Today, and largely because of this historical legacy, Muslims constitute the most urbanised community in India—with the exclusion of the Parsis and the Jews. While India’s urbanisation rate, according to the 2001 census, is below 28 per cent, 35.7 per cent of its Muslims live in towns and cities. The gap had been even larger in earlier decades. Interestingly, more than 50 per cent of Indian Muslims live in towns and cities in seven states (whose urbanisation rate is in the range of 20-45 per cent): Tamil Nadu (73 per cent), Maharashtra (70 per cent), Madhya Pradesh (63.5 per cent), Chhattisgarh (63 per cent), Karnataka (59 per cent), Gujarat (59 per cent) and Andhra Pradesh (58 per cent).
If Muslims are more numerous than any other community in cities—that they have often built or fully refurbished—they are also on the verge of marginalisation in most of them. Theirs is the only community (barring the Sikhs) where the proportion of poor is greater amongst the urban population than in the rural one. Thirty-seven per cent of urban Muslims live below the poverty line against 27 per cent of rural Muslims—as opposed to, respectively, 22 and 28 per cent among Hindus. This state of affairs shares congruence with some of the findings of the Sachar Committee, which showed (among other things) that only eight per cent of urban Muslims were integrated into the formal sector whereas the national average was 21 per cent for city-dwellers. In towns and cities, Muslims make a (usually very modest) living as artisans (mechanics and weavers, among others) or peddlers. They are not as constituent a component of the salariat as are other communities.
The decline of the Indian Muslims harks back to the British Raj (when they ceded their power and when Persian and Urdu lost their statuses as languages of the court) and, subsequently, to the abolition of the princely states (Hyderabad, Bhopal, among others) besides Partition, which mangled the community. The rise of Hindu nationalism in the 1980s-90s also contributed to the marginalisation of the community, and not just in socio-economic terms—the representation of Muslims among local businessmen and lawyers is on the decline almost everywhere—but also in spatial terms.
Fruit of urbanisation The burqa is no restraint to a workout. (Photograph by Jitender Gupta)
Communal violence and ghettoisation
In preparation for a book I co-edited with Laurent Gayer this year, Muslims in Indian Cities: Trajectories of Marginalisation, a team of 12 Indian and French researchers analysed the situation of the Muslim populations of 10 Indian cities: Ahmedabad, Aligarh, Bangalore, Calicut, Cuttack, Delhi, Hyderabad, Jaipur, Lucknow and Mumbai. This analysis was not limited solely among the local elite groups (businessmen, politicians, lawyers...), nor limited in geographical terms. While this ethnographic and statistical exercise by and large vindicated the assessment of the Sachar report insofar as the socio-economic decline of Muslims is concerned, the responses received to our question “Where do Muslims live?” are more nuanced.
Many of the elderly we interviewed emphasised the past composite culture of their city in evocative and emotional terms: they kept using formulae such as mili juli/mushtarka/ganga-jamuni tehzeeb. Their nostalgia was, for the most part, misplaced since Indian cities have always been structured along ethnic lines. Neither caste groups nor religious communities traditionally mixed in the same building—or even in the same lane. One of the reasons for this (self-)segregation was deeply rooted in their food habits (and taboos).
But the old-timers had a point in the sense that cities formed mosaics in which different communities cohabited in the same neighbourhoods. In the old cities—which were also known as the walled cities—next to a Brahmin or a Jain lane, one could find a Pathan mohalla. Similarly, on the periphery of these urban cores—especially after industrialisation resulted in the creation of new suburbs—low-caste Muslims and Dalits used to coexist in separate, but adjacent settlements. Many of them had a shared culture as part of the labour movement, especially in the cities where unions had fostered a labour culture. Ahmedabad is a case in point: in addition to the mosaic of ‘pols’ (lanes) of the walled city, the ‘challis’ (the dense rows of one room-houses) of the ‘Manchester of India’ developed along these lines in the first decades of the 20th century.
This pattern of erosion is put into practice today in many places—and ghettoisation has been the end-result in some extreme cases. And here, we need to formulate a new definition for ghettoisation because the word tends to be used in a rather loose manner today. We must reserve it for designating the gathering together of members of a community (in this case, the Muslims) irrespective of their other social markers (class/caste or ethnic origin, for instance) in a locality insulated from the rest of the city (be it at its centre or at the periphery) where state services (roads, schools, hospitals...) are not maintained properly—if at all present.
