'[Indians] Are Such Bastards'

Recently declassified 'Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972' contain awealth of information on what the then American President Richard Nixon and hisassistant for NSA Henry Kissinger thought of India, and provide a fascinatinginsight into how the duo sought to play the Russians and the Chinese in thosecrucial days of 1971

135. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for NationalSecurity Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 26, 1971, 10:38-10:44 a.m.


Kissinger: Indira Gandhi has written you a letter.

Nixon: I know about—

Kissinger: Well, no. We should answer it. Let me say one other thing.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: Well you can tell her—you can use it to bring pressure onher not to take military action. Also, I talked to the Pakistan Ambassador. Hesaid that Yahya might appreciate a letter, which would give him an excuse toanswer all the things by saying, listing all the things he’s doing because hecan’t get any publicity here.

Nixon: No.

Kissinger: And conversely, Indira Gandhi, I checked with the IndianAmbassador, they’re getting so devious now—

Nixon: She wants—

Kissinger: She would like to be able to say that one result of her letterwas—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —that you’ve written to Yahya. So everybody’s happy. ThePakistanis—

Nixon: But we don’t say anything against Yahya?

Kissinger: No, no. You just say you hope the refugees will soon be ableto go back to East Pakistan. He will then reply to you that’s exactly what hewants. I’ve got it all arranged with the—

Nixon: Good. Go ahead.

Kissinger: —Embassy. Then you can take credit. You can tell the Indiansto pipe down—

Nixon: Yeah. 

Kissinger: And we’ll keep Yahya happy.

Nixon: The Indians need—what they need really is a—

Kissinger: They’re such bastards.

Nixon: A mass famine. But they aren't going to get that. We're going tofeed them—a new kind of wheat. But if they're not going to have a famine thelast thing they need is another war. Let the goddamn Indians fight a war[unclear].

Kissinger: They are the most aggressive goddamn people around there.

Nixon: The Indians?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Sure.

--

136. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for NationalSecurity Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 4, 1971, 9:42–9:51 a.m.

Nixon: I told Keating that I would see him—he was there last night at thislittle party we had—and I told him I would see him when he came back, late andin the middle of June, just before the Foreign Minister came. And I thinkwe’ll just have him for a half hour and then have him—

Kissinger: I saw him leaving.

Nixon: I also told him that, I said the problem here is that we just got to besure we don’t get involved in an internal conflict, be pulled one way oranother, so forth and so on.

Kissinger: He’s almost fanatical on this issue.

Nixon: Well what the hell does he think we should do about it?

Kissinger: Oh he thinks—I tell you, he thinks we should cut off all militaryaid, all economic aid, and in effect help the Indians to push the Pakistanis outof—

Nixon: Push—I don’t want him to come in with that kind of jackass thing withme.

Kissinger: Mr. President, actually we’ve got to keep Yahya, we have to keepYahya [unclear] public executions for the next month. 

Nixon: Look, even apart from the Chinese thing, I wouldn’t do that to help theIndians, the Indians are no goddamn good. Now Keating, like every Ambassador whogoes over there, goes over there and gets sucked in. He now thinks the—

Kissinger: Those sons-of-bitches, who never have lifted a finger for us, whyshould we get involved in the morass of East Pakistan? All the more so, I quiteagree with the point, if East Pakistan becomes independent, it is going tobecome a cesspool. It’s going be 100 million people, they have the loweststandard of living in Asia—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: No resources. They’re going to become a ripe field for Communistinfiltration. And then they’re going to bring pressure on India because ofWest Bengal. So that the Indians in their usual idiotic way are playing forlittle stakes, unless they have in the back of their minds that they could turnEast Pakistan into a sort of protectorate that they could control from Calcutta.That they may have in the back of their mind.

Nixon: Oh, what they had in the back of their mind was to destroy Pakistan. 

137. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant forNational Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador to India (Keating),Washington, June 15, 1971, 5:13-5:40 p.m.


Nixon: Like all of our other Indian ambassadors, he’s been brainwashed.Completely throw in [unclear]. Anti-Pakistan.

Keating: All right, now let me—

Nixon: Where are your sandals?

Keating: Give me—

Nixon: [unclear]

Keating: Give me 5 minutes.

Nixon: I hope you haven’t turned the Embassy over to those hippies like yourpredecessor. [unclear exchange]

Keating: Let me have 5 minutes to—

Nixon: Go ahead.

Keating: —just give you a little background. Then you want to ask me somequestions about the Foreign Minister.

Nixon: Go ahead. No, I—he should meet with the Foreign Minister, don’t youthink so?

Kissinger: Yeah. Are you going to leave—

Keating: Yes, I’ll be—

Nixon: I think he ought to come in with him. [unclear]

Kissinger: [unclear]

Nixon: The point is, the point is it’s best to get you with the ForeignMinister. If he wants to talk to us, talk to the Ambassador. We don’t normallyhave ambassadors in. I’d get some iced tea? Would you like iced tea?

Keating: No, no.

Nixon: Booze?

Keating: No, nothing.

Nixon: Coffee?

Kissinger: Coffee.

Nixon: Maybe coffee.

Keating: Now in all seriousness—

Nixon: India thinks that they’re [unclear], you’re a good Ambassador, Iknow.

Keating: They are difficult.

Nixon: I listen to it all the time. 

Keating: The Indians are—

Nixon: [unclear exchange]

Keating: Let me say personally, I’m delighted that you’re starting off thatway because—

Nixon: I’m not [unclear].

Keating: Don’t let any of these bastards get you down. And you’re not,that’s great. That—I don’t mean any.

Nixon: Yeah.

Keating: The Indians are difficult, and time after time I’ve had to talk tothem, to have stood up to them on Vietnam and many other things. Since thiselection, and that tremendous majority she got—350 out of 520 members—thenext party to her is 27, which is the left-wing Communists. The next party isthe right-wing Communists, 25. Because you expect India to—

Nixon: Yeah.

Keating: But the rightist parties were completely wiped out. And since that timethere has been evidence of greater stability and a better relationship with us.

Nixon: That’s good.

