With Muammar Gaddafi’s bombers, tanks, artillery and naval vessels unleashing firepower on urban centers, the rebels appeal for international intervention to prevent a massacre. Libya is at a turning point, a moment when the much-talked-about responsibility to protect, or R2P principle, should trigger action led by the United Nations. But the organization is paralyzed by bickering members more concerned about their narrow national interests. The pussy-footing response of Security Council Members Brazil, India and South Africa – the rising global powers – has provided proof that they’re not ready for prime time as permanent members of the UN’s top body.
The weak-kneed response calls into question the United Nations’ value as protector of the world’s population. The organization exists to bring about a world where fear is changed to hope, want gives way to dignity, and apprehensions are turned into aspirations. In the words of the illustrious Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, the United Nations was “not created in order to bring us to heaven, but to save us from hell.” UN failures in Africa and the Balkans in the 1990s reflected many structural, political and operational deficiencies that accounted for its inability to save people from hell. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, scarred by the experiences of Rwanda and Srebrenica that happened on his watch as head of UN peacekeeping, championed the search for a new norm that would empower the world community to act to save at-risk populations.
A Canadian-sponsored international commission took up the challenge and formulated the innovative responsibility-to-protect principle in 2001.
In 2005, world leaders unanimously agreed that where governments manifestly failed in their sovereign duty, the international community, acting through the United Nations, would take “timely and decisive” action to honor the collective responsibility to protect people against crimes of atrocity. This represents the idealized UN as the symbol of an imagined and constructed community of strangers. For 350 years from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to1998, sovereignty functioned as institutionalized indifference. In 1999, international interventions in Kosovo and East Timor broke that mold and were the backdrop to Annan’s search for a new norm. R2P is the mobilizer of last resort of the world’s will to act to prevent and halt mass atrocities and mitigate the effects of sovereignty as organized hypocrisy, as Stanford University’s Stephen Krasner famously put it. It’s our normative instrument of choice to convert a shocked international conscience into collective action.
R2P meets the minimum requirement of the call to action of classical humanitarian intervention while protecting the bottom-line interests of developing countries, thereby assuaging their legitimate concerns. It navigates the treacherous international shoals between the Scylla of callous indifference to the plight of victims and the Charybdis of self-righteous interference in others’ internal affairs.
Libya today is the place and time to redeem or renege on R2P’s solemn pledge. The people’s uprising against Gaddafi is tailor-made for R2P. Many people have already been killed, and carnage is feared. After 42 years of autocratic rule, Gaddafi is using deadly violence to crush an open revolt against his dictatorship. He and his son Saif have vowed to fight to the last drop of their blood, deploying air, sea and land forces. Putting all options on the table as the riposte to planes, bombs and tanks seems a pusillanimous response.
The UN Security Council, the Human Rights Council, Ban Ki-moon and his special advisers on genocide prevention and R2P have called on Libya to respect its R2P, human rights and international humanitarian law obligations. The Security Council also imposed sanctions on Libya and referred Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court – a soft and deeply problematic option of kicking the ball out of play.
R2P is not solely about military intervention but, if it’s to have any meaning at all, must include that option as a last resort. Both for its own credibility and for the sake of Libyans, the Security Council must determine the appropriate protective measures, authorize them and urge those with the capacity to implement them.
Those who have supplied Gaddafi with his weaponry have a particular responsibility to protect civilians from being harmed by their use. But how? Premature, over-eager outside intervention will pollute the revolution made of, by and for Arabs. Muslims have cause to be deeply suspicious of Western military meddling.
Three sets of issues are involved: military capacity, legal authority and political legitimacy.
Boots on the ground may not be wanted, helpful or feasible. Instead, military operations would entail four sets of activities: surveillance and monitoring, stepped up to 24/7 operations from the previous 10 hours a day; humanitarian assistance; enforcement of the arms embargo; and enforcement of a no-fly zone.
Only the West has the military assets and operational capability for these tasks. But NATO would be ill-advised to take any military action on its own authority. Calls grow for a no-fly zone, especially from rebels under aerial attack. Military analysts are divided on the complexity and feasibility of the option: U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates says a no-fly zone requires destruction of the Libyan air force, others add anti-aircraft batteries, and still others warn of mission creep and the risk of being branded Western imperialists.
Yet a no-fly zone was successfully declared and enforced over Iraq to protect the Kurds for 12 years until 2003. It did not lead to mission creep: The 2003 war was not a creeping progression from the no-fly zone, but a deliberate policy choice for independent reasons. The quality of Libya’s air force is suspect: “a known unknown.” A no-fly zone could tip the balance for Libyan air force officers’ motivations to bomb fellow citizens or defect, either to the rebels or the West.