The main factor of ghettoisation is communal violence. In riots, the most common targets are isolated pockets of the ‘other’ community. Therefore, the minority (whatever its religion) tends to move to safer neighbourhoods where co-religionists are already in large numbers. These safe havens can be in the walled cities—like in Hyderabad, Jaipur or Bhopal—or on the periphery—as with Mumbai or Ahmedabad. In that case, Muslims are often uprooted and dislodged from the city centres. Again, Ahmedabad best illustrates this point. In spite of its rather modest size, compared to Mumbai, for instance, Ahmedabad is the city where Hindu-Muslim violence has been the more devastating over the last six decades. Every 10 years or so, a major access of violence occurs (1969, 1985, 1992, 2002...). After each bout, some Muslims from the walled city and the industrial belt have moved in large numbers to the periphery, and more especially to Juhapura. Here is a ghetto of about four lakh where middle-class people (ias, ips and IFS cadres, lawyers, businessmen) have joined slum-dwellers for the sake of safety. The state has neglected this locality to such an extent that no bus service connects Juhapura to the city. Simultaneously, the Hindus who used to live here have left and those who live in the neighbouring localities have built walls.
While walls separating communities are making an appearance everywhere in the world—including in West Asia—few cities (Belfast is a notorious exception) have resorted to such lines of demarcation. Ahmedabad is the only one we found in India. But in many places, railway lines and roads are used as almost invisible borders between India and what is locally known, sometimes, as “little Pakistans”.
The uprooted Homes and hearths lost to communal violence. (Photograph by Siddharaj)
Muslims = Victims?
The combination of spatial concentration and socio-economic decline has resulted in the making of specific kinds of “Muslim constituencies” in many Indian cities. In the old cities of erstwhile princely state capitals, where Muslims represent a large share of the voters—Hyderabad, Bhopal, Lucknow—local parties (the mim in Hyderabad, for instance) and the Congress indulge in emotional politics without paying much attention to the effective upliftment of the Muslims. They project themselves as the defenders of the waqf properties more than they promote education. That way, the local voters are bound to remain in the need of local saviours. The Congress and the mim are very good at playing this brand of clientelism which makes the ghettoised Muslims victims...of other Muslims!
Similarly, ghettoised Muslims are not victims but actors when the making of Muslim enclaves is due to their quest of cultural homogeneity. Lower-middle-class neighbourhoods—like in Zakir Nagar in Delhi—sometimes develop along these lines. They do not result only from discrimination, but also from self-segregation on the part of families eager to offer to their children an atmosphere free from Hindu influences likely to “corrupt” them.
Ghettoisation can also be a blessing in disguise. In Ahmedabad, the 2002 pogrom led middle-class people to go to Juhapura, where they took new initiatives that benefited the old, poorer inhabitants—including some slum-dwellers. Not only somewhat better roads were developed, but private hospitals and schools were created. This last initiative met rising expectations of the poor whose hunger for education was even more acute than elsewhere in India. If the relief colonies had been created for the victims of the pogrom by Islamic NGOs, which kept telling their “beneficiaries” that they had been punished for not being “good enough Muslims”—and which built mosques before anything else almost—most of the refugees do not indulge in guilt feeling any more but believe in modern education. Some of the new Juhapura schools are so “modern” indeed that their Islamic nature is completely obliterated. Some of them have even adopted Hindu names....
The paradoxical, positive impact of ghettoisation suggests that the real victims among the Muslims are not those who live in ghettoes, but those who live in slums within cities where the Muslim middle class can afford not to go to the ghetto, like in Mumbai and Aligarh. In Mumbai, the Muslim middle class has been shaken by the riots of 1992-93 and is affected by discrimination, but is more resilient than its Ahmedabadi cousin. As a result, there are more Muslim slums—like Shivaji Nagar—than Muslim ghettoes. In Aligarh, the Muslim university professors (and employees) represent such a critical mass that they form an enclave by themselves and do not mix (not even interact!) with the inhabitants of the Muslim slums (including Shah Jamal).
Muslim social Class is a factor in Muslim fragmentation. (Photograph by Jitender Gupta)
Marginalisation is not the order of the day for Muslims of all Indian cities. Their situation is better in the south and the east than in the west and the north. The case studies conducted in Calicut, Bangalore and Cuttack (and presented in the book mentioned above) show that mixity resists trends of (self-) segregation. Such contrasts are the products of history: in the south, Islam was introduced by Arab merchants along commercial routes in a quietist manner and Muslims felt (and were seen to be) as much Dravidian as the Hindus did. In Kerala, they also benefited from the Gulf connection that partly explains their relative affluence.