Keating: Let me give you chapter and verse of two things. Remington Rand andUnion Carbide have big interests there. Union Carbide very big. They’ve beentrying for several years to get a license to extend their activities. Allbureaucrat stuff from one ministry to another. Three weeks after the electionthey were called in and said we’re going to approve your license. Get going.We need employment. Have as much of your product as possible, export oriented,but get going and there will be no delay. And the presidents of the Indiancompanies of those two concerns came in to see me. And we’ve been trying tohelp. Just delightful, and they are. I went to call on the new Minister ofIndustrial Development, Choudhury [Moinul Haq], who succeeded my friend Mr.Dinesh Singh, the son-of-a-bitch, and he is a top notch. Just top notch. And Ihad a conversation with him that I have never had since I’ve been in India. Hesaid, now Mr. Ambassador, we have a list, as you know, of things in the publicsector. We have things in the private sector. We have a big list of things thatcan be either public or private sector. And, by the way, he said with a smile,"I might point out to you that the percentage of our gross national productin the public sector is about half of what yours is in America." I said,"I’m aware of that." And he said, "in this 146 items, which arein the private sector, there are some that we can’t possibly fix, where weneed foreign investment. The impression has gotten abroad that we don’t wantforeign investment. I want to disabuse your mind of that. We want, and let mesay something else to you, if you have a business group from America come inthere and they want to, there is something that isn’t on that list, you comeand see me and we’ll work it out." Now, I have never had a conversationlike that with any Indian since I’ve been there. He’s top notch. He wants towork with us.

Next, Mrs. Gandhi. Our relations have always been pleasant. She has never turnedme down when I wanted an appointment. But since then, they’re more cordialsince her election. Now part of it is because she’s got this weight off hermind. She was trying to run a government with a minority party. And now she can,if she has the will, can do the things that she thinks ought to be done. Iescorted her to a concert that Mahalia Jackson gave her; if I had the time I’dtell you about it, it was the most fantastic performance and she just loved it.And she couldn’t be nicer in her dealings with me. So that I consider thatthere is a change in the situation. And I sent two cables to the Department.Henry, the numbers are 5311—New Delhi 5311—and 6031.

Nixon: [unclear]

Keating: One was sent shortly after the Army went in and started the killing inEast Pakistan.

Kissinger: Yeah, I’ve read it.

Keating: You know, it was the result of a lot of talk. It represents my—

Kissinger: The basic principle is that [unclear].

Keating: Yes. [unclear exchange] The main thing is to... I’m convinced thereis a change in the subcontinent. And that India should not be equated withPakistan. India is a strong, stable power now while Pakistan is having all thisdifficulty. The other one, the second one, had to do with the aid program and myrecommendations as to what should be done about aid. And both of those I standon as my recommendations, which—

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: No, I didn’t see that.

Nixon: Is it something to act on now?

Keating: No, no. They represent in further form my views, and they're theconsensus of my staff that is super. I have a wonderful staff, I think, andthey’re so loyal, and they’re just great.

Nixon: That’s good.

Keating: Now, I presume you’re interested in knowing what the Foreign Ministeris going to say to you. And I can only guess, but I have talked—

Nixon: What does he want? Does he want to talk about—I suppose he wants totalk about Pakistan.

Keating: Yes, that’s it. Because—

Nixon: What do they want us to do?

Keating: Well this—

Nixon: Break up Pakistan?

Keating: No. No. In the beginning they were, just as we were, for a singlePakistan after that election, because this sheik, Mujibur Rahman, was Pro-Indianand Pro-American. He was—they envisioned a different picture in that they weregoing to be friends with Pakistan. And then when the army walked in and knockedout the elections of course they were upset. There were two reasons they wereupset. That was one. The other was that there are Bengalis on both sides of theborder and they have family ties and all that. Now I went to see him to tell himabout the aid we’re to give him. And it’s greater now. And I think he’llexpress his appreciation for that, he should. I believe he will.

Nixon: What are we up to now?

Keating: Seventeen and a half million.

Kissinger: Yes.

Keating: And—

Nixon: The first one was two and a half million.

Keating: Yes, it was two and a half million when I went in.

Kissinger: The C–130s.

Keating: And the C–130s. That’s all a new—we’re doing quite a little.And he should be, I believe will be grateful. He’s a very nice fellow; Idon’t know that you’ve met him.

Nixon: No.

Keating: Very kind fellow. Now, beyond that, he will say, as he did to me:"This aid is great. We appreciate it very much." But he said the basicproblem is to try to get these refugees back into Pakistan. We cannot stand thisdrain on India, which, if it lasted for a year with the present numbers wouldcost $400 million—

Nixon: What is it, 300,000?

Kissinger: No, it’s about—

Keating: Five million. And add that it’s in a crowded part of India.

Nixon: Sorry, it was 300,000 we were feeding.

Keating: That’s right. That’s correct. About five million, and of that aboutthree of them—

Nixon: Why don’t they shoot them?

Keating: About three of them are in Calcutta. Calcutta is the size of New York.It’d be like dumping three million people into New York, except that Calcuttais in much worse shape than New York. Not too much, but it’s worse. And it’sa horrible problem. Now, he said they’re still coming at that time at 100,000a day—the latest I heard was 150,000 a day—because they’re killing theHindus. And the thing that, in the beginning, these refugees were about in theproportion to the population—85 percent Muslim, 15 percent Hindus. Becausewhen they started the killing it was indiscriminate. Now, having gotten controlof the large centers, it is almost entirely a matter of genocide killing theHindus. And the intellectual leaders, the leaders in the country that they wantto get rid of, primarily these Awami League people, they’ve killed them.They’ve outlawed the Awami League that got 98 percent of the polls, elected167 out of the 169 members of Parliament. And they arrested him as a traitor,Mujib, and they have outlawed the Awami League. Now what he is going to pleadfor, I have heard that even since I have left, they have come to the conclusionthat because of this horrible refugee problem, this is since I’ve talked toyou, they are for a political settlement of any kind in East Pakistan which willget the people back. Now the Hindus, I don’t think, will go back. But a lot ofthe Muslims would go back if there was some kind of a political settlement. AndI think he will probably urge a political settlement there. The thing that—twothings: he wants to stop the refugees coming, which means stop the killing. Andtwo, get the refugees flowing the other way back into Pakistan.

Nixon: What does he think, Ken, we should do? What would we recommend?

Keating: He thinks—I think he thinks—

Nixon: We should pressure Yahya?

