There was little reason to doubt that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) proposals in terms ofthe interim administration they sought for the contested North East of the country would be ambitious. Thiswas to be expected, as in the case of any first offer in a negotiation. The surprise was not that the LTTEdid, in fact, make such maximalist demands. The surprise is that they did it so well.
The long awaited LTTE proposals on the type of interim administration they seek for the North East made theirappearance on October 31, 2003, on which day the proposals were handed over to the Norwegian facilitators tobe forwarded to the Government. This action underlined the central role that Norway continues to play in theSri Lankan peace process. The preamble to the LTTE's proposals, described as proposals on behalf of the Tamilpeople, also acknowledged with appreciation the services of the Norwegian Government and the internationalcommunity.
The immediate reaction of journalists covering the release in Kilinochchi was neither negative nor emotional.A key reason for this was that the proposals had been prepared with a great deal of thought about how theywould be perceived by the world at large. Hence, there were no immediate red flags that could set anyone'sblood boiling upon a quick reading.
The LTTE has clearly refrained from frontally addressing emotive issues. They made no mention either of theirown military or of the right of the Sri Lankan military to be present in the North East; or of the Sinhalesesettlements in the North East. The LTTE's proposals also did not call for a change in the national flag oranthem or the special place accorded to Buddhism in the Sri Lankan Constitution. Any mention of these couldhave generated an emotional response from Sinhalese nationalists.
However, a closer scrutiny of the LTTE proposals would reveal that they are maximalist in spirit, as indeedcould have been anticipated from an organisation that has waged a long war for the cause of complete Tamilseparation from Sri Lanka. The proposals, in sum, call for the establishment of an Interim Self GoverningAuthority (ISGA) for the North East in which the LTTE would have an absolute majority of members. Thereafter,the proposals indicate that complete autonomy is sought in virtually every aspect of the political andeconomic life of the people.
The LTTE proposals call for separate institutions to be set up for the North East in respect of the police,judiciary, elections, taxation, local and foreign grants and loans, and trade, among others. There is anassurance that internationally mandated standards of human rights, accountability, multi-ethnic representationand free and fair elections will prevail. But all the institutions that are to be set up to ensure suchpractices of good governance will be under the sole control of the ISGA which will have an absolute LTTEmajority.
In a society where the spirit of power sharing is yet to be learned and practiced, obtaining an absolutemajority is a potential license for unilateralism. When this potential is coupled with autonomy, the resultcan be a high degree of control. It is noteworthy that the LTTE's proposals make no provision for integrationwith nationally prevailing structures. Viewed in this context, it is not surprising that the Sri LankanGovernment's response to the LTTE proposals was cautious and restrained. The Government's immediate reactionwas to say that there were fundamental differences between the LTTE's proposals and those submitted severalmonths earlier by the Government itself.
In its own proposals regarding an interim administration for the North East, the Government specificallyexcluded matters pertaining to police, land, revenue and security from the purview of the interimadministration. But in the LTTE's counter proposals, all the above with the exception of security arespecifically considered to be the domain of the ISGA. Further, in the Government's proposals, while anabsolute majority is conceded to the LTTE, provision was made for a minority veto on matters that affected theinterests of the Muslim and Sinhalese communities living in the North East.
On the ground the Muslims and Sinhalese of the East, who presently constitute over 60 percent of thepopulation in this region, have strongly protested their inclusion into an LTTE dominated administration. TheMuslims in particular have been vociferous about their opposition, as in the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC)they have a political party that draws virtually all its strength from the East. The SLMC's first response tothe LTTE's proposals has been to say that they do not meet Muslim aspirations.
The Government's cautious response to the LTTE's proposals could also be due to its apprehensions about abacklash against them from Sinhalese nationalists bolstered by opposition political parties. Pro-war Sinhalesenationalists who call for the military subjugation of Tamil nationalism last week physically attacked leadingSinhalese and Tamil cultural artistes who had gathered together for an inter-ethnic cultural festival inColombo. What this increasingly frustrated minority needs is the politically motivated backing by the majoropposition parties to run amok and riot on the streets, as has happened on past occasions when Governmentsappeared to make concessions to Tamil demands for regional autonomy.
