Accommodating Muslim Fears

Since the commencement in last December of attempts to resolve Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict through peacefulmeans, Sri Lankan Muslims have assumed an important 'third party' role in the related political processes,including the formal negotiations that began in September 2002 between the Government of Sri Lanka and theLiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Muslims account for about seven per cent of Sri Lanka's total population. About 30 per cent of their totalnumber lives in large clusters falling within the Eastern Province. The others constitute small communitiesscattered throughout the country with the exception of the northern areas.

Rauff Hakeem, leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), was one of the main government delegates at thetwo negotiation sessions hitherto conducted, but political spokespersons for the Muslims, including those ofthe SLMC, have made it clear that their support to the peace process was conditional on adequate attentionbeing devoted by both the government and the LTTE to the needs and aspirations of the Muslims, especiallythose from the northern and eastern parts of the island that are claimed by the LTTE as the 'TraditionalHomeland' of the Tamils.

The stand taken by the Muslim spokespersons in the current peace process is distinctive as compared to theexperiences of previous spells of negotiation (in 1985, 1989-90 and 1994-95). The earlier negotiations focusedexclusively on contentious issues between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, with hardly any reference to theinterests of the Muslims and with the leaders of the Muslim community opting to maintain a low profile.

The principal demand of the Eastern Province Muslims, articulated mainly through the SLMC, is that anycompromise worked out to meet the LTTE claim for autonomy to the entire 'north-east' as a single unit, eitherin an interim administration or as a permanent constitutional reform, for devolution of government powershould be accompanied by an arrangement facilitating self-government for those inhabiting the main Muslimareas in that part of the country.

Since the demand is being backed by a boycott of parliament by nine Muslim Members of Parliament (MPs), allof who are members of the United National Front government, it has created an unforeseen dilemma for thegovernment. This stems, on the one hand, from the government's existing (implicit) commitment to the principleof an LTTE-dominated interim administration for the entirety of the 'north-east'; and, on the other, from thefact that, in the event of the dissident Muslim MPs leaving the ranks of the ruling coalition on this issue,they could precipitate a major change in the parliamentary balance of power and, possibly, a collapse of thegovernment.

Two sets of considerations stand out most prominently as explanations for the circumspection and theassertiveness displayed by the Muslim leaders in relation to the on-going negotiations. The first of theserelates to the nature of Tamil-Muslim relations in the 'north-east', particularly in the Eastern Province. Thesecond stems from cleavages within the SLMC.

The coastal lowlands of the Eastern Province have hardly ever been entirely free of localised friction betweenthe Tamils and the Muslims constituting, in their aggregate numbers, 42 per cent and 35 per cent,respectively, of the total population of the province. These, it must be remembered, are areas of excessivelyhigh population density, in which residential loci of one community are juxtaposed with those of the other inan intricate and closely entwined micro-spatial mosaic. The eastern lowlands are also characterised byresource scarcity, agrarian unrest, and poverty, and hence, frequent interpersonal disputes with communalundertones.

This was the demographic and socio-economic setting in which several Tamil militant groups began to build asupport base among those of their own community in the early 1980s. At that stage, evidently in response toharassment by the Tamil militants, the Muslims of their larger communities also attempted to form armedgroups, and did achieve some success in their attempt.

Thus, for example, in the Allai area (south of Trincomalee harbour), an armed group, which called itselfthe 'Jihad Movement', is said to have gathered a small but ardent following. Again, in coastal Ampara(southern parts of the Eastern Province), a movement referred to as 'Al Fatah' mobilised some support amongMuslim youth. These, however, soon succumbed under the weight of the overwhelmingly more powerful Tamilmilitants.

Following the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, the SLMC (which, by that time, had emerged as the foremostpolitical party in the Eastern Province) decided to abide by the Accord and to collaborate with the IndianPeace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in its attempts to restore normalcy in the 'north-east'. Observers believe that itwas at this point that the LTTE turned its wrath in earnest against the Muslims in this part of the country.