Keating: Yes. I think he feels that—what he said is Russia and the UnitedStates are the only ones that can influence Yahya to stop the killing. And hesaid in my judgment the United States has more leverage with him than Russiahas. And the only way is an economic way. Of course, I understand that there’sno plan to just go on as business as usual in economics. After this consortiummeeting, the Bank and the—this informal meeting that takes place nextweek—the [World] Bank and the International Monetary Fund sent this PeterCargill [Director of the South Asia Division of the World Bank] up there. And heis going to make a report to them on what he has found and what he feels shouldbe done. And the next thing they’re going to consider it back here and take itup at that time. No commitments, I believe, are going to be made at this Parismeeting. But I suspect he will find that the situation in East Pakistan, whichYahya says is normal, or practically normal, is far from normal and won’t benormal in a year. And what the political settlement is that he can bring about,that I’m not able to get in my head because this Amin was the biggest leadernext to Mujib, he got one or two members of Parliament, and they tried to get,Yahya tried to get him to head it up and he wouldn’t touch it because he’dget his throat slit. Now they had a few, I’m told, a few members of the AwamiLeague, about nine, who are ready to help form a government. But the bitternessis so great that I believe, and indeed Joe Farland does, that the old Pakistanis through. There will be—they cannot catch this together. Joe has said thatin his cable, and I feel it very strongly. And there’s got to be a newpressure.

Now, I am conscious of the special relationship that you have with Yahya. And Irespect it and I don’t to want to—

Nixon: [unclear]

Keating: Personal relationship.

Nixon: Not only just that, but there are some other major considerations.

Keating: Well—

Nixon: Well, let me say this, when do we see Singh? Tomorrow?

Kissinger: Thursday, Mr. President.

Nixon: Thursday, fine. [Thursday was June 17. The meeting took place on June16.] 

Keating: There has been some suggestion that it will be possible for you to, Idon’t think this has come to you yet, but it’s something we’ve talkedabout in the Department—

Nixon: Yeah.

Keating: It will be so long before aid to Pakistan, in the way of developmentalaid, will be possible that a diversion, a certain amount of that, to help Indiawith its refugee problem. It might be possible for you to suggest that to him inthis meeting. That paper I don’t know whether that’s reached you yet or not.But—

Kissinger: No, no. I know about the—Connally told me about it.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: That’s a scheme they thought up of taking $25 million out of—

Nixon: The Pakistan aid—

Kissinger: The Pakistan aid and give it to India.

Nixon: I think we just better find the money to give to India.

Keating: I don’t think any, I don’t think any—I think they had about $80million for Pakistan. And it will be some time before they—

Kissinger: Well they want to take—there’s $70 million for Pakistan—well,there are two issues here. One is whether they could use it, whether thePakistanis could use it if we gave it to them. The second is how Pakistan willreact if we take money from their budget for India.

[Omitted here is a discussion unrelated to South Asia]

Nixon: Let me say this, I don’t want to give you the wrong impression aboutIndia. There are 400 million Indians.

Keating: 550.

Nixon: 550? [unclear]

Keating: There are.

Nixon: I don’t know why the hell anybody would reproduce in that damn countrybut they do. But nevertheless, I know that country is trying to make it[unclear] basically with some semblance of democracy—private enterprise, callit whatever you want. And I know that looming over from the north are theChinese [unclear]. It’s, therefore, very much in our interest to see thatIndia, we want them to succeed. Because there are 550 million people, we wantthem to do well. And they always hate us [unclear] internationally, we knowthat.

Keating: Not always.

Nixon: Not always. But that’s irrelevant. I mean [unclear] but what I’mgetting at is here, right now, you can be sure that we will play a friendly gamewith the Indians. Particularly in view of the fact that the Government is morestable, that is good, and you can take a more rational line on things likeKashmir. But the other thing is that, I think we have to realize too, that itwould not be in our interest, maybe there is going to be a Pakistan collapse,depends on what happens in the next 6 months. It may never be in our interest.But it certainly is not now for reasons we can’t go into. Under thosecircumstances, what we have to do, Ken, is to find a way to be just as generousas we can to the Indians, but also we do not want to do something that is anopen breech with Yahya—an open breech, an embarrassing situation. And that’sreally the problem. You can reassure Mrs. Gandhi, [unclear] we want to help herein every way we can [unclear].

Keating: Yes.

Nixon: And let me say, the openness as far as the Congress is concerned, therereally isn’t anything in it. [unclear] Not one goddamn bit. It’s not apopular country in this Congress.

Keating: No, I know that. I served there. I know that.

Nixon: But that is even less popular today because foreign aid is less popular.

Keating: That’s right.

Nixon: But nevertheless—

Keating: But in the Congress there’s a strong feeling on thisPakistan—India—

Nixon: I understand that, I understand that. [unclear] Hell, they had usinvolved in a civil war in Biafra, and now they want us out of Pakistan. Butnevertheless, we’ve got to take up here for reasons that go far beyondIndia-Pakistan relations another position. So we will be very, very conciliatorywith the Foreign Minister. But we must not do it in a way, I hope our Embassyhas our position on this [unclear] refugees in both Pakistan and India whereverthey are. But, on the other hand, not to allow the refugee problem to get usinvolved in the internal political problems. You see that’s our policy too. Hemight, if he asks me about it [unclear].

Keating: And we also must avoid—if possible—any conflict, armed conflict,between the two.

Nixon: Oh, God.

Keating: And the Indians, they’re pressing Mrs. Gandhi so hard, and Parliamentis now in session, the politicians are—

Nixon: Yeah.

Keating: And up to date I must say she’s been a [unclear]. They’re pressingher very hard that we can’t stand this refugee thing. We’ll just go in andtake a little piece out of Pakistan where you can put these refugees. We can’thold them here, so that means war. And he will probably bring that up.

[Omitted here is a discussion unrelated to South Asia. Nixon and Kissingercontinued their discussion after Keating left.]

Nixon: I don’t know what the Christ we are up to.

Kissinger: The most insulting way we can—

Nixon: You have to go now?

Kissinger: I have an appointment with Rush but he can wait.

Nixon: [unclear] My God, does Farland, is he sending memoranda that he thinksPakistan is finished also?

Kissinger: Baloney. He’s got this maniac in Dacca, the Consul General who isin rebellion; the point is, Mr. President, first of all, I’ve talked to theIndian Ambassador as I’ve said to you, I said you want to have a directcommunication through him with Mrs. Gandhi. That we need 3 or 4 months to workit out. We will find them some money, we will gradually move into a position tobe helpful, but we’ve got to do it our way. Just to shut them up.

Nixon: Right. Right. You told him that?

Kissinger: I told him all of that.

Nixon: We don’t tell the Foreign Minister that?

Kissinger: No, you can tell the Foreign Minister that above all. But in front ofKeating he’ll blab it all over. Yeah, I’d say we have great sympathy, butthey must be restrained. And we’ll try to find some money but we cannot takeit out of the Pakistan budget.

