With the surrender of 2641 cadres of the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) at Kokrajhar on December 6, 2003, andthe subsequent swearing in of the 12-member interim Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) on December 7, aninfamous chapter of Bodo insurgency in Assam comes to a close. The formation of the new autonomousself-governing body, BTC, after the failure of a similar attempt in the form of the Bodoland AutonomousCouncil (BAC) in 1993, is yet another move to bring peace to Assam's Bodo inhabited areas, which havewitnessed violent agitations and accompanying terrorist violence since 1987. After the Mizo Accord of 1986,the formation of the BTC could be the only and still qualified success story in the resolution of aninsurgency in India's northeast.
The BTC is being formed nine months after the signing of a Memorandumof Settlement (MoS) between the BLT leadership, the Union Government and the State Government of Assam onFebruary 10, 2003. The main provisions of the MoS relate to the creation of the BTC within the State of Assamunder the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, to fulfill the economic, educational and linguisticaspirations, as well as the claims of the socio-cultural and ethnic identity of the Bodos in Assam (numbering1,267,015 in the 1991 Census, more than 44 per cent of the State's total population), and to speed up thedevelopment of infrastructure in the BTC area. The area of the proposed BTC will comprise of 3,082 identifiedvillages, which will be divided into 4 contiguous districts after reorganization of the existing districts ofAssam, subject to clearance of the Delimitation Commission.
With the formation of the BTC, the Bodo struggle for development and good governance enters a decisive phase,creating new and onerous challenges for an inexperienced leadership. The transition of insurgent leaders intothe arena of politics is bound to create at least a few problems. The BLT has already announced its intentionof forming a political party to manage the BTC affair. However, sooner or later, the BLT leadership is boundto realize that running a democratic administration is a far more difficult task than planning ambushesagainst the security forces or killing civilians.
The distribution of spoils is also likely to create problems for the BTC leadership. Till now, Bodoorganizations like the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) and the Bodo People's Action Committee (BPAC) sang inchorus with the BLT. Such unity is bound to face serious challenges as realpolitik takes over junglecamaraderie. The reality of life will also strike hard at the 2,641 BLT cadres, only some of whom can beaccommodated within the limited BTC structure. With the plum posts going to senior functionaries, the euphoriaof winning a war might give way to frustration. There have been many cases in the past when peace deals haveled to the creation of new insurgent groups by disgruntled cadres.
The problem is accentuated by the fact that the State Government has ruled against providing a rehabilitationscheme for the BLT cadres, though a notification on November 27, 2003, announced a general amnesty andwithdrawal of cases registered against persons related to the over-ground Bodo movement since 1987. Accordingto the notification, there are 452 cases registered against the persons connected with such over-groundactivity in as many as eight districts of Nalbari, Dhubri, Bongaigaon, Kokrajhar, Darrang, Barpeta, Kamrup andSonitpur.
There is also need to guard against the notoriety of the BLT cadres. During the outfit's parleys with theUnion Government since July 1999, BLT cadres indulged in large-scale extortion and periodically orchestratedthe selective elimination of their opponents. To cite an example, on January 27, 2003, suspected BLT cadreskilled one of their former colleagues and four members of his family, including two women, at Duligaon inDhubri district (the outfit subsequently denied its involvement in the incident). There is every chance of theBTC ending up institutionalizing such outlaws on the line of the infamous SULFA (surrendered United LiberationFront of Asom or ULFA) cadres, who enjoyed State protection for a wide range of illegal activities through the1990s, under successive Assam Governments.
Significantly, moreover, the pomp and show of the surrender ceremony, accompanied by great exhibition of Bodoparaphernalia, masks the rather poor acceptability level of the BLT leaders even among their own tribesmen.Few among the Bodo people know or are able to name any of the BLT leaders. Irrespective of the hype, the BTCgenerated, even in the remotest of the Bodo areas, people were uniformly skeptical of the leadership'scommitment to development.
A seemingly formidable challenge is posed by the non-Bodo umbrella organization, the Sanmilita JanagoshthiyaSangram Samiti (SJSS), which stands opposed to the Bodo aspirations for autonomy. Insurgent groups such as theUnited Peoples' Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) do not favour the granting of Scheduled Tribe (ST) status to theBodos living within the Karbi Anglong district, an assurance to which effect is given in the MoS.
The most difficult challenge, however, comes from the active Bodo militant outfit, the National DemocraticFront of Bodoland (NDFB), which finds itself marginalized with the finalisation of the BTC deal. The NDFB,fighting for an independent 'Bodo hadat' (Bodoland), has already issued statements asking people not tosupport the BTC, which they claim is not in the interest of the Bodo people. The Union Minister of State forHome Affairs, Swami Chinmayananda was also reported to have said on December 6, 2003, that, "the securityforces would do everything to ensure that they (BLT cadres) were not victimized by the still active militantgroups." The grossly diminished military strength of the NDFB may, within this context, prove to be anadvantage for the BLT as well as a matter of relief for the Union Government.
There has been some speculation whether the formation of the BTC would lead to the United Liberation Front ofAsom (ULFA) and the NDFB renouncing the path of violence. The State Chief Minister, on December 6, 2003, tookthe opportunity to invite the ULFA and the NDFB to move in this direction, saying, "There is no problemso big that can not be resolved through talks." However, while there is a possibility of individual NDFBcadres deciding to give up arms (21 of them surrendered recently), the group as a unit is likely to continueresisting attempts for peace. Given the fact that the BTC is an all-BLT affair, there would be little hope forthe NDFB leadership or surrendered cadres to be accommodated in it. In the longer run, however, theperformance of the BTC would decide the future and utility of violent groups like the NDFB. The possibility ofULFA agreeing to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the State also remains remote.
Under the circumstances, the BLT men who will take charge of the BTC will need support and patience not onlyfrom their own tribesmen and the non-tribals in the BTC area, but also from the State Government. There are anumber of unresolved issues, such as the demarcation of the geographical boundary of the proposed BodolandTerritorial Area District (BTAD), comprising four districts - Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baska, and Udalguri (thelast three are yet to be formed by the State Government) and the inclusion of additional villages. These willneed the cooperation of the State Government for a peaceful and early resolution.
There is a great deal at stake for the union government in the success of the BTC experiment. In addition tothe resolution of the BLT brand of insurgency, the formation of the BTC could also be a test case before aplausible deal with the NSCN-IM in Nagaland can be hammered out, excluding the Khaplang faction and the NagaNational Council (NNC). Peace and development under a BTC manned by former BLT cadres in Bodoland may go someway in convincing the central government of the possibility of a durable peace in Nagaland, even if non-NSCN-IM(National Socialist Council of Nagalim - Isak-Muivah faction) opinion is ignored.
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Bibhu Prasad Routray is Acting Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati. Courtesy,the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