The unfortunate history of post-independence Sri Lankan politics is that opposition parties have repeatedlyseized upon Governmental concessions to Tamil parties as betrayals of the Sinhalese to mobilise popularopposition to the Government. The last occasion for this unsavoury practice was in Parliament itself in August2000, when many members of the present Government behaved like louts, hooted and burnt copies of the DraftConstitution that President Chandrika Kumaratunga sought to present before Parliament. Today, alas, it is theturn of President Kumaratunga and her party to get even with those who wield the reins of the Government.
There is much to commend in the LTTE's proposals, in particular their willingness to give weight to theprinciples of good governance, representative democracy and accountability. They are the result of a greatdeal of effort and provide a basis from which to engage in dialogue with other parties to the conflict, suchas the Government and the Muslims. The fact that the LTTE has invested so much time and effort in a politicalendeavour is to be appreciated by those who seek a peaceful solution to the ethnic conflict.
For nearly six months the LTTE focused its attention on the production of its interim administrationproposals, holding a wide range of consultations with local and international experts in its capital ofKilinochchi and also in numerous foreign countries, including France, Northern Ireland, Denmark, Norway andSwitzerland. The document they have produced is a concise exposition of Tamil thinking over which there is, ofcourse, the final authority of the LTTE. There is no doubt that the proposals are maximalist in spirit; butthey are an opening offer in negotiations in which there has got to be give and take.
With its proposals for an Interim Self Governing Authority the LTTE has given concrete form to itsexpectations in a manner that is essentially compatible with peaceful coexistence in a united Sri Lanka. Thefact that the LTTE has recognised the right of the Sri Lankan Government to appoint members to the ISGA, andhas not challenged the right of the Sri Lankan security forces to be present in the North East, are specificindicators of a preparedness to accept a united country.
Further, even with regard to the new regional institutions they have proposed, such as the police andjudiciary, there appears to be an openness to dialogue with the Government on how to set them up and on theircomposition. It is unlikely that the Government will either have the ability or the intention to set up newinstitutions that supersede the existing ones during an interim administrative period. New institutions thatrequire legal and constitutional change are more appropriate for the final political settlement.
It is noteworthy that, in the Sri Lankan Government's immediate response to the LTTE's proposal, theGovernment's chief negotiator, Prof. G.L. Peiris, noted that the international community had stronglysupported the peace process and emphasised the principle of partnership. He also pointed out that the jointstatement issued in New Delhi at the end of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's visit to India earlier thismonth had "made a definitive statement about the parameters within which a negotiated political solutionshould be arrived at." The joint statement made mention of the fact that the two Governments expected theLTTE to be reasonable and comprehensive in the proposals it made regarding the interim administration, andstressed that its proposals should be linked to the final settlement.
The linkage of the interim administration to the final solution is important because it implies that therewill be a progression towards a federal and democratic system. At present, neither of these exists in theNorth East. The interim administration that is permissible, and realistic to achieve, at this stage, willnecessarily have less powers and democracy in it than the final solution, which must see the full flowering ofdemocracy and sharing of power at all levels and for all communities.
Perhaps the Ceasefire Agreement signed in February 2002 between the two parties with Norwegian facilitationcan be a model in respect of creating new working arrangements during the period of the interimadministration. It is an agreement between the two sides that has enabled the LTTE to take on new roles andwork in Government-controlled territory without the need for constitutional changes. There is certainly a needfor an ISGA until the final political settlement is reached, but it will need to be compatible with a unitedframework of governance.
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Jehan Perera is Media Director, National Peace Council of Sri Lanka. Courtesy, the South AsiaIntelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
