Making A Difference

Green Gills In A Reddened Sea

Does India have a role in Southeast Asia or will it be all at sea?

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Green Gills In A Reddened Sea
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It seems a veritable habit of outsiders to affix the tag of ‘Great Power’ to India in an effort to advance their own agendas. In the 1950s, during the Cold War years, Moscow described India thus in the hope that it would relinquish its avowed non-aligned stance. It is now the turn of the United States and its allies in East and Southeast Asia to dub India as a great power. The reason: they believe adding to the hype surrounding India could inspire it to undertake a bigger role in stabilising the Asia-Pacific region, which seems perturbed at China’s growing assertion.

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Realpolitik underlies the coining of the fancy labels that Indians seem to love. Since China’s rise is seen to mark the relative decline of America—manifest in its economic woes—Washington wants to create space for India to play a role beyond the confines of the Indian Ocean. Evolving international politics introduces new nomenclatures—Asia-Pacific is consequently now the Indo-Pacific, a term underlining the centrality of India in the new balance of power game. “The Indo-Pacific is the western Pacific plus India and mainland Southeast Asia,” Robert Kaplan, an American author-commentator of the Centre for New American Security, told Outlook. “It’s a term that allows American experts and policymakers to include India into western Pacific diplomatic, economic and military power calculations.”

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As other countries fete India, the establishment in Delhi has been mulling and debating two vital issues. One, what role does America and its allies want India to play? Two, does India have the requisite naval strength to meet these expectations? Says an Indian diplomat in South Block, “Whether we like it or not, for most countries in the region, China is the elephant in the room.” This was indeed the sentiment at the recent East Asia Summit (EAS) in Bali, where the US, Russia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and the 10 ASEAN member-countries met. The participants discussed the need to turn the EAS, which focuses on trade and economic issues, into a forum for thrashing out political and security issues and evolving a collective mechanism to resolve disputes arising among the countries in the region. This does not mean a NATO-like security alliance, but rather an “open, balanced and inclusive regional architecture, which will be in the region’s long-term interest”.

In this scheme, Kaplan says “India will have a central role in protecting sea-lines of communications between the energy-rich Middle East and the hundreds of millions of middle-class customers in East Asia”. He makes no bones about the fact that much of India’s role has been scripted vis-a-vis China. “It has much to do with China’s rise. India in the future should have the capability to play a significant role as a counter-weight to China,” he explains.

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For months now, this has been the hot topic of discussion in the US establishment, which has been subtly changing its hierarchy of priorities. In a speech to NATO a few months ago, former US defence secretary Robert Gates spoke of America increasingly turning its focus onto Asia—the growth engine of the world economy. US secretary of state Hillary Clinton has been describing the region as the ‘Indo-Pacific’ to ensure the Indians get the message about Washington’s expectations. Ditto President Barack Obama, who harped on this theme on his recent visit to Australia and again in Bali. These comments the Indian establishment has greatly appreciated.

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But, really, does India know what is desired of it? “Indo-Pacific,” says former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran, “springs from the perception that the Indian and Pacific Oceans are a seamless continuum and a single strategic space. For example, a very large amount of oil moves from the Gulf to East Asia and the Pacific Rim now more than the traffic westwards. The sea-lanes traversing the Indian Ocean into the Pacific have, therefore, become a single maritime space. Hillary has used the term to reflect this new reality.”

As is always the case with diplomacy, there are potential pluses and looming minuses. Many in the Indian establishment, no doubt, are enthused at the new opportunities for safeguarding, and promoting, the country’s vital national interests in the region. An equal number is circumspect about New Delhi’s over-dependence on the US, as also about over-stretching India’s naval capabilities. Nevertheless, India’s location in the Indian Ocean has provided it with a “maritime destiny”. Take a look at some figures—more than 90 per cent of India’s trade by volume and 77 per cent by value is seaborne. To quench its thirst for energy required for development, India has to ensure that the straits of Malacca, Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb and the South China Sea are not imperilled in any way. The cluster of countries around these sea lanes are India’s major source of investment and trade, and home to millions of Indians.

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These maritime aspects explain why India would not want a single power dominating any of the sea lanes. Vice admiral (retired) Pradeep Kaushiva of the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, says India fully understands China’s attempt to bolster its navy to ensure the safety and security of the sea lanes for its own growth. Yet, simultaneously, India cannot just accept China invoking history to lay exclusive claims on waters shared by others, says Kaushiva, adding, “China’s proclivity to seek to change the status quo unilaterally is indeed worrisome.” He is referring to Chinese claims to the South China Sea, which seeks to nullify the rights of Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines.

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Yet there exists doubt about the Indian navy’s ability to ensure China does not become the single dominant naval power in the region. Says Saran, “India’s naval capabilities are significant, but its power projection capabilities are still limited.” He points out that India has a strong naval presence, both in the western and eastern reaches of the Indian Ocean, which enabled it to provide relief fairly quickly to countries like Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Thailand and Indonesia during the 2004-05 tsunami. Saran, however, adds, “Beyond this, we currently do not have the capability, but we are building up our naval assets.” He points out that the Indian navy is soon to be in possession of at least two aircraft carriers and an augmented submarine fleet.

Others contend that India should emulate the model adopted by the US in the 19th century—it consolidated its strength even while “free-riding” the era’s pre-eminent naval power, Britain. “Transposed to today, this would mean that New Delhi will be largely amenable to cooperation with the US (although opposed to any formal alliance) while it works on economic development and constructs a military adequate to fulfil its political aims,” James Holmes of the US Naval War College told Outlook. He added, “To me, an India that can police its own home region is a good thing, not only for itself, but for the region. Not least, this would relieve the US military some of the security burden at a time when we could use some relief.”

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India has a “blue water” navy, which means that it has the capacity to operate at least 200 miles away from its shores on the high seas. It also boasts the fourth largest navy in the world. Says Holmes, “The Indian navy is a more than respectable fleet. The measure of a navy is whether it can concentrate combat power at a decisive point, not whether it matches up with potential adversaries in the pages of Jane’s Fighting Ships.” Agrees Commodore (retd) C. Uday Bhaskar, “Currently, India is still a medium naval power, (but one) which is also handicapped since much of the critical hardware is still imported.”

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India’s naval weaknesses prompt sceptics to warn that India should not rush in to act as a counter-weight to China. Their caution stems from the belief that the US is not a reliable partner. As proof, they offer that India did not even receive mention in Obama’s first speech on Asian security delivered in 2009; while in the next 24 months, Washington has U-turned and begun to talk of the region as the Indo-Pacific. So, what changed in two years could well come in for a further review in, say, 2013.

Even the Indian naval establishment does not see “balancing China” as a top priority. With progressive improvement in India’s nautical capacity, Bhaskar feels the much-needed “equipoise” in the Indo-Chinese relations would naturally follow. In other words, he means India should consciously improve its navy—but not in order to match China’s. As he explains, “I believe India should not seek to either balance or equal China in military terms. Equipoise that will ensure that India is neither deferential nor belligerent is the preferred posture and this has to be complemented by political perspicacity and will.”

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This, perhaps, is the course India should set out for itself in the coming years, at least till such time it manages to grow into a real “oceanic power”. For a reality check to all the hype, know this to be fact: emerging as an oceanic power has not yet become part of the Indian navy’s perspective planning.

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