But the Muslims from Kerala are not the only ones to benefit from Gulf remittance money. In fact, in almost each and every city mentioned above, including Bhopal, Jaipur, Lucknow and, of course, Mumbai and Hyderabad, large numbers of Muslim families have expatriate members working in that part of the world. This external resource plays a major role in keeping them afloat. But the new, emerging (if not embryonic) middle class which is developing among the Muslims in the cities elsewhere is hopeful that other opportunities will materialise in India itself thanks to liberalisation. They not only expect more international trade from the economic reforms, but also more jobs. Usually, weaker sections—including the Dalits—long for a stronger public sector. The Muslims (who do not get the benefit of reservations) have no nostalgia for the Nehruvian pattern because the State has discriminated against them more than against any other community—as evident from the figures of the Sachar Committee reports which show, for instance, that non-OBC Muslims represent 2.7 per cent of the psus’ personnel and 4.5 per cent of the railways, when the Hindu OBCs are respectively 8.3 and 9.3 per cent.
Whether the private sector will do better in this respect remains to be seen. The Muslims who invest in education have great expectations that may remain dead letter. In the process, they may learn to downplay their Islamic identity like some of the best schools of Juhapura or some of the Muslim localities which have adopted the name of Shivaji (in Bangalore and Hyderabad) in order to conceal their Muslim character. Whatever the result, these moves already suggest that even if ghettoisation is not as bad as it sounds, Indian multiculturalism is in danger.
There is much at stake there. Most of SIMI’s cadre—including the few, radical ones who created, apparently, the Indian Mujahideen—were educated Muslims. To alienate those who invested in education in order to be part of the brighter part of urban India may result in the making of “reluctant fundamentalists”, to use the title of a recent book.
(Christophe Jaffrelot is the co-editor of Muslims in Indian Cities: Trajectories of Marginalisation, to be published soon in India by HarperCollins.)
Apropos The Sense of a Community (July 23), Christophe Jaffrelot pompously preaches to Hindus about their coming conflict with Muslims, not realising he’s describing the future of his own France too.
Lutuf Ullah, Kanpur
Jaffrelot appears to make a number of over-simplifications about Gujarati Muslims. They aren’t all huddled masses in Juhapura nor are less educated relative to other ethnic groupings. To me, he started with set assumptions and then tried to generate the relevant data to clothe his thesis.
Gaurab Banerjee, Calcutta
The author has attempted to go beyond the easily accepted perceptions on the socio-economic profile of the Muslim community. Hopefully, his forthcoming book delves deeper into the issue.
Sunil Kumar, Delhi
We’d do well to remember at all times that Muslims have the same dreams and aspirations as other Indians.
Interestingly, in another instance, this Frenchman has claimed that the Nizam’s rule was non-sectarian. If that was so, how did the merger of Hyderabad impact Muslims alone?
Ankush Poddar, Calcutta
Let’s not be blind. Indian Muslims are better-off than their counterparts elsewhere in Asia. Unlike the popular myth about their ghettoisation and marginalisation, the community has a rare sense of solidarity and collectiveness.
B.M., on e-mail
Writers of Jaffrelot’s ilk know well that India handles its diversity issues better than most countries, which is why they never try to make one-on-one comparisons with their own countries.
Varun Shekhar, Toronto
Thank you to all those who have taken the trouble to read the article and share their thoughts. Out of the arguments made here, there are two that perhaps need answering. So here they go.
1. The first part of the article compares outcomes (relative percentages of population of the religions concerned) irrespective of the process that led to those outcomes - whether immigration, relatively faster population growth or conversions. This was for two reasons. One, to put the figure of 2.3 per cent in "numerical perspective", as the article itself explained. The second reason was that outcomes are ultimately what the crux of debate is about. The rest of the article in any case dealt with process - or conversions in this case, from both a contemporary and historical perspective.
2. Some commenters have tried to cast doubts on the reliability of Census 2001. Those who do this should bear in mind that Census 2001 was conducted by a BJP government. Considering the extreme importance that BJP gives to this issue, it would be reasonable to expect that IF it had perceived a problem with the methodology that was distorting the numbers, it would have fixed it. As the article mentioned, BJP or BJP-supported governments have been in power for 10 of the last 40 years, or about a quarter of the time, and the only reasonable conclusion one can arrive at is that any misreporting of numbers, real or perceived, would be marginal and hence, not of importance.
To all other arguments made, my answer is the following: Please read the article again, with particular focus on the quotations of Vivekananda and Monier Williams, and the history of the missionary efforts in Bengal and their outcome.
The politics of economic embargo
As Muslims benefited from the economic reforms of the 1990s and spread their influence from business to politics, they first became objects of envy and then targets of hate. In communal riots, like those in Muzaffarnagar and Atali, it is hard-won Muslim businesses and wealth that are the worst casualties.
If, in the early 1990s, economic liberalisation provided opportunities to self-employed Muslims, the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid agitation brought them to the streets. As the consequences of the two unravelled over the next two decades and more, Muslims bore, first, the brunt of the communal violence and, then, the burden of radicalisation.