Nixon: Well the Ambassador will tell the Foreign Minister that.

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: But Keating will go blab it over to the State Department. What Keatinghad [unclear] Pakistan—they’re out of their goddamn minds. Of course we’renot going to take it out. That would bring down the Pakistan Government.

Kissinger: Well it would be considered such an insult by Yahya that the wholedeal would be off.

Nixon: I don’t know what the Christ he’s talking about.

Kissinger: I will, when I’m talking to the Chinese, set up a separate channelso that we’re not so vulnerable. I mean we can’t be that—

Nixon: Of course, I don’t know, Henry, it just may be that the poorson-of-a-bitch can’t survive. Five million? Is it that bad really or are theyexaggerating?

Kissinger: Of course, I don’t know how many of them they generate?

Nixon: Yeah. 

--

138. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant forNational Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Indian Foreign Minister (Singh), andthe Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco),Washington, June 16, 1971, 2:58-3:41 p.m.

Kissinger: Now on the Indian who’s waiting; the basic problem is to givehim a combination of both sympathy, so that he can go home with—to Mrs. Gandhiand—

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: —and great firmness. Now I have, in addition to what you will say,but with Sisco there you won’t have much of a chance to. I’ve told Yahyathat he had a personal channel through me to you. I’m just trying to keep them[the Indians] from attacking for 3 months. Now, if you could say that you aredirecting, that $60 million be made available for refugee support after July 1.

Nixon: Do they know that yet?

Kissinger: No. This is why it would be very helpful.

Nixon: Does Sisco know?

Kissinger: No, but it’s based on a recommendation from the State Department.

Nixon: That’s all right.

Kissinger: Out from the Embassy there. They’ll be delighted.

Nixon: Fifty thousand?

Kissinger: Yeah, and $20 million. You will see whether you can get $20 millionfrom other programs this month. Now, they wanted to take it out of Pakistan. Istopped that.

Nixon: I know.

Kissinger: But we can take a little from Turkey and a little from Indonesia andpay it back to them after July 1st. But if you could give those two figures,then you’ll get the credit for it and—

Nixon: And that we are concerned.

Kissinger: Well, he’ll have a story. And that we cannot—that you think thatovert pressure on Pakistan would have a counter-productive effect, and that youare working with Yahya in your own way. It’s a little duplicitous, but thesebastards understand that.

Nixon: I must say I am not too damned impressed with Keating. I think he’sjust gone overboard. Now I must say maybe there’s a hell of a problem on whichthe TV is starting to pick it up now.

Kissinger: Oh, it is a hell of a problem.

[Omitted here is a portion of the conversation unrelated to South Asia.]

Nixon: I don’t want to see [unclear, them start war?] just now.

Kissinger: Because you saw harm on it from Pakistan.

Nixon: I know, but I don’t want to see it more. You see? I just, they’rewasting my time. I just [unclear].

Kissinger: That really depends what we have to do. We have to keep them fromattacking for our own reasons.

[Pleasantries were exchanged as Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, Ambassadors Jhaand Keating, and Assistant Secretary of State Sisco entered the Oval Office. TheWhite House photographer was present at the beginning of the meeting.]

Singh:Our Prime Minister asked me to convey her warmth and greetings. Shegreatly appreciates your letter, the United States [unclear] conveyed in thatand she asks me to convey her greetings to you [unclear].

Nixon: Sure. I appreciate that. Tell her that we were all very impressed by hergreat political victory out there. It gave her the stability that she, that sheneeds now. It’s much, much better to look after a very successful electionlike that. [unclear] There’s a lot more to this. She has more confidence thanpreviously.

Singh:Yes [unclear]—

Nixon: Things are going well from what Ambassador Keating tells me.

Singh:Yes, she has always had confidence, but now she also has strength to—

Nixon: That’s right.

Singh:—put them on [unclear]—

Nixon: Oh, I know. I know.

Singh:And, in fact, she was looking for a period when, as a result of thisvictory—

Nixon: Yeah.

Singh:—she’d have both peace and opportunity to implement thesocio-economic content of the program on the basis of which she won.

Nixon: Uh-huh.

Singh:But suddenly she’s confronted with a—

Nixon: Yeah.

Singh:—type of situation not of her making.

Nixon: Oh. Yes.

Singh:Not to place blame here. . .

Nixon: Uh-huh.

Singh:. . . [unclear] being subjected at this present moment.

Nixon: Uh-huh.

Singh:[unclear] and she wanted to, wanted me to convey, Your Excellency, thelatest situation, as the present one has no [unclear] and we are coming and thatevery second [unclear, refugees they come?]

Nixon: Every second?

Singh:Every second. So this is the type of situation that we face. And this hascaused a tremendous problem to us, because they come in an area thattraditionally is very dependent, both politically and economically.

Nixon: Would you like some tea or coffee?

Singh:Thank you very much.

Nixon: [aside] Ken?

Singh:I’m all right.

Nixon: [aside; whispering] Some tea perhaps, please. Thank you.

Singh:[unclear]

Nixon: No, I can’t.

Singh:Politically, economically adept. And if another six million people areready to come in a state of anger, frustration, and destitute, that adds to the[unclear] ability and the social-economic tension that all of them have created.[unclear] We’ve reduced any financial [unclear]. In this situation, that weseek your advice how we should achieve that objective. But perhaps mostimportant thing in that situation [unclear] will use this movement of refugeeswhich always [unclear]. Technically, on this issue, we gave a clear [unclear,signal?]. We [unclear] the objective will be [unclear]. In this situation wherewe [unclear] many field commanders that we called feel it’s their own problem.It ceases to be an internal problem and it should affect [unclear] tension[unclear]. And it’s the best end right now that we’ve got. Support for thisapproach of ours and help with [unclear]. How to meet this objective, we believethat if the building of the [unclear] can be seen [unclear] make up their minds.[unclear] can be sure as he can be [unclear] security take [unclear].

Nixon: Hmmm.

Singh:And secondly, then, the condition that they are to be restored shouldenable you to return that. In the statements we are prepared to take, we mustperhaps create this. [unclear] And for this, obviously some political settlementis needed. You mentioned in your letter to the Prime Minister you are engaged inthis task in your quiet manner and tried to impress on them what you have done.We believe that the return from [unclear] is possibility if the military actionsof trying to solve a situation [unclear]. Apparently those people who have nowdemonstrated [unclear] that they enjoy the confidence of the people [unclear].In the long range there are really two guys [unclear]. This will be a situationin which [unclear].

