Making A Difference

'We Failed To Communicate The Essence Of The N-Deal'

India's outgoing ambassador to the USA, the high point of whose tenure was no doubt the N-Deal, talks about his various diplomatic assignments

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'We Failed To Communicate The Essence Of The N-Deal'
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"We worked as a team under the overall leadership of Manmohan Singh. He and President Bush took India-US ties to unprecedented heights."

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"When then deputy PM Advani visited London after the Gujarat riots, he gave a patient hearing to Muslim leaders at my residence."

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"I had recommended against Narendra Modi's visit to London. But when he did visit, all courtesies due to an elected CM were extended."

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"President Obama is a good listener. He has the capacity of grasping the essence of complex issues. His goodwill towards India is palpable."

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"Once he took a decision, he brooked no argument about implementation difficulties. This trait of his helped finalise the nuclear agreement."

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"Contrary to perceptions, my equation with Rajiv Gandhi was not of a personal friend. He was, plain and simple, my boss. I enjoyed his confidence."

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On March 31, Ronen Sen took his final bow as India's ambassador to the United States of America. The high point of his tenure was no doubt the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal. Ashish Kumar Sen met the ambassador at his Macomb Street residence, days before his departure from Washington. In this exclusive exit interview, Ronen Sen talks about his various diplomatic assignments, the joy of working with former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, and says the Manmohan Singh government could have done a better job of selling the N-deal in New Delhi. Excerpts:

What are your thoughts as you leave the US on the completion of your assignment?

I leave with a sense of satisfaction at the rapid transformation of India-US relations into a truly strategic partnership, particularly over the last four years.

What was your specific role during the negotiations of the N-deal and the main challenges you had to overcome?

The negotiations were conducted by a truly outstanding team, led by M.K. Narayanan, and including A.R. Kakodkar, Shyam Saran and Shivshankar Menon, under the overall leadership of our prime minister, aided by our external affairs minister. We worked as a team.

My role during the actual negotiations was marginal. I provided inputs and assessments. This was on the basis of my involvement at the policy level with issues related to our civilian and strategic nuclear programmes for nearly a decade-and-a-half, and, of course, on the basis of my interaction with the US administration and meetings with key Senators and Congressmen.

I was involved in our internal strategy sessions, and in mobilising bipartisan support in the US Congress with the help of the Indian-American community, the media and think-tanks, and, of course, CEOs of major US companies. My single biggest challenge was in the last lap, which involved getting the US Congress to drastically cut short the prescribed time required for Congressional consideration, by bypassing its own mandatory procedures for the first time ever. We also had to persuade the US Congress to accord top priority to approving the N-deal, in the midst of Congressional preoccupations with the worst financial crisis faced by this country since the Great Depression.

At a critical time when you had committed all your energy to getting the deal through came the controversy about your "headless chicken" quote...

My remarks were unquestionably in poor taste. My apology was unqualified and sincere. However, I was also disturbed by the reaction of some politicians. My first instinct was to resign and return and face all charges as a private citizen, unencumbered by the constraints of public office. I later recognised the primacy of institutions over individuals, and was also convinced that I shouldn't permit personal sentiments to distract me from pursuing a goal I believed was in our national interest.

Why do you think we could secure overwhelming bipartisan support in the US Congress for the N-deal but failed to achieve it in our own Parliament?

I, honestly, don't have a clear answer. The agreement was, undoubtedly, one of India's greatest diplomatic achievements. I fully understood some of the concerns expressed. The agreement was not a perfect one. No agreement is entirely one-sided. There is invariably a balance of rights and obligations. However, our core concerns had been addressed. It was, by any reckoning, the best possible agreement we could have got. While opponents at home were critical, our opponents abroad were left in stunned disbelief at what we had achieved.

In these circumstances, we could perhaps have done a better job in communication. I share the responsibility for this. Maybe we were unnecessarily reactive and defensive, apart from being far too technical and legalistic in our statements. By focusing on details, we obviously did not effectively convey the big picture. Perhaps we did not succeed in communicating the essence of the agreement and what its implications were, in terms of bijli and paani, and the far-reaching socio-economic implications of access to a broader range of technologies.

