Making A Difference

Twist 'N' Shout

It's delayed, but a U-turn on Kashmir will happen. But can President Musharraf survive it?

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Twist 'N' Shout
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Facing imminent international isolation, and fearing Pakistan is in danger of squandering its gains accruing from the war against terror, President Pervez Musharraf is mulling yet another U-turn on his foreign policy: abandoning the jehadis operating in Kashmir. Sources in the military establishment say this great leap forward could have been already taken had it not been for intense opposition from jehadis and, presumably, those in the Pakistani society who support them.

Neither Pakistan nor Musharraf have any delusions about the sudden change in the global tide against them: both the US and UK have condemned Pakistan's recent missile tests, and increasingly shown signs of accepting New Delhi's claims of Islamabad fomenting terrorism across the LoC.

Military sources say international big boys are also dangling the carrot. In recent weeks, they say, US assistant secretary of state Christina Rocca and British foreign secretary Jack Straw have held out credible assurances that India would reciprocate in equal degree to any dramatic shift in Pakistan's Kashmir policy. "At the same time," says one of them, "the Pakistani foreign office was told that US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage, being sent to South Asia early next month, would not arrive in Islamabad until Pakistan took necessary steps to stop cross-border terrorism. Only after this, it was conveyed, could the US pressure India to pull back its troops."

That's precisely why diplomatic circles in Islamabad were expecting Musharraf to announce in his May 27 speech a ceasefire with India. Kashmiri jehadi groups were then to emulate the President in their Kashmir operations. Government circles also hinted to journalists that his speech would be ground-breaking.

But this wasn't to be, largely due to the jehadis' furious manoeuvrings. Worried over reports that the Pakistani army had already started stopping the mujahideen from entering Kashmir, Jamaat-e-Islami chief Qazi Hussain Ahmad had decided, sources in militant circles say, to contact religious parties and launch a countrywide movement against Musharraf's possible compromise on May 27. A day before, say the sources, Qazi confided in his partymen that Islamabad had sought his support on the contemplated ceasefire.

Perhaps such opposition activities persuaded Gen Musharraf to depute two ISI men to set up an emergency meeting with the Pakistani chapter of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) and the jehadis a few hours before the speech. The participants were informed that Musharraf planned to announce a ceasefire on behalf of the Pakistan army, which should be followed by a similar ceasefire announcement by the United Jehad Council (UJC) in Kashmir.

The participants from the APHC (Pakistan chapter) included Altaf Qadri of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, Ghulam Mohammad Safi of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Siddiq Ganai of the People's League, Ashraf Saraf of the Muslim Conference, Yousaf Naseem of the People's Conference and Mir Tahir Masood of the Ittehadul Muslimeen. Those from the jehadi organisations included Syed Salahuddin of the Hizbul Mujahideen, Bakhat Zameen Khan of the Al-Badr Mujahideen, Commander Osman of the Hizbul Momineen, and General Abdullah of the Jamiatul Mujahideen.

But the proposal angered the jehadi commanders; almost all voiced their opposition to it, even refusing to take the soft drinks on offer as a mark of protest. "We're being stabbed in the back and abandoned by Pakistan in the same way as it did with the Taliban," one of them told the presidential aides. Only Mir Tahir Masood supported the ceasefire idea.

The aides tried their best to convince Salahuddin, the UJC chairman. Salahuddin was enraged at the suggestion, accusing Musharraf of pushing the mujahideen into a Tora Bora and Kunduz-like situation in which Indians would butcher the mujahideen.The meeting's organisers tried to pacify him saying the world community would guarantee against bloodletting. Salahuddin, then, reportedly countered, "What happened after we announced the ceasefire in July 2000? They tried to create differences among us and also killed two out of the five commanders who had announced the ceasefire."

Sources say it was a veritable revolt. Some commanders offered to leave 'Azad' Kashmir, claiming they would even then continue their struggle. With the meeting ending in a fiasco, a few hours later, Gen Musharraf addressed the nation, promising to fulfill his previous commitments—"Our territory will not be used for terrorism in any part of the world and we condemn terrorism in any part of the world"—and yet deciding against announcing the ceasefire.

Senior political analyst and former editor Hussain Naqi senses a rethink in Islamabad over Kashmir. Yet he cautions, "This change would be more problematic for Pakistan than the U-turn it took on the Afghan policy post-September 11, ending support to the Taliban and joining hands with the US in the war against terrorism."

Sources say the focus of Pakistan's 'modified security strategy' would be to continue persuading the pro-Kashmiri jehadi leadership that the solution to the Kashmir problem lies in a political and diplomatic dialogue. Intelligence agencies say a large number of the 5,000 mujahideen who're considered motivated supporters of the Kashmiri movement now operate completely out of the government's control. The success of any change in the Kashmir policy depends greatly on the response of jehadi groups.

A senior Pakistani official with a vast experience of Kashmir says some of these jehadi groups could have been responsible for targeting civilians in Kashmir, hoping to provoke India into retaliating against Pakistan. This, the official says, would harden positions at home and render impossible for the government to counter those committed to the Kashmir cause. An Indo-Pak war could also plunge the region into a crisis, persuade the US to evacuate its troops and consequently relieve pressure from Al Qaeda and Taliban activists on the run.

There's also a section in government circles that would want Musharraf to tread warily and obtain guarantees of a quid pro quo for any shift in the country's Kashmir policy. Pointing to his January 12 speech, they say Musharraf's conciliatory gestures only emboldened India to raise its pitch, and insist for action upon the Most Wanted list New Delhi had submitted. Perhaps this is the reason why Musharraf struck a belligerent tone—his reference to attacks on Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and scheduled castes have won him a rare appreciation from the Pakistani religio-militant quarters—hoping to manage international guarantees for persuading jehadi commanders to agree to his new Kashmir policy.

But there's no denying that change is on the anvil. That the government is gradually distancing itself from the jehadis can be gleaned from the fact that it has blocked the wireless communication system used by militants on both sides of the LoC. The militants fighting in Kashmir now have no links with their base camps or with other ultras in Azad Kashmir (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir for us). Under these circumstances, the worried commanders of Pakistan-based militant groups are trying to evolve a new strategy to continue their armed struggle in Kashmir.

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