Making A Difference

Shrill Chimes Of Chittagong

The 20-year-old insurgent conflict may have quietened down but is far from resolved

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Shrill Chimes Of Chittagong
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A semblance of normality is slowly returning to the picturesque Chittagong Hill Tracts. For some two decades now, southeastern Bangladesh has witnessed a bloody conflict pitting the security forces against the Shanti Bahini, the militant wing of an embittered tribal people, a majority of them Chakmas, fighting for a measure of autonomy to ensure their way of life.

With a ceasefire announced by the insurgents in 1992 still holding, people can now be seen loitering around late into the night—unthinkable even three years ago. Most of the military checkpoints that restricted free movement have virtually disappeared and as Mohammad Ismail, the deputy commissioner of Khagrachari, says, "You can actually come and go without the fear of being waylaid, even after midnight."

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It is still not clear why the insurgents actually declared the unilateral ceasefire. The PCJSS (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity), the political wing of the Shanti Bahini, maintains that it was effected to test the government's commitment to a negotiated settlement of the problem. Military leaders, on the other hand, say it was a tactical move so that they could reorganise themselves and launch a fresh movement. Indeed, in the last few years the security forces have been able to push insurgency into fragile remission. Besides, the insurgents have also been weakened by infighting, failure to achieve any specific goal and, more importantly, the ambivalence of India in providing sanctuaries and other material help, crucial for carrying on the struggle.

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The shift in the Indian attitude dates back to 1991-92 but was concretised after the change of governments last year in both New Delhi and Dhaka. The two regimes have agreed in principle to stop aiding insurgents in carrying out subversive activities from their respective territories. In fact, the tardy peace process under way since 1992 received a big boost following a declaration by Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her then Indian counterpart, Deve Gowda, that they would stop cross-border insurgencies.

There has been a significant shift in India's foreign policy vis-a-vis its neighbours: security and trade now override all other considerations. India has reportedly been seeking Dhaka's cooperation to shut down landing facilities in Bangladesh available to the NSCN to transport arms via the Chittagong Hill Tracts. India is also keen to flush out Manipuri insurgents seeking safe sanctuary in Bangladesh. Besides, South Block is more interested in mutual trade advantages than in protecting the Chakmas' rights.

For its part, Dhaka realises that a military operation will not achieve much, given the heavy human, social and economic losses it entails. "I don't think there can be any military solution to the conflict and it must be settled politically," says Maj Gen Abdul Matin, commander of the Chittagong army division. This admission underscores the failure of 70,000 well-trained security personnel backed by vastly superior fire power, helicopters and a huge amount of money to put down the 20-year-old insurgency carried out by a poorly-equipped, ragged guerrilla force of no more than 5,000.

Another vicious enemy, the mosquito, has further weakened the resolve of the military in tackling insurgency. "Malaria is our biggest enemy, not the Shanti Bahini," says Brig Kazi Ashfaque Ahmed, regional army commander of Khagrachari hill district. In the past few years, more men in uniform have succumbed to the deadly cerebral malaria than to the insurgents' bullets. According to official statistics, 75 troops died of malaria in last five years compared to 23 deaths from encounters.

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SINCE 1989, several attempts have been made to win over the tribals. The creation of the separate local government council for the three hill districts of Khagrachari, Rangamati and Bandarban in 1989, with tribals as their head, was aimed at building confidence among the tribals about the government's bona fides. But since then, no substantial breakthrough has been made—simply because the authorities have reneged on their promise to deliver all powers to the council. "I really don't have much authority," says a rueful Samiran Dewan, a tribal leader and chairman of the Khagrachari hill district. "Many of the problems would have been solved by now, had the government implemented all the terms of the agreement."

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This lack of sincerity has also plagued the repatriation of refugees from India, where 36,000 tribals have been languishing in makeshift camps for 11 years. About 15,000 refugees have returned since 1994 following agreements between India, Bangladesh and refugee leaders. The latest effort was stalled again because of alleged violation of the agreement by Dhaka. (An estimated 50,000 tribals were forced to flee to Tripura in the face of a brutal crackdown by the security forces in 1986.) 

The tribals' resentment dates back to 1960 when the first hydro-electric project was built in Rangamati, ignoring the cries of the local inhabitants. More than 100,000 people who were displaced did not get the promised compensation, leading to widespread anger. "The first seed of discontent was sown then," says Shah Alam, deputy commissioner of Rangamati. "How can you justify illuminating the rest of the country while keeping the place, from where the electricity is produced, in darkness?" "From then on, we've literally and figuratively been pushed to the wall," notes Charu Bikash Chakma, a prominent tribal leader.

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The second shock for the tribals came in the late 1970s when nearly 200,000 plains-people were settled in the hill tracts at the behest of president Ziaur Rahman. The tribals saw the officially-sponsored influx as a deliberate attempt to destroy their distinct culture and turn them into a minority. The Indian view on this is that there was a deliberate attempt by the governments of Rahman and H.M. Ershad to rep -lace the Chakmas with Bangladeshi Muslims and Rohingya Muslims from Burma—giving credence to Dhaka's allegations that New Delhi was funding the Shanti Bahini.

There is no denying that the area's demographic profile has changed dramatically. In 1974, for instance, the Bengali population in the hill tracts was only 12 per cent, compared to 88 per cent of the tribal population. (The latter are mostly Buddhists of Mongoloid descent. Of them, the Chakma tribes are in a majority.) According to the latest official statistics, the non-tribal population has shot up to nearly 49 per cent in a total population of about one million.

The government insists that in an area of over 5,000 sq miles—one-tenth of the country—the population is barely one-hundredth of the total and, as one official put it, "there's no question of expelling the settlers". The tribal leadership appears to have accepted this reality and no longer insists on its previous demand of expulsion.

Instead, says the elderly Charu Bikash Chakma: "The settlers can be put in a designated area and we should be left alone." The government is against any such segregation. "It violates our constitution," points out an official of the Special Affairs Division, which deals with the Hill Tracts. This is the crux of the problem and the government seems clue-less about how to resolve the issue peacefully. Any attempt to placate the tribals is bound to provoke a violent backlash from the Bengalis, who have grown into a formidable force over the last two decades. "We'll no longer take it lying down," warns Jalaluddin Chowdhury Alamgir, leader of the Hills Tracts Peoples Council, an organisation created to protect Bengali interests.

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Bengalis settled in the hill tracts are agitating against what they say is a discriminatory approach towards them. They also deeply resent being called non-tribals. "We are Bengalis and we don't want to be treated like second-class citizens," says Chinu Anawar, a local leader of the ruling Awami League. And with the settlers and the tribals in no mood for coexistence, it may be a while before grievances are settled. 

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