Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's recent statement on the US-India civil nuclear deal may have done much to allay the concerns of the political left and right in India, but is unlikely to make an impact on congressional attitudes in Washington. Instead, analysts say, Singh's comments have put the onus firmly on President George W. Bush to hold up his end of the bargain and ensure that the U.S. Congress adheres to the core principles of the July 18, 2005, agreement.

In a detailed presentation in New Delhi on August 17, Singh assured members of Parliament that India would not agree to any changes in the landmark deal. The U.S. House of Representatives had overwhelmingly approved the deal last month but had also added clauses that would require annual reporting on the use of nuclear technology and fuel for peaceful purposes.

Robert Einhorn, a former assistant secretary for nonproliferation at the State Department and currently at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, admits Singh's comments "might energize the U.S. administration to work harder to roll back elements of the House and Senate bills that Indians find objectionable." But, he says, a number of members of the U.S. Congress will find both the tone and content of the remarks "a bit worrisome - and an indication that the Bush administration's hopes for close partnership between India and the U.S. in the future may be overstated."

Others, like Anupam Srivastava, director of the Asia programme at the University of Georgia, contend that while Singh's statements will "definitely be a matter of serious debate" in the U.S. Congress, both the Congress and the Bush administration realise that these comments were primarily intended to silence the growing domestic criticism in India.

In his comments, Singh had emphasized - as he did once again today in the Lok Sabha - that his government won't accept anything that deviates from the July 18 agreement. The ball is now in the Bush administration's court, says Sumit Ganguly, Rabindranath Tagore professor of Indian cultures and civilizations at Indiana University. "It is now up to the dexterity of [Undersecretary of State] R. Nicholas Burns and [Secretary of State] Condoleezza Rice to ensure swift passage of the bill without non-germane riders," he says.

Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution in Washington says the Bush administration will have to work with Congress to "ensure that the final outcome does not exceed the range of understanding that the Bush administration reached with the government of India."

In a lengthy defence of the nuclear deal, Singh assured parliamentarians India's strategic programme is "outside the purview of the agreement."

The Bush administration, determined to mark up a foreign policy success, has its work cut out. Einhorn says since most members of Congress do not believe the current House and Senate bills are inconsistent with the July 2005 agreement, they are unlikely to be sympathetic to changing elements of the bills in significant ways.

Like Einhorn, Michael Krepon at the Henry L. Stimson Center has reservations about the agreement. He believes the U.S. Congress and the Bush administration have been "extraordinarily generous" to India. But, he adds, "I suspect that even the Bush administration and the Congress will not support India's demand for access to reprocessing capabilities and changes in U.S. public law to lift penalties in the event India resumes nuclear testing."

Noting that the language of the House and Senate committee reports as well as the testimony of the Bush administration are clear on these points, Krepon says he's hard-pressed to identify a single member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group that would support these demands. "If New Delhi is serious about conditioning the deal to these demands, it is in serious jeopardy."

"It looks like the Prime Minister has upped the ante by demanding the lifting of all restraints on nuclear commerce, including reprocessing, as well as by demanding a free pass on the resumption of nuclear testing," says Krepon.

On the question of nuclear testing, Singh asserted there is no question of India being bound by a law passed by a foreign legislature. Krepon says both Houses of Congress will include language reaffirming existing U.S. public law that calls for penalties in the event of a nuclear test by India. "The Prime Minister's insistence that 'there is no question of India being bound by a law passed by a foreign legislature' is true, but is also besides the point, since members of Congress have the power to establish laws governing U.S. nuclear commerce to foreign nations," he says.

India has made a unilateral undertaking not to test another nuclear weapon. Teresita Schaffer at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies says India's decision presumably means that in the best judgment of the Indian government, its strategic programme does not require a test. She believes Singh's statements will not cost India the nuclear deal, "but it must be clear to the government of India that if in the future it decides, unilaterally, to revoke that undertaking not to test, this will be a major change in the deal the U.S. signed on to and would at that point probably be a deal-breaker for the U.S."

Singh spoke very carefully, being very precise about what he understood the U.S. and Indian commitments to be, says Schaffer. "In general, the U.S. and India are trying to make very different points to their respective parliaments and publics. As a result, every time that one government or the other spells things out in detail, it causes problems in the other capital," she says.

On the question of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, Singh told Parliament that, "we will accept only IAEA safeguards on the nuclear facilities, in a phased manner... only when all nuclear restrictions on India have been lifted."

Ganguly says this is a realistic condition. "Until these restrictions are lifted how can India accept safeguards?" he asks. "That is putting the cart before the horse. The sequencing is very important. One does not accept restrictions before one is given deliverables."

The legislation approved by the House of Representatives requires the president to make a determination that India has concluded an acceptable safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The waivers required to permit nuclear cooperation with India cannot be issued before the safeguards agreement is concluded. "But the entry into force of that safeguards agreement, and the actual application of safeguards to additional Indian nuclear facilities, could take place at a later date, after those waivers are issued. I don't think sequencing should be a problem," Einhorn says.

On the Senate bill's provision calling for an annual presidential certification that India is in full compliance with its non-proliferation and other commitments, Singh said India opposes this provision because it would have the effect "to diminish a permanent waiver authority into an annual one." Because this language "would introduce an element of uncertainty regarding future cooperation," the Prime Minister stated that this provision, if maintained in the final bill, would not be acceptable.

The Senate is expected to vote on the bill when Congress returns from its recess in September. If passed, the Senate and House versions of the bill will then be put together in conference.

While Singh made clear India would not accept the introduction of "extraneous issues" on foreign policy, Krepon says he will be very surprised if the provision that India support U.S. policy on Iran is removed from the final bill. California Democratic Congressman Tom Lantos, a key architect of the House bill, is determined to ensure India's support for tough U.S. action against Iran's nuclear programme.

Critics as well as supporters of the agreement, that seeks to overturn three decades of U.S. policy and provide nuclear technology and fuel to India, agree that Singh has dealt adroitly with opposition to the deal. "He has overcome a number of hurdles - clearly the left feels that it would rather have the deal than have a BJP government in power," Cohen says.

But has the Prime Minister painted himself into a corner by publicly spelling out a rigid stance on the deal?

Srivastava says had Singh not spoken out, he faced the danger that all support for the deal in India might evaporate and affect its implementation no matter what version was approved by the U.S. Congress. He sees in the August 17 statement a clear signal from Singh to the Bush administration that India "cannot change the scope and sequence of the basic agreement, but can support important U.S. goals and policies outside the framework of this agreement."

Eventually, Singh made clear he won't accept anything outside the framework of the July 18 agreement. "That is a standard I think the eventual legislation will be able to meet," says Schaffer. Ultimately, she adds, both the U.S. and India will have to live with some level of ambiguity.