Following the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka in the early months of 1990 and the concurrent emergenceof the LTTE as the most powerful among the separatist groups, Muslim communities in the Eastern Provincebecame the target of large-scale LTTE attacks. These evidently represented an attempt at 'ethnic cleansing' ofthe 'Traditional Tamil Homeland'. Several gruesome massacres of Muslim civilians, each involving death tollsexceeding a hundred, were carried out by LTTE cadres, resulting in mass evacuation of certain localities bythe Muslims.

By January 1991, about 350,000 Muslims had been displaced from their villages and towns of the EasternProvince. In October 1990, the LTTE also evicted en masse all Muslims (total number estimated at about 70,000)from the Northern Province. Though the policy of 'ethnic cleansing' appears to have been abandoned since thattime, LTTE attacks sporadically targeted the Muslims, mainly for their suspected collaboration with armedforces of the government, throughout the 1990s.

The experience in the Eastern Province, since the commencement of current negotiations, has not allayed Muslimfears. Throughout, there have been clashes between the LTTE cadres and Muslim civilians, triggered off mainlyby Muslim resistance to extortion. Among the major confrontations this year, each of which lasted over severaldays, were those at Muttur in February; Valachennai in June; and Akkaraipatu in October. In the NorthernProvince, the LTTE has continued to resist the return of Muslims who were evicted in 1990. Current mediareports indicate that LTTE extortion (now being referred to as 'taxation') in the east has acquired anincreased intensity, and that the LTTE network of 'police stations', initiated in early 2002, has now beenextended to the east in the face of Muslim protests.

In the longer term, Muslim fears of becoming a beleaguered minority in the entire country have been reinforcedby several brief localised Sinhalese-Muslim clashes of the recent past - in the township of Mawanella in May2001; and in northern Colombo in October 2002. There is, in addition, the long-standing dispute in theinterior of the Eastern Province concerning an alleged encroachment by the Muslims of land belonging to anancient Buddhist temple.

The boycott of Parliament by nine Muslim members from the east ended on November 14, 2002, following a formalassurance by Prime Minister Wickremasinghe to accord priority to their main demands. On the eve of theirreturn to Parliament, however, their spokesperson Anwer Ismail, ruled out any possibility of cohabitationbetween the Muslims and the Tamils under an LTTE-led interim administration in the 'north-east'.

The vehemence of the Muslim agitation for self-government in their main population clusters of the EasternProvince could also be attributed in part to the factional cleavages within the SLMC. Rauff Hakeem's grip onhis party, it should be noted, is much weaker than that of his predecessor, the late M.H.M. Ashraff. In thiscontext it is necessary to recapitulate that:

1. the origin of the SLMC in 1981 represented the fruition of an idea that had gained currency among Muslimsof the Eastern Province that their interests have tended to be neglected by the leaders of their community(drawn from an affluent elite in the urban areas elsewhere in the country);
   
   
2. SLMC's main support base has continued to remain in the east; and
   
   
3. Hakeem, being a Muslim from the highlands, does not command extensive personal support among the EasternProvince Muslims. Though, as Ashraff's deputy, this suave and astute politician did perform an invaluable rolein extending the SLMC electoral base to the Muslim communities in certain Sinhalese-majority areas outside theeast, it seems that he is no longer of much use to his party stalwarts in the Eastern Province. Indeed, at apress interview during the parliamentary boycott by his nine colleagues, Hakeem himself admitted that eversince he took over the leadership of the SLMC, there have been moves (within the party) to portray him as" ... an outsider who does not understand the dynamics of Muslims in the Eastern Province".
   
   
4. In addition to the dissidents within the party, there is Ashraff's widow, Ferial, presently a member ofthe parliamentary opposition, waiting to step in daintily into Hakeem's shoes in the event of his beingdislodged.

Under the circumstances, it is not clear how the clashing aspirations and apprehensions of Sri Lanka'sMuslims will be reconciled within the present negotiation process that seeks to bring peace to the fracturedisland nation.

The author is Senior Professor, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka, and Senior Fellow, InternationalCentre for Ethnic Studies. Copyright: South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal, whereit first appeared.