Nixon: What do you think is the, what do you think is the benefit of [unclear]being able to—East Pakistan will to have to become independent, or whathappens in the long run? This does not mean that your personal view, Iknow—that’s not what I meant. How do you see the historical process workingdown there?

Singh:I have a feeling, Mr. President, that showing, telling the United Nationsthat there’s a very good chance of saving Pakistan and [unclear]. [unclear]maintain central authority in an area of confrontation of the [unclear] can theyhandle central authority?

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Singh:[unclear] There’s a very good chance to have. Even the course of thenegotiations, with all that we know, would even the Awami [unclear] more thancontained in their six-point program in the direction. [unclear] withoutdirection of this nature, and we have authority to create [unclear], so it couldbe saved. The Council has become most angered because they [unclear]. Theconfidence has been very rudely shaken. When the military rulers in Pakistan canstill bring back the country themselves, those for the present moment who findthemselves in the [unclear].

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Singh:[unclear] Then it appears that they’re pushing them more and more intothe point of, the position of the point of no return. And it appears [unclear].They must. We have an opposition quite clearly; it’s developed between thecentral authority of Pakistan and the leaders. So that [unclear] anything thatwe want to. They do not realize that from our point of view is when theyseparate from [unclear]. But we are bothered by the continuance of conditions ofinstability. Continuation of the conditions there you will find [unclear];continuation of conditions where the military rule is pitted against almostunited will of [unclear] people. [unclear] We’ll do that to maintain controlof the situation. And that is something [unclear] from our [unclear]. [unclear]from our point of view; certainly from our point of view and maybe even fromyour point of view. Because it is a holy land, trying to resort to that. Thatyour country and ours, we can work together, work in a [unclear] manner. To thatextent [unclear] stability, so much in common. We should not.

Nixon: You don’t, you don’t have a feeling that the situation would be toyour interest to have a, to have an independent country? What would be inIndia’s best interest? To have it independent or under the central government,for example—

Singh:No, we have—we have no fixed position on that.

Nixon: That’s up to them, isn’t it?

Singh:On this matter we leave it up to the Pakistanis and the leaders of theAwami League to decide about their future in any manner they like. We will notpress one or the other solution, or [unclear] to it. We are interested inobserving the neutrality in [unclear] considering the situation.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Singh:That being our fixed position.

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.

Singh:[unclear] silent spectators all [unclear] agreeing with what, to ourarrangement to [unclear] the people and until then, it seems to me, there willbe unstable conditions, at least.

Nixon: Yes.

Singh:And we are conscious of our responsibility and even when we were facingthis big trouble in the end with these people when we [unclear] did our best.[unclear] All provisions are to be clear which were settled by [unclear]extra-constitutional means. [unclear]

Nixon: Sure. First let me say that we, that you couldn’t have a man more[unclear] in so far as bringing this matter to our attention, than your ownAmbassador here. He’s talked to our people and he’s a very persuasive manand has let us know what the position is. And, of course, he has—we have greatrespect for him. And on our part we couldn’t have a person who is morevigorous in presenting this point of view which you have described. Of course,you would describe it in a more precise way than, which you naturally can inyour position. It’s obvious that Ambassador Keating, of course you know an oldfriend of mine in the House and Senate. He lives here. We had a long talkyesterday. We went over all these matters.

Singh:[unclear]

Nixon: He is, he is just—he is concerned as your Ambassador, and of coursewe’re aware of this. So I am keenly aware of the problem. I’m aware, too, ofthe enormous agony that must be caused—I have not been, Rogers has been onlyonce. [unclear] I have not been to Dacca, but I know that part of thesubcontinent, that the problems of poverty are serious, very serious. And addedto it is this instability. However simple their homes may be, they are theirhomes. And pouring into an already overcrowded city. This must be a terribleagony for a country to go through. We’re aware of this thing. Also imposedupon your country, big as it is, 600 million people. Nevertheless, five millionpeople is a lot of people, because. . .

Singh:We count six, Mr. President.

Nixon: Six million. Yeah, that’s right.

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: One every second, that’s 60 every minute.

Singh:[unclear]?

Nixon: [unclear] That’s over 600 an hour.

Singh:[unclear]

Nixon: Yes, yes, yes, yes. Now the, the—I am sure you realize, too, that whatwe can do, you know, what we feel is one thing; what we can do is another. Wehave the deepest sympathy and we will try to do as much as we can. We don’twant to do anything that would be, that has the opposite results from what wewant, you know. Naturally, our—with regard to the Government of Pakistan, weof course have our contacts with them, our relations with them, with thePresident, of course. It’s terrible. The question is how we can discuss thismatter with them in a way that will maybe, may bring about action that wouldlead to amelioration of the situation. Or how we, or—and avoiding [unclear,the woodshed?] might set up, as often is the case when such things are done toopublicly, which would set up an antagonistic attitude. I’m not speakingpersonally from the standpoint of those who would look for something to beantagonistic about. That might just upset it all. We, I would like to say this:that we, I think that under best course of action—I’d like to talk first ofall what would we need your advice with regard to what we can do with themeeting situation—the best course of action we think as a Government is for usto, is for you to have confidence, and I want you to convey this to the PrimeMinister, on a completely off-the-record basis. Discussions that are publiclytalked about would have exactly the opposite effect on that. You’ve got to,you must have confidence that one, I am acutely aware of the problem. I amdeeply concerned about the problem for humanitarian [unclear, reasons?] and I amconcerned about it for its foreign policy implications, for all this could eruptinto some armed conflict. We know that. Now—therefore, we, I will use all thepersuasive methods that I can, but I must use them in the way that I think isthe most effective, in a way perhaps that, say, she might never use, in a waythat any nation would want used when we talk with their leader and so forth. ButI am aware of the problem, I shall try to use my influence as effectively aspossible at least if effectively means not using it in a public, blunt way. AndI [unclear] such and such is, had been. Not only has our concern been expressedbut that you will have this in mind in future discussions that we have that wehave to do it this way. And that has to be answered. The second thing is, ofcourse, looking at the immediate problem that you need more funds; theAmbassador has discussed with us the various options that we have. We have animmediate problem between now and July 1st, and it’s just for here [unclear,’til then?] And, but on the other hand, but because, you know, we’ve run outof money because it’s all been spent with only 15 days left. On the other handwe have out of other aid programs that won’t need any [unclear] because thatwould cause problems for where they came from. But we have been able to acquire$20 million that we will, we will find immediately available. And then inaddition to that, on the July, on July 1st, we will be able to apply $50million, so which will give you a total of $70 million to relieve them, the aidproblem. We’d give you more, but that’s, that’s as much as we can find.You see, we have to take from various other commitments that have been made. Soyou get $20 million between now and the first of July, $50 million more on thefirst of July or just as soon as the fiscal year begins.