It was then that Muslim leaders, especially in Uttar Pradesh, began to realise that a new path was needed, one that would see members of the community acting not as victims or perpetrators of crimes but becoming part of a responsible decision-making process. They needed to do this by becoming elected representatives in the legislatures.
Marginalized Sections Living Under Fear – A Letter to NHRC
There are extremely disturbing reports about the climate of abject fear that the poor and marginalised communitoies of JJ Colony, Bawana are living in, following recent incidents. Prominent residents of Delhi have carried out an independent fact finding into allegations of cow slaughter and the systematic intimidation of local Muslims.
The Congress formula for Indian Muslims is rooted in colonial legacy: divide and rule. The BJP approach has been shaped by rage at partition: avoid and rule. All Muslims want from both claimants to national power is provide and rule; not because they are Muslims but because they are largely poor.
Poverty was the prevailing story when India became independent. It cut across other fault lines: there was a morbid equality of poverty. More than six decades of uneven growth later, we have the inequality of partial success.
Neither the Congress nor the BJP prescription is sustainable , but in the short run Congress gains from cynicism have been so spectacular that it has stopped thinking outside its established clichés . The BJP thinks in spasms, if it thinks at all.
The most efficient form of economic growth comes when a country can maximise development across all its demographic segments. Everyone will not pull equally, but everyone must pull. Half of India is still underperforming. Raise its wealth and walk into high double digit growth. Economics is not complicated once the human being gets more attention than statistics. - M.J.Akbar
In an example of communal harmony in India, Muslims in the holy month of Ramadan have helped in the construction of a Jain temple in Bhagalpur town of Bihar. Mohammad Janeshar Akhtar even demolished a portion of his house Friday to enable the movement of a 70-foot long truck laden with a granite stone block, being carried for making an idol at the temple, officials said Saturday. Other Muslims helped widen the street so that the vehicle could reach the temple without much difficulty.
Early this year, some Muslims had helped in building a Hindu temple dedicated to goddess Durga in Bihar's Gaya district. Muslims not only donated money but were also involved in the construction of the temple.Earlier, a Muslim had donated his land for a temple dedicated to god Shiva in Begusarai district. Mohammad Fakhrool Islam had given land for it in Muslim-dominated Bachwara village. Over three decades ago, in the same village some Hindus had donated a piece of land for the construction of a mazar (a place where a saint is buried).
>> Agreed. But from the perspective of a bystander, it seems, whenever Anwaar voices Muslim concerns ( am not saying others dont) in no time the logical discussion,if any, turns into hostile commentary about muslims as whole. At times feels like, people are commenting just out of reflex action. This impatience hurts.
Was debating for some time whether to bother explaining my position, or just ignore it. Oh, what the hell. Let me rant. Hopefully, the moderators, who seem overactive today, shall reward the effort and let it stay.
To begin with, if he writes about Muslim issues, he can be identified so. There is nothing wrong in that. However, just as someone who talks about Dalits/tribals/upper castes etc can be called a Dalit activist, etc., it is perfectly legitimate to label someone who speaks about Muslims. That's not an insult. Just a statement of facts.
More importantly though, I refuse to concede the "secular" or "liberal" space to people who speak for a certain community or group. If they speak only for a section of people, while claiming ownership of terms meant to be used in a broader sense, they shall invite ridicule, and give a pejorative sense to those terms.
Worse is the tendency of these idiots to not only claim such space, but to brand genuinely secular discourse as Sanghi or communal. Let me give examples
If Gujarat govt gives higher compensation to Hindu victims than Muslim victims, it is a clear case of discrimination. If some people complain about it, they are valid, and I shall either support them, or at least, not brand them as communal.
If the Andhra govt releases Muslims wrongfully incarcerated for some crimes they didn't commit, this shall be fair. If they pay them compensation, even that shall be fair. But to restrict it to Muslim victims shall be communal. If me, or anyone else points this out, it shall not be a communal position, but an entirely secular one. If someone labels me a Sanghi for taking this position, then that person is an idiot, or worse, and shall be the butt of ridicule and contempt from my side.
Along similar lines, it is perfectly okay to demonize Modi. However, when someone calls him the biggest mass murderer in independent India, or labels Gujarat riots as the worst in India, etc., they are lying. It becomes even worse when the same people (including all sickular politicians), ignore or defend Rajiv Gandhi and Congress.
Similarly, it is one thing to demand reservations for Muslims. As long as there is no violence, such demands are part of democratic process. But such demands, as well as such sanction is clearly communal. However, if anyone says so, he/she is immediately branded a Sanghi, fascists, etc. So, in my book at least, labeling such people as jehadis is perfectly fair.
I could go on and on, but this is a long enough rant already. Plus, positions are clearly defined, and I'm not converting anyone from it. Doubt shall respond again if you bother to respond.
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