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'If This Is Not War, What Is?'

Peace talks are for the politicians. On this icy frontier, the Indian army is digging in, preparing for the long haul.

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'If This Is Not War, What Is?'
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The 30,000 Indian troops deployed in the sector, backed by heavy artillery and supported by the air force, are not merely pushing back the Afghan mercenaries who have taken up positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC). They are also fighting the Pakistani Army, which seems to be masterminding and actively participating in a battle that shows no signs of abating, three weeks after an Indian Army patrol stumbled across the insurgents on the snowy heights of Banju, near Kargil.

And as the iaf's supersonic fighter jets and helicopter gunships shatter the icy calm over the Zojila Pass, which links the Dras-Kargil sector to the Valley, it adds to the widespread feeling - among soldiers and civilians alike - that they are in the middle of a war zone. The intensive bombardment, a steadily mounting casualty list and the sight of local residents in their thousands abandoning villages and towns completes this picture. The loss of two Indian migs on May 27 and the shooting down of a MI-17 chopper the next day has pushed the situation to the very brink. And with the long-range Bofors howitzers being pressed into action, the army seems to have readied itself for a long-drawn confrontation.

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 If this is not war then what is?  asks a senior army officer operating in Dras. Even as he speaks, the guns boom in alarmingly close proximity. The very briefing room where he sits was targeted a few days ago.  This is serious stuff. No militant group can sustain this kind of intensity,  he adds.  The enemy is right up there, we are down here - `easy targets.  He points to the snowclad peaks rising behind the town.  That's 17,000 feet and they can see every move we make. But there is no way of being sure what they are up to. 

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In fact, these comments illustrate the core disadvantage of the Indian army as it attempts to clear land taken over by the Pakistan-backed infiltrators. Having taken vantage positions on the peaks six to eight km inside Indian territory, they have been engaging the army in an exchange of fire for close to three weeks now. The army admits it cannot spell out a timeframe for  neutralising or clearing  the infiltrators. The operation, say senior officers, could take three months,  perhaps longer . This, despite the aerial bombardment.

The strategy at the moment seems to be to first isolate the captured posts atop the mountains by cutting off supply lines, to  soften  them up by intensive bombing. And then, perhaps, para-drop troops on the mountainside to take on a weakened enemy and recapture the posts. Operation Vijay, launched by the iaf on May 26, was an integral part of this strategy. But it has met with limited success, say army sources.As things stood on May 28, the airstrikes would have to continue at least for a few more days before the army could initiate the next step. But senior officers point out that they can't promise instant success. Miracles aren't on the agenda.

It's obvious that the army was caught unawares. While the intelligence agenciesóraw, IB and Military Intelligence - are copping part of the blame for failing to provide clear, specific inputs on the possibility of infiltration on this massive scale, which would have required months of preparation, middle-level army officers have another take. They spoke to Outlook about the  sense of complacency  that they believe had set in after the Lahore declaration. The mistaken belief that the Kargil-Dras sector was not  hot  or active allowed the Pakistanis to carefully plan this intrusion.

According to army sources, six months of planning must have gone into setting up the posts on rugged, snow-bound mountain tops at altitudes ranging from 16,000 to 18,000 feet. Some of the 30-odd posts were set up at positions that India had abandoned in winter last year. The climatic conditions being extremely inhospitable, it was felt that leaving them unattended through winter would not pose a problem. The Pakistani army has capitalised on this miscalculation and seems to have cut out mountain paths and established supply routes to the higher reaches. And trained its men to fight in sub-zero temperatures.

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All of this only confirms what senior army officers have been saying in private for some time now. The feedback from officers and jawans on the 208-km drive from Srinagar to Kargil does not echo the hopes of many in Delhi that the operation would be  localised . For the record, however, Major General V.S. Budhwar, General Officer Commanding, 3rd Division at Kargil, was categorical that this was  no war-like situation, despite the large-scale infiltration .