Keating: Yes.

Nixon: And that your Government can count on. Is that correct, roughly speaking,or is the 20—?

Kissinger: The difference is that we had to piece together the $20 million, Mr.President, out of other programs.

Nixon: Right. The point is we’ll find the $20 million. You can count on it.The $50 million—

Kissinger: That’s right.

Sisco: We’ve got that.

Kissinger: Including the lowest parts of your supplemental appropriations

Nixon: Right. And we’ve got to look down towards that, but on the other hand,I’m aware of the fact that this will take care of how many? Six millionpeople. For how long? Not long. It’ll help. On the other hand, I realize thatthat does not get at the long-range problem. The long-range problem is how do westop this inflow of people? How—maybe you’d start having them turn around,start outflowing them. That’s what we’re getting at. I think you, you first,you brought it to my attention when you met me. The Prime Minister and you heardthis conversation with our Ambassador, Ambassador Keating. All brought it to myattention and I’m convinced of the seriousness of the problem. I will, I willtry to find the methods that I think will be effective. I think it will protect[unclear] can’t do that. [unclear] effective. There may be other ways for thisto be effective. But I think we have to, I think it must not be in a way thatappears that we’re, that what has happened here is that the United States isinserting itself into basically an internal situation in an open way. That is wehave to—we can be most effective by persuading the parties involved to come toa decision of theirs rather than one that’s imposed upon them. That’s atleast my [unclear, instinct?] telling the individual players and so forth.That’s the way I see it at this time. And we will—the results will tell uswhether we’re right or not. And also after trying that method for a whilewe’ll have to see the situation, but in the meantime, I think, and to theextent that we can, to keep as cool as possible, in terms of charges andcounter-charges and all that sort of thing. We’ll—You can count on ourfinancial assistance to the extent that we are able. And this—we will findthis money. [unclear] Second, you will have the, on other side which is far more[unclear, important?] the governmental side. Let us, if you will, let us do thatin our way, in the way we think will be more effective. That’s the way I wouldlike to do it. You’re, do you approve or do you think there’s a better wayto do it?

Singh:We greatly appreciate your sentiment and [unclear] in coming to aconcrete conclusion in a short time. [unclear] This is an internationalresponsibility. [unclear] We appreciate it, yes. [unclear]. You yourselfmentioned it. [unclear] The question, one, how to stop it, and how to createconditions [unclear].

Nixon: This is the fundamental question now.

Singh:This is the fundamental question. [unclear]

Nixon: I know. I am aware of that. I am aware of the, I am aware of the factthat the funds, while essential, [deal] with a temporary problem do nothandle—I am not suggesting at all, or have any illusions, that if we found$700 million to put into this thing that would simply buy the problem away. Theproblem is going to go away only as the deeper causes are resolved. And I amaware of that. How we get at those deeper causes is a very sensitive problem asyou well know, and the Foreign Minister has to be highly sensitive to how peoplefeel and approach us and so forth. And how other governments may feel aboutthis, how they react. One way the public pressure, another way the private,shall we say persuasion. I have always believed in the latter myself as the mosteffective way, particularly when I know the individuals fairly well.

Singh:That we are agreed. Perhaps the whole problem can be divided into twoparts. There are some aspects, which could [unclear]. France has agreed to makea statement to that effect. [unclear] in Moscow. And also the necessity of theirreturning. I agree that that’s a question to how [unclear]. We know what isactually happening. [unclear]

Nixon: We will then proceed on that basis . I don’t think anything, however,certainly at this point, would be served by any indication of the United Statesputting public pressure on Pakistan. That I know would be wrong if we want toaccomplish our goal. On the other hand, something might be, something might verywell be accomplished in other directions. I am aware of that. I would like totry it this way. We will, you can be sure that we’re as totally concernedabout it as we can be, not being there. Incidentally, how much did the Germansprovide? How much are they providing?

Singh:The German money, I honestly—

Nixon: How about the French?

Sisco: I looked at a figure today, Mr. President, I think the Germans aresomewhere around two million, and the French are something a little less thanthat. 

Nixon: That’s not enough.

Sisco: That’s not enough.

Nixon: All right, that’s not enough. The French and Germans have just as greatan interest as we have. Here they are making all sorts of big statements anddoing very little. Now, you head over to the French and Germans and theircolleagues formally, that clear? The same with the low countries that talk bigand don’t help much. I have no sympathy for them. [unclear] made a statementwhen he was here. The Germans can afford—if we can afford $70 million, theGermans can afford 10, easy—or 15. 

Kissinger: We’ve already given 17.5.

Nixon: That’s right. We’ll, we’ve put in 100 so the Germans should put in25. That’s the way it ought to be. Because you know, we don’t believe inthis office of talking big and doing little. 

141. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant forNational Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador to Pakistan (Farland),Washington, July 28, 1971, 4:21-4:54 p.m.

Nixon: You know, the thing that really concerns us, naturally, as we allknow, the miserable campaign, I don’t know what you can do about it while youare here, against Pakistan. Do you think he’s doing—Keating was over herelobbying for the Indians when he was here—do you think he ought to try to sayanything good about the Paks while you are here? Could you?

Farland: I can..

Nixon: Would it be useful?

Kissinger: I think it would be useful to put out [unclear].

Farland: I agree, although I was trying to maintain a relatively low profilebecause I didn’t want to get questions about particulars to the China trip.

Nixon: On that you have a perfect thing, you just say I’m not saying anything.[unclear]

Farland: I saw Chuck Percy today at a luncheon that Frank Kellogg gave at theState Department. And several Congressmen, and they all wondered why my presencewasn’t known, why could I appear before a committee and I had no comment tomake. I said I don’t know. I had a conversation with [unclear] this morningand he was quite hopeful that I could appear before one of the committees. Iagreed with Charles Bray over at the State Department to give a backgrounder tothe press on Friday afternoon.

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: That’s better than testimony [unclear].

Nixon: Good. The press likes backgrounders much better. That’s where itcounts. The hell with the damn Congress.

