Advantage Insurgency?

When the 74 years-old veteran politician and former Chief Minister S.C. Jamir returns tothe 10th State Assembly in Kohima, he will not be sitting at his familiar chair. Indeed, it is clear that itwill require a great deal of conscious political efforts before the fractured verdict of the people can betranslated into a stable arrangement for governance, though it is now apparent that a non-Congress regime isset to take the seat of power in the State after an interregnum of 20 years.

The sidelining of the Congress party will not only delight its rivals - the Nagaland People's Front (NPF), anew political entity which took shape few months before the elections, and the the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)which put up an 'impressive show' by winning seven seats in the State - but also the dominant insurgent groupin the State - the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM). The NSCN-IM, in the 13th yearof its present avatar, is currently engaged in negotiations with the Union government.

There were several allegations, mostly from the Congress Party in Nagaland, regarding the interference of themilitant group in the electoral process. The NSCN-IM Chairman, Isak Swu, had, after a round of negotiationswith the Union Government at Delhi in January 2003, asserted that his organisation would not involve itself orinterfere in the election process. Nevertheless, the shadow of the group loomed large over the voting process,as armed-cadres threatened candidates and voters, abducted supporters and workers of political parties, andgenerally to ensure that the Jamir Government did not come back to power.

There were also cases of NSCN-IM cadres campaigning openly in favour of the BJP candidate - as in the Longkhim-Chareconstituency in Tuensang, the largest among Nagaland's seven districts - and also threatened villagers not tovote for the Congress candidate. The BJP candidate, A. Imtilemba went on to record a handsome victory.

Similarly in the Meluri constituency under Phek district, NSCN-IM cadres abducted fouryouth and threatened to kill them if the villagers dared to vote for the Congress. The NPF candidate Yitachuwon handsomely over his Congress rival. In Phek constituency, gun-toting NSCN-IM cadres moved from house tohouse, warning people not to vote for the Congress party. The NPF candidate Kuzholuzo won with a victorymargin of 9,084 votes. All these seats had been won by candidates of the Congress party in the last electionsin 1998.

The NSCN-IM's objective of preventing a Congress win coincided not only with the aspirations of politicalparties and the individual leaders (most notably the NPF leader Neiphiu Rio) who had left the Congress a fewmonths ago to fulfil their personal ambitions, but also with those of civil society organisations such as theChurch, the Naga Hoho (the apex tribal council), the Naga Students' Federation (NSF) and some 'human rights'organisations in the State. All these groups, overtly sympathetic with the NSCN-IM's objectives, shared Swu'sperception that the Jamir government was 'a stumbling block' on the path of a solution to the Naga conflict.Most of these organisations issued 'election guidelines' urging people to 'vote for candidates who would takethe peace process forward'. On the ground, the message was understood to mean: 'Do not vote for the Congress'.

The verdict, consequently, appears to hand out a raw deal for the Congress, though the party continues to be apotent force in the state, as the single largest party with 21 seats in the 60-member Legislative Assembly. However,few expected the Congress to repeat its 1998 performance of winning 53 seats in the Assembly when all majorpolitical parties, with the exception of the Congress, had responded to a general call for boycott of theelectoral process by the Naga Hoho.

The manner in which the party has been removed from power, however, is a pointer to thedrift that has been allowed to take effect. This will have larger implications for a possible solution to theNaga conflict in the foreseeable future. The installation of a non-Congress regime places the NSCN-IM in theboots of its bete noire, the Khaplang faction (NSCN-K). The NSCN-K was seen to be close to the Jamirgovernment, and was once described by the NSCN-IM as a 'security provider to the Chief Minister' - a positionit now finds itself stripped of.

This is certain to affect the sporadic utterances for unity and reconciliation between thefactions, and would create conditions for an increase in internecine clashes. The election results will alsoembolden the Isak-Muivah faction, which will incline further to buoy up its dream of a larger and independentNaga homeland. Handicapped by ambivalent mandate in the Assembly, the new regime is, consequently, bound tofind itself in the unenviable position of trying to live up to the expectations of many and conflictingplayers, in the jungle and the streets alike.

The author is Acting Director, Institute for Conflict Management Database &Documentation Centre, Guwahati. Courtesy: South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal