Is China A Neurotic State?

China is a great power in making and the Chinese elite are conscious of that. All countries in the world recognise Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and are in awe ofits rapid development -- the railways being the most famous example. Even the Dalai Lama insists that Tibet's future is within China.

What then makes China so sensitive when it comes to the Tibet question? How does one explain its almost paranoid state? The answer does not lie in putative notion of timeless Chinese culture but in a mix of strategic location of Tibet, regime type and, most importantly, modern Chinese nationalism.

Contrary to popular belief, China is not a closed society. Debates and dissent are part and parcel oflife--except on matters of national security. But, yes, the state does not dialogue with those dubbed as separatists.And, unfortunately, all protests in Tibet are viewed from the lens of 'splittism'-- even when they are over issues that fall well within Chinese constitutional framework.

As we saw during the recent events, within China the news of the protests was strictly controlled and represented solely as unacceptable ethnic violence conducted against innocent Han and Hui Chinese by very few Tibetans instigated by the"Dalai clique".

If the past is any guide, we can now expect an increased repression, policing, surveillance, and 'patriotic education' in Tibet but no attempt to understand why, despite years of rule and serious efforts by China to develop Tibet economically and to allow significant religious and cultural freedom, some Tibetans protest knowing fully well the high cost of it.

The Dalai Lama's bending over backwards to show how he remains committed to Tibet being an autonomous region within China has won him no kudos from China.

The intolerance of protests is not unique to the Tibetan case. The public face of politics at the top-level remains stage-managed for the domestic as well as international audience. If this is the case in mainland China, what else can one expect in Tibet which is seen as strategicallyimportant?

One should note that China's conceptualisation of Tibet as a site of strategic vulnerability is a direct product of British invasion of Tibet in 1904. The imperialist invasion radically altered the Chinese perception of Tibet--the traditional loose political control characteristic of the Qing imperial rule was no longer acceptable in the nationalising China. The Qing court, regional governors,nationalists, communists-- all major actors in the rapidly changing China in the first part of the 20th century now conceptualised Tibet's position as strategic bulwark against hostile incursions from the south of the Himalayas.

However, a focus on the location of Tibet in geographically strategic context (say vis-a-vis India) does not fully explain China's sensitivity. The most important factor is the role of Tibet in modern Chinese nationalist imaginary.

Contemporary Chinese claim over Tibet is based on a version of Chinese history that sees the present-day nation-state as a successor to a longer history of Chinese civilization marked by a number of imperial phases. Tibet was historically linked with various Chinese empires and therefore it is'an integral' part of modern China. What was the exact nature of Tibet's status is not deemed a crucial factor; what is held to be important is Tibet's political subservience to the Sino-centric empires. This historical subservience is argued as affirming Chinese sovereignty over Tibet forever. The Western vocabulary of sovereignty is adopted as easily translatable to capture traditional Sino-Tibetan historicalrelations.

Tibet's religio-political relations with Sino-centric rulers (often Buddhist Mongols and Manchus) was of mchod-yon (patron-priest). Modern Chinese translation of this as'domestic affair of China' was part of a wider development at the start of the 20th century when nationalism emerged strongly. China, imagined as a modern nation, maintained a schizophrenic attitude toward its imperial past, especially toward the Manchus (Qing court).

While the Manchus and other 'barbarians' were held responsible for the decline of the'great' Han Chinese civilisation and for failing to adjust and counter the rising European (and Japanese) powers, the territorial legacy of the Qing empire was seen as legitimate. The minoritisation of Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, Hui, and several other 'nationalities' went hand in hand with the construction of 'Han' identity as the leading force within the multi-national Chinese nationalism.

In this nationalising China, traditional religio-political fuzzy relations that marked Tibet's relations with the Qing court and, before that, with the Mongols, were seen as anomalous and sovereignty talk along absolutist European lines became dominant.

The development of modern Chinese nationalism was consciously inclusive. Despite the overwhelming 'Han' (a constructed category in itself) majority, political elite of all shades were careful in imagining China as consisting of different nationalities marching together to modernise the new China. After PRC was formed in 1949, the communist party went out of its way to fashion a unitary state that was based on an inclusive nationality policy.

Recognition, accommodation, assimilation, and repression were all part of the evolving state-majority-minority relations. While officially all nationalities were equal, there was a strong paternalist assumption of Hans being the'elder brother' who will help other more backward but colourful minorities to develop.

But what if the 'younger brother' refuses to be grateful? Do you punish or listen? This is what Chinese state faces with Tibetans and it should realise that its best interlocutor is the Dalai Lama. The neurotic state of China is more a symptom of fear than of strength. One wonders whatChina is afraid of! A stable prosperous China that accommodates and respects its diverse population and deals with dissent within its constitutional framework is what Chinese people of all nationalities deserve and the world expects.

Dr Dibyesh Anand is a reader in international relations at Westminster University in London and has recently authored Geopolitical Exotica: Tibet in Western Imagination.