Even before Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh landed in Washington for his much-hyped meeting with President George Bush, one could sense an attempt by the Indian policy-makers to scale down public expectations from the visit. Sunday morning's newspapers say the policy-makers have realised that India's permanent membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC) is not for tomorrow.

The euphoric expectations voiced by governmental and non-governmental analysts in New Delhi some weeks ago that the views expressed by Mr. Nicholas Burns, US Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, indicating that the US might support the induction into the UNSC of "two or so" new permanent members and the elucidation of the criteria on which the US support would be based indicated a likely US support for India have proved themselves to be premature. The community of strategic analysts in New Delhi, which could be more appropriately called the community of wishful-thinkers, had gone to town proclaiming that this heralded US support for India.

So too, the similar expectations aroused following the statements made by Ms.Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State, during her visit to New Delhi in March on the possibility of bilateral co-operation in meeting India's future energy needs. In a curtain-raiser on the visit, apparently based on a briefing by Shri Shyam Saran, the Foreign Secretary, The Hindu of July 17, 2005, has stated that the visit 'is unlikely to see "dramatic moves on key issues of public interest in India, including membership of the UNSC and civil nuclear supplies."

The moment Mrs.Shirin Tahir-Kheli, an American citizen of Pakistani origin, was chosen by Ms. Rice to handle policy-making relating to UN reforms, one should have expected that she would do whatever she could to block the entry of India into the UNSC as a permanent member. Despite her pleasant exterior, the warmth exuded by her in her interactions with her Indian interlocutors and her claims of having backed India's case for the purchase of a US super-computer when she was in the National Security Council Secretariat in the Reagan administration, many persons who have known of her, speak of her well-concealed dislike of India and her close relations with the military-intelligence establishment in Pakistan.

Since the beginning of this year, Pakistan's President Gen.Pervez Musharraf and his Prime Minister, Mr. Shaukat Aziz. have left no stone unturned in their efforts to frustrate India's aspirations of becoming a permanent member of the UNSC, even while proclaiming that their opposition to the expansion of the permanent membership was not India-centric.

Not that India's not becoming a permanent member would be a great tragedy. As I have been pointing out in the past, heavens would not shine on India if it became a permanent member and heavens would not fall if it did not. One does not know why we spent so much time, energy and money on our quest for permanent membership.

The lack of lucidity and a sense of balance, which characterises the analyses of the community of strategic analysts in New Delhi, who influence policy-making, in matters relating to Indo-US relations, is also illustrated by their writings and statements on the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. The relevant question is not whether the US would impose economic sanctions against India if it bought gas from Iran coming by the pipeline. It would not. Despite its economic sanctions against Iran, the US had never tried to prevent any country from buying its energy requirements from Iran. It knows that if it tried to deprive the rest of the world of energy flows from Iran, the international prices, which are already high, might further go up.

The really important question is whether the US would facilitate the construction of the pipeline by Western (including Australian) companies, whose assistance Iran would need. It would not. None of those companies would like to antagonise Washington by helping Iran in the face of US opposition to the pipeline. We may have the psychological satisfaction of having resisted the US pressure to abandon the pipeline project, but we won't have the satisfaction of seeing the pipeline materialise. The possibility of the project materialising has become even more remote now that a conservative, virulently ant-US leader of Iran, who was associated with the raid on the US Embassy in Teheran and the kidnapping of US diplomats immediately after the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, has been elected as the President of Iran.

Instead of putting all our eggs in the pipeline project, which could only create negative vibrations in our relations with the US, we should start looking for alternatives, including transporting more energy supplies from Iran by sea.

On the question of nuclear energy too, the analyses emanating from New Delhi are often based on assumptions, unwarranted by evidence, that the US policy-makers are now reconciled to India emerging as a military nuclear power and hence are likely to be more flexible in the future in matters such as transfer of civilian nuclear technology, sale of nuclear power stations, insistence on full-scope safeguards etc. These assumptions are not supported by the ground realities.

Everybody wants improvement in Indo-US relations. Any realistic assessment of the scope for such improvement has to carefully analyse what would be the US' foreign policy priorities in the remaining period of the Bush administration and how they would impact on relations with India.

