenient answers. "They hate our freedom"or "they envy our success" or "criticism just goes with the territory of being the topdog," we are told.

Glibness, however, requires gullibility.

Take first the very notion of America battling alone in the face of envy and hatred. The outpouring ofsympathy and support that occurred around the world on Sept. 12, when even the French newspaper Le Mondeproclaimed "We Are All Americans" should have put that notion to rest. If it didn't, certainly thenumber of world leaders, from India to Canada, backing UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in his offer of help inIraq showed a worldwide willingness to help with reconstruction, even though most nations had opposed the war.

The real problem here is not so much foreign hostility as America's insistence on going it alone in its ownway. Wolfowitz's testimony is the tip-off. The United States would rather be in absolute control than acceptany help that might in any way dilute that authority or that might even slightly complicate US operations.

This was evident in the case of Afghanistan long before the Iraq question arose. Immediately after Sept.11, America's longtime allies in NATO literally begged Washington to include their troops in the invasion ofAfghanistan, to no avail. It would be easier and faster simply to move alone, the Pentagon said.

The lack of interest in NATO and UN help is the natural result of the adoption by the United States of theradical new doctrine of preventive and pre-emptive war developed by Wolfowitz and a small group of self-styledneo-conservatives after the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991.

Although the US won the Cold War with a strategy of deterrence, and by building alliances and multilateralinstitutions such as NATO, the UN and the World Trade Organization, the new thinking argued for militarysuperiority such that no other power would even consider a challenge. In foreign policy, this thinking alsodemanded a unilateral approach, based on the view that while friends are nice to have, they're really notnecessary for the US to achieve its objectives.

Much discussed and partly adopted during the 1990s, this doctrine of pre-emption and "coalitions ofthe willing" in place of deterrence and alliances became the foundation of US strategy after Sept. ll. Inthe world of the 21st century, it was argued, the threats will be so dire and immediate that we must beprepared to strike first, and perhaps alone, to avoid being struck.

Of course, to be credible as something other than an excuse for permanent war, such a strategy must bebased on accurate intelligence about the immediacy and seriousness of the threat.

In the run-up to the recent Iraq war, the Bush administration repeatedly emphasized that Iraqi dictatorSaddam Hussein had large numbers of weapons of mass destruction that could be unleashed against the UnitedStates at any moment. Other countries harbored doubts, but, claiming superior knowledge as well as virtue, theUnited States overrode allied requests for further investigation and deterrence and set course for war with a"coalition of the willing."

In the aftermath, we have learned not only that our intelligence was faulty, but that while we can win themilitary battles by ourselves, we really need help with what comes afterward. Yet our doctrine and operatingstyle inhibit us from getting that help.

Despite our great power, it is clear that beyond the battlefield there is little that we can accomplish byourselves in an increasingly globalized world. We can't fight the wars on terror and drugs by ourselves, norcan we run the world economy or deal with epidemics such as AIDS and SARS, or problems like global warming, byourselves. We need help and friends, yet our inconsistent attitudes and policies are a source of constantdisappointment to those who would be our friends.

Examples of this recurring problem can be found from South Korea to Afghanistan, but perhaps the mosttroubling example of American inconsistency is international trade. During his recent trip to Africa, Bushtalked about helping fight AIDS and promoting investment and economic development.

But like all of his Republican and Democratic predecessors, he failed even to suggest the one thing thatwould make all the difference. Despite all of America's rhetoric about the glories of free trade and all itspressure on countries like China and Japan to open up their markets, American leaders never suggest cuttingsubsidies for US agribusiness. Consider that, in West Africa, farmers using oxen and hand ploughs can producea pound of cotton for 23 cents while in the Mississippi Delta it costs growers using air conditioned tractorsand satellite-guided fertilizer systems 80 cents a pound. Logically, the US farmers ought to be switching tosoybeans or something else they can grow more competitively. Instead, they are expanding their planting andtaking sales away from the African growers in export markets. How can they do this? Via subsidies to the tuneof $5 billion. Not surprisingly, Muslim West Africa does not see America as a friend and force for good and isincreasingly listening to the mullahs who call America the "Great Satan."

Thus does America checkmate itself by eschewing offers of help and insisting on total control whilealienating those who would be friends by talking the talk but not walking the walk. It should be clear by nowthat the doctrine of pre-emptive war and coalitions of the willing can no longer be maintained. The failure tofind those weapons of mass destruction in Iraq means that future US warnings of imminent threats will be metwith disbelief by the rest of the world and the American public.

Moreover, it is clear that the United States is already stretched to the limit by the effort in Iraq andcould not contemplate any significant additional interventions without real help from the internationalcommunity. But others will not proffer this help without getting some say in the policy-making process.

Thus, the way forward is to return to the multilateralism that won the Cold War, and to work on correctingour inconsistencies rather than telling ourselves it doesn't matter what the rest of the world thinks. Infact, it makes all the difference, because, in the shrunken world of the 21st century, we won't be able toachieve our objectives without friends.

Clyde Prestowitz is president of the Economic Strategy Institute and author of"Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions." Rights: © 2003 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization. YaleGlobal