Farland: There is another side to this picture, and I can say with completecandor that if we push Yahya to the point where he reacts, the reaction will besuch that the entire subcontinent will be [unclear]. I mean he’ll fight.He’ll fight, and he may go [unclear]. If he goes out, and he may go [unclear]it’s going to be [unclear] that ever mankind has seen, in our lifetime. TheChinese will come right down through Assam. [unclear] Furthermore, the Chinesewill come across the Mintoka Pass and start guerrilla warfare in Kashmir. Andthey’ll have everything surrounded. And the vociferous forces in India today[unclear]. That’s a very stark picture but it’s one that’s not overdrawn.

Nixon: What do you think our position should be?

Farland: I think we are doing what we should. This is a policy that I joined in.I don’t think we can overplay our hand, but I don’t think we are looking forvociferous, positive action. Mr. President, as I was telling you this morning,that as a matter of actual fact this problem goes back to about the year AD 712,when the Muslims first invaded the Sind. There’s been no peace on thesubcontinent since that time because the Hindus and the Muslims have nothing incommon whatsoever. Every point of their lives is diametricallyopposed—economic, political, social, emotional, despite their beliefs. Oneprays to idols, the other prays to one God. One worships the cow; the other eatsit. Simple as that. And last year there were 521 communal riots in India,acknowledged.

Nixon: Miserable damn place.

Kissinger: And what the Indians are really after, that became clear to me on mytrip [unclear]. Their thoughts are about East Pakistan because they think that[unclear] West Pakistan. They think that by, well, if they can undermine EastPakistan then in West Pakistan so many forces would be, will unloosen, will beturned loose that the whole Pakistan issue will disappear. The Indians and WestPakistanis they hate each other–

Nixon: Oh sure, that’s what they fear. East Pakistan [unclear]. The thing, thebad thing is you are convinced, though, that Yahya will fight?

Farland: Oh, he will.

Nixon: He will commit suicide.

Kissinger: I agree completely. He will fight. Just as Lincoln would have fought.To him East Pakistan is part of Pakistan. [unclear]

Farland: Because of their sense of defeat, the possibility of defeat is a minorconsideration as opposed to their sense of national unity. Remember, almostevery [unclear] over there recalls the time of partition, back when they had–

Nixon: Horrible slaughters?

Farland: The acknowledged figure is over half a million. The figure that mostpeople believe is way in excess of a million people. Fifteen million refugeeswere on the road.

Nixon: What is the situation, I really, of course there are always two sides toeverything, but with the Indians [unclear]? Terrible stories [unclear] and soforth.

Farland. They are past masters of propaganda. The Pakistanis don’t—

Nixon: How can you, can you perhaps put a little of that [unclear]. Well anyway,I think if you could, if you could–

Kissinger: [unclear]

Nixon: Yeah. Okay.

[Unclear exchange]

Farland: This matter of arms to Pakistan.

Nixon: Uh, huh.

Farland: Since March 25 we have sent over 2,200 rounds of .22 ammunition forsurvival rifles for down there, that’s all. This part of our arms deal isjust, in guns and the story hasn’t properly–

Nixon: You tell them that’s good. That’s good.

Farland: Forty to fifty percent of what’s in the pipeline is for spare partsfor trucks and for communication equipment without which the starving refugeescould not be fed.

Nixon: Good. Good. Good.

Farland: So these are—

Nixon: You ought to lay it right out. And also, I guess everybody’s concernedabout [unclear]. Let’s not aggravate the problem; let’s try to help on theproblem—East Pakistan. And the main thing let’s not stir it up. It’sstirred up too much. Inevitably it will be a bloodbath down there.

Farland: It will be. It will be all over the subcontinent.

Nixon: We warned the Indians very strongly that if they start anything—andbelieve me it would be a hell of a pleasure as far as I am concerned—if wejust cut off every damn bit of aid we give them, at least for whatever it’sworth.

Farland: Yahya told me that they had pinpointed 29 camps within India whereguerrillas were being trained. Now I hate to tell you this, Mr. President, butthe guerrilla threat is growing by leaps and bounds. They’re averaging 18Pakistanis a day now; they are averaging two bridges a day. Killing that many.And this is [unclear]. And once the refugees get there, they are beingprohibited, are prevented from coming back by Indira’s own statement.Political accommodation in her book means Bangladesh. This is bad.

Nixon: Well, I think we just continue on our line. We, as you know, we’rehaving a hell of a time keeping the State Department bureaucracies hitched onthis thing. They’re basically pro-Indian. When I say “they,” not all. Buta lot of them. And they want to believe what the American press is writing. Andthe Indian press, of course, the American press is the same as the Indian press,follows everything they say. 

Farland: Well, my Consul General over in Dacca—

Nixon: He’s no good.

Farland: blew the whistle on the whole thing.

Nixon: He’s bad, isn’t he?

Farland: Well he’s gone. He’s here in the Department now. And the head ofthe USIS was just as tendentious in his reporting. Got rid of him. Shakespearegot him out.

Nixon: Good.

Farland: The one remaining, who is a very critical situation, this fellow EricGriffel, who is the head of AID [Griffel was the associate director in charge ofAID operations in Dacca], he will be out in September. I wish he were out now. Idon’t think you could pull him out without—

Nixon: Repercussions.

Farland: –repercussions on the Hill. And my guess is that he has beeninstrumental in leaking some of this information.

Nixon: Sick bastards. You just keep right after it on this thing. 

146. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant forNational Security Affairs (Kissinger), the British Foreign Secretary(Douglas-Home), and the British Ambassador (Cromer), Washington, September 30,1971, 4:10-5:31 p.m.

Douglas-Home: This India thing we have here is really very serious, indeed.The guerrilla warfare we have now is really operating in a very wide area of thecountryside in East Pakistan, and it is [unclear] refugees out of East Pakistan,which is still not prepared for 4,000 a week, or even more than that. They’lltake [unclear] to run through there. In the last 3 weeks or so, 11 trips takingfood and supplies to East Pakistan have helped a lot so far. And one of ourshipping lines is now refusing to take any more stuff to East Pakistan andChittagong. And, third, this is all going through that particular situationwhere I don’t know [unclear] however much the United Nations wants to rebuildcommunications to help all that. It’s not going to be possible with thisguerrilla stuff going on.

Nixon: Hmmm.

