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Pakistan's former military ruler General Pervez Musharraf has called alleged Indian spy Kulbhushan Jadhav a bigger crimina
Pakistan has told India that a re- investigation of the Mumbai attack case was "not possible" as the trial was at an advan
Pakistan's former military ruler Pervez Musharraf has claimed that Jamaat-ud Dawah chief Hafiz Saeed was not involved in t
Pakistan's former national security adviser Mahmud Ali Durrani today said the 26/11 Mumbai attack was carried out by a ter
Pakistan's former dictator Gen Pervez Musharraf has demanded JuD chief Hafiz Saeed's release from house arrest, claiming t
India called for a collaborative preventive approach to address terrorist cyberattacks against critical infrastructures, u
Eight years after the terror attacks in the city which claimed 166 lives, Mumbai's top cop is confident that the for
India has not responded to Pakistan's request and reminders to send the 24 Indian witnesses in the 2008 Mumbai terror atta
Caesar, the famed sniffer dog of Mumbai police who saved several lives during the 26/11 terror attacks, died today at a fa
A judicial commission constituted by a Pakistani anti-terrorism court today examined a boat used by 10 LeT terrorists to r
I tweeted about it earlier, but it deserves a larger audience. Manan Ahmed and Huma Imtiaz pore over Pakistan’s Most Wanted List, compiled by the FIA, and cull out some gems from the descriptions of the listed terrorists:
The one liners that describe the suspects’ way of talking, which one would only assume is their dialect, is yet another work of art by the talented souls at the FIA.
1. “Way of Talking: Bihari tone”
2. “Way of Talking: “Speaking on non serious matters”
And when FIA’s describing everything, how could they miss the nose?
1. “Nose: Pressed (Like a Chinese)”
2. “Nose: Small (Bengali type)” [Clearly the FIA has no qualms about being racist]
There are also honorable mentions of the lips.
Read more of their findings here.
Post Script: Incidentally, the list cannot just be dismissed frivolously, for inter alia it is the same talked-about report that also includes details, of crew members of boat Al Hussaini & Al Fouz used by the [26/11] terrorists -- the boats used for transporting Kasab and gang -- and other LeT financiers and terrorists.
Author Pankaj Mishra makes it seem in an article that appeared in the New York Times of November 28th, 2009, that, in mainstream India, outside the excitable and--according to him--right-wing news media, there has been little resonance with the commemoration of the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai. Mishra says said media have been attempting, without much success, to resort to an analogy with the attacks on America on September 11, 2001, in order to whip up an exaggeraged mass emotional hysteria directed against Pakistan, where he says the attacks were "partly" planned and financed. He notes that these right-wingers remain enraged and frustrated because Pakistan has boxed India into a corner where there are no aggressive options for the latter. The reason 26/11 has not resonated with mainstream India, says Mishra, is that Indians are too fatalistic and preoccupied with various ongoing crises. Mishra registers his disapproval of America's response to the September 11 attacks, and expresses his relief that, mainstream India's indifference to 26/11 would prevent India from responding to assured future major attacks from Pakistan in America's manner, that is to say, driven by arrogance and hubris.
The full article is here.
Going by Mishra's article, the only way to understand Indian emotions flowing from the attacks is to see the emotions as a phony product of a vast conspiracy of rich right-wing urban twits. In sharp, Sarah Palinesque contradistinction to this group, Mishra sets up the real India, which is (of course) fatalistic, lives in villages, and doesn't give a damn about the attacks on Mumbai. He doesn't mention them, but presumably the left wing, of the rich and twitty as well as the other kind, is also a part of this real India. Does this mean that Indians espousing left-wing politics are barred from expressing honest grief and outrage at the attacks on their country? Mishra doesn't say.
About the only support Mishra presents for his assertions regarding his putative real Indians' feelings about the attacks on their country is his use of the "fatalism" codeword, an implicit allusion to a vast and persistent body of Orientalistic writings and prejudice about the passive and fatalistic Indian. Certainly logic and internal consistency are not Mishra's friends here: Rural Indians could well have chosen to ignore the attacks (assuming that this is demonstrably the case) or even cheer the attack, but their choice would not necessarily be an account of their fatalism, which is doubtful in point of fact. As Mishra himself says in the article, many of those Indians are busy coping with their personal crises or engaging in Maoist insurgencies or even suicide--none of these behaviours is fatalistic or passive, suicide least of all.