But even as he was briefing journalists, the ear-splitting roar of heavy artillery could be heard from the border close by.  That's our fire,  a brigadier hastened to add. Only a few hours earlier, the living quarters of the jawans was hit by a shell.  Their positions on top of the hill gives them an advantage, but we have quietened them down a lot,  says another officer. But no one confirms or denies a rumour that an army ammunition dump near Kargil had been hit two weeks ago, causing considerable damage.

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Though relatively quiet over the last week, Kargil wears the look of a ghost town. According to the civil authorities, about half the population has fled. The only hotel (opened for journalists) had no water and no meals to serve. A few shops are open, but the shelves are bare.  The only way in for provisions is from Srinagar, and the highway has been closed for civilian traffic,  they explain.

In fact, Kargil has been the epicentre of media reports on the border confrontation because it is the only town in the area, and one where not all the residents have fled. The rest of the battlefield spans inhospitable, sparsely-populated terrain. It ensures that civilian casualties have been minimal. Considering the intensity of shelling, these would otherwise have been much higher.

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Army officers who have been directing the operations against the infiltrators now have a fairly good idea of the kind of force they are trying to flush out. This information comes from intelligence inputs since to date no infiltrator has been apprehended, although the army claims it has killed over 200 militants. According to the army, there is a core group of Afghani mercenaries or militants - a conclusion drawn from their wireless intercepts (in Pushto) - who are supported and directed by the Pakistani army. We know Pak army personnel are there on the mountain peaks. It is also the Pakistani army which is replenishing the ammunition for those targeting Indian positions below,  says a senior officer.

The posts on the peaks have been provided with 120 mm artillery guns and rocket launchers. Besides, the men at the top also act as spotters for the Pakistani heavy artillery batteries stationed behind the mountain, which fire over the top at Indian targets on the other side. A favoured target is the Srinagar-Leh highway: shelling this leads to the closure of the only road link between Srinagar and Ladakh.

But why has Pakistan chosen to shift its operations to this sector? One theory is that, militancy having abated slightly in the Valley, the isi is keen to spread militant activity to Ladakh where the terrain provides perfect cover. The army agrees. Says General Budhwar:  Their efforts in the Valley having failed, there seems to be an attempt to move and the isi may have thought this would be an ideal area. 

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But there are other explanations. One is that the Kargil sector is an area where the Indian army is at a distinct disadvantage, since Pakistani positions overlook Indian ones and a large troop deployment would be required to keep a check on Pakistan. Also, defending the Srinagar-Leh highway is virtually impossible, with long stretches exposed directly to enemy attack from vantage positions across the border. Should the army redeploy its forces to defend the Kargil sector, it would weaken the Indian presence along other borders in j&K. Such a redeployment would incur a heavy cost in human and financial terms as well, since the troops will have to fight in sub-zero winters where the temperatures dip to minus 40 degrees Celsius. In short, another Siachen would be created.

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But none of these theories explain the blatant Pakistani activity in Kargil and Dras, say army officers. The shelling from across the border and the setting up of outposts within Indian territory does not seem to be aimed at merely sneaking in a few hundred militants. While defence ministry officials and senior army officers have not openly talked about declaring war, those in the field fighting the enemy are very clear that this is no low-intensity conflict. And that the earlier the government accepts this, the better.

Pakistan, too, has not talked of declaring war, but such a possibility, according to army officers, looms large. The feeling on the Indian side is that unless the political leadership of the two countries comes to an agreement soon, this 'slide into a war' would continue.

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The army and the air force seems to be prepared for such an eventuality. And as additional troops and equipment are moved up the Zojila Pass, troops seem surprised that journalists still talk of  militants  and  infiltrators . They say that they have been told by their superiors that they are being brought in to fight a war.  You don't fight militants with fighter planes and Bofors guns,  says a jawan on the move. Routine army tactics to ensure the troops are fully prepared, perhaps. But equally, an ominous sign of the possibility of the conflict spinning out of control.

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It took the Indian army three tortuous months to flush out the Pakistanis from Dras and Ghumri in '48. The sophisticated weapons of contemporary warfare were absent, but then that cuts both ways. Should the present conflict drag on, the Indian army will be battling not only the enemy but also the severe climatic conditions and harsh topography of a land that has cost India some of its bravest and best. 

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