I remember the widespread scepticism about the economic reforms and the numerous technology missions launched by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. These were then regarded by many as elitist approaches which did not reflect the needs of the aam admi. It was much later that his vision of the transformatory power of technology, not just in terms of economic development, but also for socio-political emancipation and empowerment, gained recognition. The mobile phone is a symbol of this.

What would have happened if the N-deal hadn't materialised due to lack of political consensus in India?

We would have continued our global isolation and pariah status; this time not out of compulsion but by choice. We would have successfully turned a historic triumph into a major liability; a soaring eagle or proud peacock into an albatross. Our dealings with the US and the rest of the world would have continued, though we would have demonstrated that we have not yet shed our colonial-era mindsets; that we are not yet confident enough of our capability to sit at the high table of major powers.

Many felt that an excessive focus on the N-deal prevented a more broad-based engagement with the US.

Yes. I have heard that the political capital spent sucked too much oxygen out of the system to permit much other activity. But this is not true. In recent years, particularly in the last four years, India-US cooperation has, in fact, been transformed into the most broad-based and multifaceted relationship that we have with any country in the world. Today, we have about 30 bilateral dialogue mechanisms. Half of these were instituted within the last four years. These initiatives ranged from the introduction of Indian mangoes in the US to US payloads on board our first mission to the moon. In less than four years, trade was more than doubled and made more balanced. The US remains our largest trading partner in goods and services, and the largest source of investment. Trade, investments and job creation have become a two-way traffic. With a dynamic and growing Indian-American population of around 2.6 million, and the US remaining the top destination of choice for Indian students, at least 25 million Indian citizens have a direct stake in this relationship.

When we talk about the India-US strategic partnership, we go beyond the shared values and interests of not only the world's largest democracies but also the world's most diverse and pluralist politics. Our growing defence cooperation across a broad spectrum, and intelligence cooperation, which was manifested recently after the Mumbai terrorist attacks, could not have been contemplated even a few years ago.

To change the subject, I recall there was speculation that your possible posting as high commissioner in Pakistan during the nda regime did not materialise because of objections by the RSS.

This speculation was baseless. When I was informally sounded out about the posting, I was in somewhat indifferent health and could not avail of this challenging offer.

How is your health now?

Good enough to maintain 16-hour days for the entire period of my assignment here.

You were in London when there was a strong reaction against the Gujarat riots. How did you deal with the fallout? What happened during the visits of Narendra Modi and L.K. Advani?

I had reached out to our Gujarati Muslim brethren. I ignored security advice, and went unescorted for meetings at mosques or community halls. When then deputy PM Advani visited London, he gave a patient hearing to Gujarati Muslim leaders at my residence. I had recommended against the visit of chief minister Narendra Modi to London because of the probability of his being summoned in a court. But when he decided to undertake the visit, all courtesies due to an elected chief minister were extended.

You had played a key role in India-Pakistan relations when Benazir Bhutto became prime minister for the first time. You were prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's special envoy at that time...

Yes, I did meet late prime minister Benazir Bhutto in the late '80s in Karachi and Islamabad, and also in Malaysia. Good progress was made in bilateral relations, including on the Siachen issue. I did not have any formal designation as special envoy. However, during all such missions in Pakistan, as well as in South Asian and other countries, I invariably met the head of state or government. The sole exception was during one visit to Nepal, when I was not received by the late King Birendra. With one exception, all these visits were also completely out of public domain.

There are some who feel that it was time for you to move on, since your close association with the Bush administration could have affected your effectiveness with the Obama administration.

It was indeed time for me to move, but not for the reason indicated. I hold President (George) Bush in the highest esteem for his extraordinary commitment to India and his leadership role, together with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in taking India-US relations to unprecedented heights. History will recognise this. However, I first met President Obama when he was a freshman Senator in 2005. Right through the extraordinarily long presidential campaign, my colleagues and I had constant interaction with his principal advisors.