Mishra's message is that this questionable Indian fatalism has prevailed over an overwrought right wing to save India from the latter's hankering to emulate America's response to 9/11, which Mishra labels with the twin epithets of arrogance and hubris. These are two terms that hearken more to timeworn anti-American liturgy than imagination, let alone fact. Mishra, aside from the Pakistani leadership, the Taliban, and understandably Afghan civilians, is likely one of the few who thinks America and NATO's UN-approved 2001 effort to dethrone the odious Taliban in Afghanistan was morally wrong. The Taliban did, demonstrably, have a major role in the 9/11 slaughter in Manhattan, Washington and in the skies over Pennsylvania. The 2003 attack on Iraq was, of course, the universally-deplored war, and also hardly controversial, but in an opposite sense. The two are not to be conflated, as Mishra does.
The deeper, moral problem here is that in Mishra's world, a country responding to an attack to the limits of its ability is arrogant and hubristic, whereas, the country launching the attack deserves the benefit of every doubt, real or made up. Thus, to Mishra, the Mumbai attacks were "partly planned and financed" in Pakistan, with the remainder of the planners and financiers no doubt ensconsed in the land of perennial mystery that also harbours the real assassins of John F. Kennedy. (While we are at it, why not also magnanimously concede that the British were "partly responsible" for Jalianwala Bagh?) And, while he doesn't say it outright in the flagship newspaper of the city that is about to re-experience its 9/11 trauma with the upcoming trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the Pakistani architect of the 9//11 attacks, Mishra's exclusive focus on the orchestrated aspects of the 26/11 commemoration, their alleged "right-wing" associations, and the efforts to link the attacks to America's 9/11 experience, suggests that that America's response to 9/11, including the mass emotional outpouring of its people, was somehow phony and disreputable. Certainly, Mishra's cheap if unoriginal gibe at the erstwhile War on Terror as a "war ... on abstract noun[s]" telegraphs his withering contempt for the American people's heartfelt outrage and their government's robust if ruthless steps that have kept Americans from experiencing any further direct attacks since 2001.
Mishra himself recognizes that Indians, by contrast, are virtually guaranteed to be the victims of further major attacks from a Pakistan. Now that is a country which remains unrepentant and determined to harm India in relentless pursuit of what its thought-leaders see as the righteous cause of supremacism. In view of this, Mishra's own determination to tag India, rather than Pakistan, with arrogance and hubris represents a perverse inversion.
"Jordari, Jordari," the voice is reported to have said in perfect Benglish, "I weel shee you."
Words to this effect is what, we all laughed last year, must have made a rattled Asif Zardari rush to the Americans, complaining Pranab Mukherjee had threatened him at the height of the Mumbai siege.
Except the Benglish-spouting gent wasn't Pranab.
It now appears that the hoax calls that brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war post 26/11 were -- yes, it seems incredulous -- made by none other than Omar Saeed Sheikh, one of the dreaded terrorists freed by India during the Kandahar hijack crisis.
Surely the Pakistanis cannot be that easily fooled? Particularly, because anybody who has heard or met Pranab-da -- as Zardari indeed has -- would always remember his distinctively endearing accent.
That someone could have put on a heavy Bengali accent and mimicked Pranabda, we thought, was a possibility. But Omar Sheikh?
He apparently tried calling Condi Rice and Pranab Mukherjee himself and was not allowed access, which is how it should be when it comes to call filteration for such high-profile personages.
It does beggar belief that not only were the calls actually put through to Kiyani and Zardari or, as the Dawn report puts it, that Gen Kayani was bewildered by the caller’s threatening tone.
He is confined in a high security cell of Karachi Jail, has a long record of militancy, from kidnapping foreigners in Mumbai in 1994 to possible involvement in 9/11, Parliament attack case and kidnapping Daniel Pearl in Jan 2002. But still has -- or, at least, had -- access to a mobile phone that he seems to be putting to good use. I am amazed that the Americans aren't even ensuring that he was being monitored properly. Another common thread of course is that Omar Sheikh's Pak handler Ilyas Kashmiri also handled Headley, also under investigation for 26/11
Most of those interested would by now definitely have seen the Channel 4 Documentary (also shown on HBO a couple of days back with a new commentary by Farid Zakaria), but other than that, while there has been a lot of comprehensive western media coverage, perhaps the most detailed and sequential piece appeared some days back as a series of four blog posts by Jason Motlagh on the Virgina Quarterly Review site and was later collated into one long post. It's very long but well worth a read. Took me a few days because of other preoccupations, but here it is for those who have not yet come across it and would like a comprehensive narration of those dreadful 60 hours and after -- including the transcripts of the phone calls of the terrorists with their handlers in Pakistan and Kasab's interrogation that was included in the Channel 4/HBO documentary: Sixty Hours Of Terror
H/T: Separate emails from Amar Chopra and C.M. Naim