Douglas-Home: We’ve done what we can, and then what you’ll do what you canto get Yahya Khan to move that quickly, on a visible front . And I just don’tknow if he can make contact with the Bangladesh people in Bengal. And if hecould, I think he will get more substantial people to cooperate than he is ableto get now because the Indians have them, and the people he’s talking to inthe civil administration now are people of no consequence. And they will allstill be. Now this entire notion—but I suspect—

Kissinger: [unclear]

Douglas-Home: Yes.

Kissinger: Speaking here in this room with the [unclear] for you [unclear]. Wehave been in touch with Bangladesh people in Calcutta. And we were trying to setup a meeting between the Bangladesh people and the West Pakistanis outside ofIndia. And we had Yahya’s agreement to that. And the Indians have now totallythwarted it. They made it impossible for these people to deal with us; they’reforcing them to check everything with them, they are padding demands, which aretotally incapable of fulfillment.

Douglas-Home: [unclear]

Nixon: Yeah.

[overlapping conversation]

Nixon: We’ve really got a crisis. [unclear] They’re so—smug is the word,and—

Kissinger: It’s really hard to believe. Even I could get relief in there.

Douglas-Home: That’s very bad news.

Kissinger: They’ve cut, they’ve cut the supply lines into the food deficitareas you pointed out. We have offered them guarantees that the convoys or shipsthat go in there will not carry troops out, which is really a tremendousinvasion of sovereignty, just to make sure there will be no additional refugeesproduced by another [unclear]. They refuse to cooperate with that.

Douglas-Home: [unclear]

Nixon: The Indians did insist there’s this, and, you know, they’rehypocrites and sanctimonious about this. Now there’s no question that Yahyahas handled it really in a stupid way. I mean, and the only way you would expectin [with?] all the military backing. He’s a very decent man, but it’s justbeen handled badly. And in any case that the country is inevitable, as it’sinevitable this country will tear part, come apart. But the Indians, the Indiansare playing—I'm afraid from all reports, they’re playing a game here that Ithink is wrong. I think they’re deliberately trying to make it insoluble. Andif it becomes insoluble what happens? Well, what happens is you have India,which can’t even digest what they already have, probably—how the hell arethey going to run that place? The other thing is that there is the danger, andthere is the danger that a West Pakistani with a suicidal attitude will decideto have a fight.

Douglas-Home: Through Kashmir?

Nixon: Certainly.

Kissinger: We’ve had an intelligence report today—I don’t know that[unclear]—Well, that they’re thinking of going into Kashmir because thissituation, as the Foreign Secretary is pointing out, is getting unmanageable.

Nixon: What can we do? What can be done?

[unclear exchange]

Kissinger: Well, we haven’t totally failed with the Indians because theBangladesh people, as you correctly point out, are actually quite eager to talk.

Douglas-Home: Yeah.

Nixon: They are?

Kissinger: Yeah, but they—At first, they were willing to settle for autonomy,and as we all know autonomy would produce independence, there is no other way itcan go.

Kissinger: Now the Indians have escalated their demand into total independenceimmediately. Well, that Yahya will never agree to. There has to be a face-savingformula and a transition period.

Douglas-Home: That’s right, and I think it will. I think two [unclear] withregard to everything. You’ve got to have it.

Kissinger: We told the Indians that if they could separate the political processand if they could give a little more time to that and to the relief process wethink everyone could achieve this objective.

Douglas-Home: Mrs. Gandhi is coming to see us quite soon, and if you could—

Nixon: She’s seeing you?

Douglas-Home: She did stop by in London. She’s coming back.

Nixon: [unclear] and after that comes here, doesn’t she?

Kissinger: She’s coming in November [unclear]—

Douglas-Home: Well, if you could tell us, if you could, you know, keep usinformed before she comes, we can all [unclear]—

Nixon: So that she doesn’t come in here and, frankly, pull our legs. I mean,let’s be sure we’re in contact on this thing. Can you tell us too?

Douglas-Home: And we’ll tell you [unclear]

Nixon: Now I raised this subject with Gromyko. And I was very tough with him. Isaid, “Now if there’s a war”—I said “We just can’t have a war. Youcan’t encourage the Indians because then Pakistan might—” He said, “Oh,we don’t want a war, and it’s what we’re, we have—” And he said theyhad told her that in Moscow. Right?

Kissinger: Yeah, but–

Nixon: I don’t know whether he was telling the truth or not.

Kissinger: But what the Indians are doing now is the, are equipping theseguerrillas with really very advanced weapons and wanting them to[unclear–advance to this area?]

Douglas-Home: The only thing apparent in my mind as a part of this thing, is heis ranting about this thing. He can’t see any sense—

Nixon: You remember when he came in to see us. I told you that I didn’t likethe way he handled himself.

Douglas-Home: [unclear] what can we do?

Kissinger: Well, I think that if we could shock the Indians we would—becauseour judgment is that Chinese almost certainly come in at the Indians—

Nixon: That’s the other thing.

Kissinger: And whether the Soviets then will forgo the opportunity to settlescores with the Chinese is ultimately—I think if the Indians could be shockedinto being reasonable, if that’s possible the problem is soluble. But ifthey’re really concerned about East Bengal that problem is soluble. Ifthey’re concerned with using East Bengal to disintegrate all of Pakistan, tosay it never should have existed then that, I think, is in the back of thiscomplicated Indian mind.

Douglas-Home: What I wanted to say, to maintain [unclear] above all things, isthat they ought to be encouraging Yahya Khan in his political moves. [unclear]

Kissinger: That’s right.

Douglas-Home: Political realism.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: And my judgment, I had a long talk with Yahya when I was on the wayto China. And he’s really [unclear]. He’s not very bright, but he has tried.

Nixon: He’s a decent man, an honorable man.

Kissinger: He needs some face-saving formula to go to autonomy.

Douglas-Home: That’s right.

Kissinger: Given the difference in culture and in public leaning, autonomy mustbe the answer. There’s no other way it can go.

Douglas-Home: No.

Nixon: Now let’s—this could be one, this could be a parable. This could be[unclear]. Wouldn’t that be something to have a [unclear] in that visibleplace? All that I can say is that I think the British got out too soon. Really,you know?

Douglas-Home: Uh-huh.

Nixon: I’ve been down that area, you know, the—I was there, I forget thelast—but, and I know it’s inevitable. But when you think of India andPakistan they just aren’t ready. They just aren’t ready, that’s all.

[Omitted here is concluding conversation unrelated to South Asia.]

Part I !  PartII  ! PartIII  ! PartIV

For more declassified documents and originals of telegrams and backgroundpapers, please visit the Officeof the Historian, the US Department of State.