Making A Difference

Kashmir-Baloch Bhai Bhai

Mere tactical backlash or indicative of greater strategy, Modi’s references won’t obscure the fact that Kashmir holds the key

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Kashmir-Baloch Bhai Bhai
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APOLOGY

In the print version of the article 'Kashmir-Baloch Bhai Bhai', in the Outlook issue dated August 29, 2016, two maps on page 51 inadvertently misrepresent the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The error crept in on account of maps sourced from the internet. Both maps have been removed from the online version of the magazine. The error is deeply regretted.

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Successive Indian prime ministers since Jawaharlal Nehru have used their Independence Day speech in the last seven decades to make people aware of the challenges that lay ahead. Most took opportunity to share their plans on how they intended to meeting those challenges—predominantly dom­estic issues. Occasionally, they had also warned the nation of external threats trying to destabilise the country.

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But so far, they had rarely, if ever, tried to raise developments deep inside a neighbouring country, as PM Narendra Modi did on this August 15 from the ramparts of the Red Fort when he spoke about the situation in Balochistan and the plight of the Baloch under the might of the Pakistani state. For good measure, he also highlighted the dismal human rights situation in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and the Gilgit-Baltistan reg­ion—both part of the Kashmir jigsaw.

Some see this as an attempt to divert att­ention from the Kashmir Valley, where an agitation has been raging for weeks, resulting in, till now, 65 deaths and forcing the government to impose curfews and susp­end workaday activities to bring the situation under control. Debates in Parliament, an all-party meeting chaired by the PM and several other closed-door par­­leys have perhaps managed to convey the signal that politicians of all shades con­s­ider Kashmir to be an integral part of India and won’t allow Pakistani meddling. But such nationalist solidarity has so far been unable to find an effective way to look for a political solution to pacify the restive Valley.

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“It may be the first time that India ref­erred to Balochistan, but it won’t be the last,” says Stephen Cohen, veteran Ame­rican commentator on South Asia. “Fru­st­rated at home, it turns to the other country’s weakness, hoping that raising it will help India deal with its own problems,” he adds.

Others see the premier’s reference to Balochistan, PoK and Gilgit as a major, considered policy shift that seeks to lay down the new terms of engagement with Pakistan. “It is a significant departure from the past, in view of the prime minister himself commenting on Balochistan, and that too in a speech marking India’s Indepe­ndence Day,” says former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran. He points out that “it was obviously designed to get maximum exposure, and it has”.

It has managed to stir a diplomatic hornet’s nest both within India and beyond its shores. The responses pouring in ever since from Pakistan and elsewhere make it clear that Modi’s unp­recedented comments on Balochistan have made a hitherto taboo subject as central to a debate on future Indo-Pakistan relations as Kashmir.

Yes, there have been occasions when India, which has enjoyed cordial ties with Baloch nationalist leaders, has issued sta­tements through the MEA on human rights violations in Balochistan. But the closest an Indian PM came to discuss Bal­o­chistan was Manmohan Singh, when at the Sharm-el-Sheikh meeting with his Pak­i­stani counterpart, Yousuf Raza Gilani, he incorporated Balochistan in the Indo-Pak joint statement. In both countries, it was widely interpreted  as an admission on India’s part that it was fomenting trouble in Balochistan, just as Pakistan had been crowing about.

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“There is also a hint that India intends to offer support to the people of Balochistan in their struggle against Pakistani authorities,” says Saran, referring to Modi’s speech. “If this becomes a pattern then this, too, will be an important shift from the past.”

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Baloch nationalists protest at the UN in New York

Predictably, Baloch nationalist leaders are ecstatic, hoping that at long last their struggle would get the required international focus—an essential cachet. (read int­­erview of the Baloch leader). Pakistan, which on August 14  (its independence day)had decided to dedicate itself more resolutely to the “independence struggle of the Kashmiri people”, reacted to Modi’s speech on expected lines. It refuted any comparisions between the situation in the Valley and that in Balochistan. Instead, it stated that Modi’s comments only vindicated their long-held stand—it was India which was behind disturbances in Balochistan.

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While most commentators agree that Modi’s reference to Balochistan, along with the human rights situation in Paki­stan-occupied Kashmir and in the Gilgit-Baltistan areas was a major shift in India’s Pakistan policy, their opinion is divided on what the Indian premier aims to achieve.