What was your impression of Bush?

I found him warm, engaging, straightforward and sincere. He acted on the basis of his convictions, often at political cost to him. Once he took a decision, he did not tolerate arguments about difficulties in its implementation. This attribute, together with his unilateralist approach, which was widely criticised, were the very traits which were responsible in finalising the nuclear agreement, against formidable odds.

And your personal impressions about Barack Obama?

Apart from his obvious charisma and charm, I found President Obama to be an exceptionally good listener. He demonstrated the capacity of grasping the essence of complex issues. His goodwill towards India is palpable. He clearly understands and appreciates our interests and concerns. This came through clearly in his immediate response to the terrorist outrage in Mumbai, and on several other occasions.

What is your assessment of the recent AfPak review? Were our inputs sought?

Yes. We have regular ongoing consultations on this issue. Our positive and stabilising role in Afghanistan is appreciated by the US administration. One manifestation of our transformed relationship in recent years is regular and close US consultations with India on regional and global issues. The days when India was seen by the US through the distorting sub-regional perspective of our relationship with just our third-largest neighbour (Pakistan) are over. The review recognises the central source of the problem. It is part of an ongoing process and our consultations will continue.

What about the new challenges in the relationship posed by the Obama administration's positions on climate change, non-proliferation and protectionist trends, accentuated further by the economic crisis?

Each such challenge represents a corresponding opportunity for cooperation. Given our common concerns about energy security, and meeting the challenge of climate change, we can cooperate constructively in ensuring a successful outcome of the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change. We can also focus on joint endeavours towards a green economy. Recent high-level discussions in this regard have been cordial and constructive. Apart from the European Union and the US, a number of other countries had taken some protectionist measures recently. We have conveyed our concerns, both officially and through our corporate leaders.

What about non-proliferation issues? President Obama has signalled his intention to get Senate ratification for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to press for the early conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty....

We were pioneers in advocating disarmament and non-proliferation. We restricted sensitive exports well before current non-proliferation regimes were even conceived of. We never sought to undermine non-proliferation regimes even when we were the target of these regimes. Now that this historic wrong has been corrected, we should be glad to promote international cooperation in preventing further proliferation and promoting global disarmament. There will always be some challenges. These can be overcome.

In any case, I do not see any reason to be defensive or unduly perturbed. If something emerges which is not in our national interests, we should be confident of our ability to resist it.

At the conclusion of an extraordinary career, could you tell us about the high points and any regrets you may have?

Undoubtedly, my most satisfying experience was working as foreign and defence policy advisor to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. My most challenging assignments abroad were in Moscow and Washington. During my six years as ambassador in Moscow, India-Russia relations were back on an even keel after the turmoil in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. During my nearly five years in Washington, India-US relations witnessed the most rapid positive transformation since our independence. It was also an honour for me to set up India's first embassy in Berlin as the capital of a reunified Germany, and to serve in London, which is not only the capital of the UK but a major global financial and media centre. My only disappointment was the cancellation of my posting as ambassador to China in 1996, particularly since I was so closely involved with Rajiv Gandhi's historic visit to China in 1988.

What was your relationship with Rajiv Gandhi?

Contrary to some perceptions, my equation with him was not of a personal friend. He was, plain and simple, my boss. I was privileged to enjoy his complete confidence and have direct access to him. When I disagreed, I conveyed it in person but never at a larger meeting. He was never officious and did not take offence. He was exceptionally kind and gracious with me.

What was he like to work with?

Working with him was really enjoyable and exhilarating. One could not avoid getting inspired by his vision of India. He did not just think of our country as it was, but what it could become. All his energies were devoted to the realisation of this mission. All his domestic and foreign policies, which are inextricably linked in any case, were focused on meeting the aspirations of the poor and underprivileged in India or globally. As someone had put it so perceptively, Rajiv Gandhi's nationality was Indian, his religion Indian, his region India. Whenever we travelled with him, there was a spring in our step and we all felt proud to be Indian.

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