Going Soft On Hard Power

CAMBRIDGE, USA. Just over a year ago the Bush administration published its National Security Strategy,which articulated a dramatic change in its foreign policy outlook after the events of September 11, 2001. Thenew strategy declared that "we are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologiesfalling into the hands of the embittered few." Instead of strategic rivalry, "today, the world'sgreat powers find ourselves on the same side - united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos."

The rhetoric of the new strategy attracted criticism at home and abroad, but critics notwithstanding, thedistinguished Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis has compared the new strategy to the seminal days thatredefined American foreign policy in the 1940s. ¹ The new strategy responded to the deep trends inworld politics that were illuminated by the events of September 11, 2001. Globalization, for instance, hasproved itself to be more than just an economic phenomenon; it has been wearing away at the natural buffersthat two oceans and distance have always provided to the United States. The implications of state failure arealso clear: dreadful conditions in poor, weak countries halfway around the world can have terribleconsequences for the United States.

The gravest threat, however, is posed by the privatization of war. One surprise attack by a transnationalterrorist group killed more Americans than the state of Japan did in 1941. The democratization of technologyover the past decades has made terrorists more lethal and more agile, a trend that is likely to continue.Traditional state-centric analysts think that punishing states that sponsor terrorism can solve the problem.Such punitive measures might help, but in the end they cannot stop individuals who have already gained accessto destructive technology. After all, Timothy McVeigh in the United States and Aum Shinrikyo in Japan were notsponsored by states. The privatization of war is not only a major historical change in world politics; itspotential impact on U.S. cities could drastically alter the nature of American civilization.

This is what the new Bush strategy gets right. What the United States has not yet sorted out is how to goabout implementing its new approach. Washington has done far better on identifying the ends than on the means.

According to the strategy, the greatest threats that the American people face are transnational terrorismand weapons of mass destruction, and particularly their combination. Yet because of its transnational nature,meeting that challenge requires the cooperation of other countries. The willingness of other countries tocooperate in dealing with transnational issues such as terrorism depends in part on their own self-interest,but also on the attractiveness of American positions.

Soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce. It means that others want whatthe United States wants, and there is less need to use carrots and sticks. Hard power grows out of a country'smilitary and economic might. Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, politicalideals, and policies. When U.S. policies appear legitimate in the eyes of others, American soft power isenhanced. Hard power will always remain crucial in a world of nation-states guarding their independence, butsoft power will become increasingly important in dealing with the transnational issues that requiremultilateral cooperation for their solution.

The need for international cooperation in Iraq has moved to the foreground, but the manner in which theBush Administration handled the diplomacy leading up to the war has made others reluctant to help. The war'snegative effect on American soft power has forced the United States to incur the lion's share of the costs forthe rebuilding effort. The contrast with the example of the first Gulf War is instructive. In that conflictour allies picked up the majority of the tab, thanks in large part to the fact that the first President Bushpainstakingly assembled a broad coalition of allies long before the first shot was fired. Soft power helpedthe United States shape the international agenda without arousing widespread suspicion or resentment.

In many respects the Iraq War represented the unfinished business of the 20th century. The Security Councilresolutions mandating the destruction of Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs date back adecade. North Korea and Iran, on the other hand, pose the first real tests of the national security strategy.

North Korea's flagrant record on weapons proliferation is beyond dispute, and its negotiators have declaredthat Pyongyang already has nuclear weapons. What is left to negotiate? Plenty. President Bush's recentsuggestion of a multilateral security guarantee demonstrates that he understands the dangers of going it aloneon North Korea. He has little choice but to continue negotiations with the full realization that they will bedifficult and have no guarantee of succeeding.

In addition to the threat posed by its hard power, the United States will need its soft power to maximizethe cooperation of the other parties at the table. If negotiations fail, multilateral cooperation among theregional players will become more, not less, important. But the clock is running quickly in this case. TheNorth Koreans already claim to have a bomb, and plutonium reprocessing at the Yongbyon nuclear facility hasbegun. There is no margin for error here. Talks are scheduled to reconvene next month, but the prospects for aresolution remain dim. Much will depend on whether China, Pyongyang's principle supplier, decides to exerciseits potential leverage.

Iran offers yet another test with a different timeframe. In October, Iran agreed to allow the IAEA toconduct wide ranging special inspections and to temporarily suspend operation of the centrifuge enrichmentfacilities that it had secretly constructed. But that will not be enough to solve the problem. Iran claimsthat as a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. Ina sense, the NPT was born with a loophole. Even if a country allows inspections, it can legally accumulateenriched uranium (or reprocessed plutonium) under the guise of a peaceful energy program, and then suddenlydeclare that circumstances have changed and withdraw from the treaty. It could then produce nuclear weapons atshort notice. If Iran were to do this, it would add to the dangers in an unstable region and would be likelyto begin unraveling the non-proliferation regime world wide.

President Bush should approach Europe, Russia and others and persuade them to offer Iran a deal that wouldplug the loophole. Russia, which is helping Iran construct a nuclear energy reactor at Bushehr, could offerTehran a guarantee of low enriched uranium fuel and reprocessing of the reactor's spent fuel in Russia. Thedeal could be given teeth by a United Nations Security Council resolution that the United States wouldendorse. The resolution could include a stick declaring that further proliferation of nuclear weapons would bea threat to peace under the Charter, and that any country moving in such a direction would be subject tosanctions. The resolution could also include a carrot guaranteeing Iran access to the non-dangerous aspects ofnuclear energy technology. The pot could be further sweetened by offers to relax existing sanctions and asecurity guarantee if Iran remains non-nuclear.

Because of Iran's suspicion of the US, subtle American diplomacy could persuade Europe and Russia to launchthe proposal, and Washington could then announce its support. Given the paucity of issues on which the US,Russia, Europe and the UN are in close agreement, such a proposal offers a rare opportunity for a multilateralsolution to a vital concern.

John Lewis Gaddis, "Bush's Security Strategy," ForeignPolicy, November/December 2002.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is the dean of Harvard University-s Kennedy School of Government. Rights: Rights:© 2003, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization. YaleGlobal