The risks of mission creep and deepening quagmire leading to nation-building would arise only if ownership of the uprising is appropriated from the Libyans by the West, as would happen with ground troops. The chances of this are reduced with legal authorization from the UN Security Council that’s restricted to the four military tasks listed above. The usual suspects have been reluctant to support such a resolution. Their opposition could be overcome if and as it becomes clear that the Arab, Islamic and African nations, as well as the mass of defecting Libyan diplomats, support prompt and effective action to protect Libyan civilians, oust Gaddafi and promote democratic reforms.
If the Security Council dishonors the world’s collective responsibility to protect, limited and legitimate action by NATO is still possible under clear mandate from the African Union and Arab League, backed by the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Absent that, NATO guns should stay silent.
In his speech to India’s houses of parliament on November 8, President Barack Obama endorsed India’s quest for permanent membership of the Security Council, but reminded listeners that global power carries responsibility for solving global problems. For the first time ever, the Security Council includes the powerful southern heavyweights of Brazil, India and South Africa, all weak and poor in previous decades and now vibrant, even ebullient democracies. They should have taken the lead to turn R2P from principle to actionable norm, providing the legal authority to utilize Western military capability on behalf of innocent victims.
Instead they’re among the biggest foot-draggers. Having failed the test of acting as stewards of world order that combines values and power, they have proven their critics right. They are not yet ready to join the top table as permanent members.
Ramesh Thakur, professor of political science, University of Waterloo, was UN Assistant Secretary-General, an R2P commissioner and a principal author of its report. His most recent book is The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws and the Use of Force in International Politics (2011). Rights:Copyright © 2011 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization. YaleGlobal Online
Thank you to all those who have taken the trouble to read the article and share their thoughts. Out of the arguments made here, there are two that perhaps need answering. So here they go.
1. The first part of the article compares outcomes (relative percentages of population of the religions concerned) irrespective of the process that led to those outcomes - whether immigration, relatively faster population growth or conversions. This was for two reasons. One, to put the figure of 2.3 per cent in "numerical perspective", as the article itself explained. The second reason was that outcomes are ultimately what the crux of debate is about. The rest of the article in any case dealt with process - or conversions in this case, from both a contemporary and historical perspective.
2. Some commenters have tried to cast doubts on the reliability of Census 2001. Those who do this should bear in mind that Census 2001 was conducted by a BJP government. Considering the extreme importance that BJP gives to this issue, it would be reasonable to expect that IF it had perceived a problem with the methodology that was distorting the numbers, it would have fixed it. As the article mentioned, BJP or BJP-supported governments have been in power for 10 of the last 40 years, or about a quarter of the time, and the only reasonable conclusion one can arrive at is that any misreporting of numbers, real or perceived, would be marginal and hence, not of importance.
To all other arguments made, my answer is the following: Please read the article again, with particular focus on the quotations of Vivekananda and Monier Williams, and the history of the missionary efforts in Bengal and their outcome.
Mr. Thakur - I have no quarrel with the fact that India is not ready for "big power" status. Don't know much about Brazil or SA to comment. My reasoning is however based more on the fact that as a culture (collective people) we are quite poor in terms of what we do with power. We have mostly extremes - either saintly disinterest in power or chronic abuse of power. The duality of power and powerlessness within us is too sharp and unresolved - the Indian road is a classic example of that - a mirror for the dance of power and powerlessness as a people, the whole V*VIP culture reeks of this chronic abuse of power. On top our egos very brittle and inflated, easily bruised - for a culture that preaches containment of ego our practice is quite poor. May be it is all due to Kalyug.
We know what you think ought be the action taken in Libya. What about Bahrain, as an example or others who are close dear western allies (or stooges)? It doesn't sound like the west is too keen to get involved in Libya. Are they just being smart and using the 2nd rate powers in the security council to say "we tried but these other jokers came in the way" - two birds with one stone
Maybe , as a person who was closely involved in formulating the R2P report you are a little biased?
I think it is a good idea in most cases that the world keep itself out of internal issues of nation states; the 'conscience' of the world is a very selective one and prone to be activated by the button of self interest. Poking and interference specially by the western block has done untold harm and little good.
India had better concern itself with its own issues, resolve them before it wanders around looking for international issues to highlight. NATO countries with their deep financial and increasingly, social fissions, to worry about would also do well to take this stance.
The current permanent members of the Security Council did not shine in their support of R2P either, so why blame India, Brazil and South Africa? I endorse R2P in principle, but the present world order is not even near where it can become an operational reality.
No huge amounts of money to be made..., Why bother may be the desi leaders reaction,,,
That's a thought - we can introduce the UNSC to "vote for money" :-)
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