According to Saran, what remains to be seen is whether this is a tactical move, in response to Pakistan’s negativity vis-a-vis Kashmir, or if it represents a broad, strategic move. He argues that “if it is a strategic move, its imp­lications will be significant both for future Indo-Pak relations as well as India’s relations with China. As we know, the China-Pakistan corridor will pass thr­o­ugh Balochistan and its terminus is Gwadar port, on the Baloch coastline.” The immediate thing to consider would be whether this imperils India’s tentative outreach to Beijing on the NSG membership.

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Historian and strategic affairs commentator Srinath Raghavan is sceptical about the efficacy of this sudden shift.

“As with all such statements, it is aimed at multiple audiences,” he says, referring to Modi’s I-Day speech. First, as far as Pakistan is concerned, the PM wants to send out the message that India won’t tolerate Pakistani interference over dev­elopments in Jammu and Kashmir.” But this, he thinks, is unlikely to work. “Pakistan is able to interfere because of developments inside J&K that the government there seems unable to control. Unless this changes, Pakistan will continue to rake up the issue.”

Second, Raghavan feels Modi attempted to reach a wider international audience,  but points out that Kashmir and Balo­ch­istan have different valences for this target audience. “We may not like it, but the fact remains that Kashmir is seen as an ‘international dispute’ in a way that Balochistan is not. And it is patent that India is simply bringing it up as a tit-for-tat.”

Modi’s third objective, says Raghavan, is to address the domestic audience in India. “The prime minister’s support base will, of course, see this as another ‘tough’ stance,” he says.

Essentially, there are three issues on which the current situation has a direct bearing: the state of India-Pakistan relations, the Kashmir issue and the ongoing unrest in the Valley and, in the short term, the forthcoming SAARC summit to be held in Islamabad at the end of the year. It will determine how effectively India can deal with Pakistan vis-a-vis all three issues.

Since coming to power in May 2014, Modi had made it clear that one of his top priorities will be to break the logjam in Indo-Pakistan relations and take ties forward. His invitation to Nawaz Sharif and other SAARC leaders for his inaugural ceremony was an attempt to convey that message. While the message may have been loud, there is doubt if it was conveyed—or received—in an ideal way.

Tentative attempts at resuming a sustainable and meaningful engagement with Pakistan have in the past two-and-a-half years remained elusive. Perhaps this could be blamed on developments in both countries and the wider world. In bet­ween, Modi had tried several fresh tacks—including a brief tete-a-tete with Sharif in Paris on the sidelines of an international meet on climate change and a surprise stopover to Lahore to greet the Pakistani premier on his birthday.

But all such moves have failed to bear results, leading his detractors to see them as nothing more than ‘spectacles’—mere photo-opportunities to grab media headlines. And soon, as the incipient dialogue was hijacked by terror incidents like the Pathankot attack, it only hardened the respective position of the two sides.

Now, can future talks ever concentrate merely on Kashmir (as demanded by Pakistan) or on cross-border terror (New Delhi’s demand), or, have the terms of engagement been permanently altered? “If the objective is to extend active and sustained support to these anti-Pakistan elements, then there will be significant consequences, for which we must be prepared,” says Saran. Others, however, see in Modi’s tough talk an attempt to create the required space for engaging Pakistan. A first sign in this regard will come on how India responds to preparations under way in Pakistan for the year-end SAARC summit.

“Pakistan, as host, would ordinarily have made all efforts to ensure that PM Modi attended. My sense is that they will still try very hard,” says Raghavan. He points out that since Modi has also publicly committed to attend the summit, it will seem churlish not to do so. “He too may well regard the summit in Islamabad as an opportunity to row back from the rhetorical exchanges and focus again on substantive issues,” adds Raghavan.

But for all this to happen, Kashmir holds the key. If the unrest continues and India is unable to find a political solution to bring down the temperature, Pakistan may continue to see it as a 1989-like situation and exploit the trouble in the Valley to bleed India. On the other hand, if the situation is brought under control and normalcy returns to the Valley soon, the possibility of the resumption of an India-Pakistan dialogue and engagement also becomes stronger.  

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