The first priority is the on-going war against international terrorism inspired by the Al Qaeda and directed against the US. They are determined to do whatever is necessary at whatever price to protect American lives and interests and to prevent another 9/11 in the US homeland. American policy-makers have realised that victory in the war is still far away. However, this would not make them relent in their efforts to destroy the Al Qaeda. For prevailing over the Al Qaeda, co-operation with Pakistan is more important to them than co-operation with India and Pakistani sensitivities are more important than those of India. They are unlikely to undertake any policy initiatives in their relations with India, which could affect Pakistan's co-operation in the war against international terrorism.

The second priority is extricating themselves out of the mess in Iraq without any loss of face and without paving the way for the take-over of Iraq by international terrorists inspired by the Al Qaeda. For this, neither India nor Pakistan has any importance in the eyes of the US. For very valid and understandable reasons, neither of them wants to get involved in Iraq.

The third priority is enforcing the US' nuclear non-proliferation objectives on Iran and North Korea. In respect of Iran, the Musharraf regime has played its cards intelligently and cunningly by agreeing to help the US in the collection of technical and human intelligence regarding Iran's nuclear establishments. Satisfaction over Pakistan's present co-operation has made the US forget and forgive Pakistan's past sins in clandestinely transfering the nuclear capability to Iran. In respect of North Korea, the US is dependent on China to pressure Pyongyang to agree to give up its military nuclear capability. India does not count in the eyes of the US for achieving this policy priority.

The fourth priority is maritime security to prevent acts of maritime terrorism. India has some importance in the eyes of the US for co-operating with it in ensuring maritime security in the South-East Asian region in general and in the Malaca Straits in particular. However, of the countries of the region, only Singapore is positive towards an Indian role in maritime security. Indonesia has openly expressed itself against it. Malysia is reticent. Moreover, maritime security in the Malacca Straits is of great importance to China and Japan, but not to India. India has reasons to be more concerned about maritime security in the Straits of Hormuz and the rest of the Gulf region. All its energy supplies come through this area. But, the US never talks of any Indian role in maritime security in this region due to the Pakistani sensitivities in this matter.

The fifth priority is China--how to ensure that the rise of China as a major military and economic power does not undermine US interests in this region and create regional tensions and instability. It is here that the importance of India as a possible balancing power looms large in the eyes of the US policy-makers, but it would not be in India's interest to let itself be perceived as a facilitator of US strategic interests in this region.

Thus, none of the five policy priorities of the US would allow for any substantial role for India as a strategic partner of the US in this region despite all the hype about India and the US being natural allies, strategic partners and open societies and open economies and hence birds of the same feather flocking together.

India is important to the US because of its developing economy, its large market, the brain power of its youth and the vast contributions of the community of Indian origin in the US. The US is important to India if it has to emerge as a major economic power and reduce and ultimately eradicate the poverty and ill-health of vast sections of its population. It needs a continuous and ever-increasing flow of US investments and manufacturing and technological skills.

It is here that the scope for a strategic economic co-operation between the two countries is immense. The sky is the limit for such co-operation. The success of strategic economic co-operation will not depend on the equation between the political leaderships of the two countries or on the perceptions of the policy-makers of the two countries. It will depend uniquely on the perceptions and personal experiences of the American business community in dealing with India and its policy-makers. The investment decisions of the American business community are not going to be influenced by the honours accorded to Dr.Manmohan Singh by the US President and Congress and by the spins of the leaders and bureaucrats of the two countries.

They are going to be influenced by what they hear from their business comrades in their own country as well as in other countries about the pleasure or pain of doing business in and with India. Whatever might be the negative perceptions of China in the minds of the American policy-makers, the US business community views China very positively as a country worth doing business with. Whatever might be the positive perceptions of India in the minds of the American policy-makers, the US business community is still far from viewing India positively.

India is still viewed by them as a country where economic decision-making is painfully slow and unpredictable, where economic reforms are being introduced in trickles, where the economic decision-making machinery is unduly politicised and where the coalition politics adds to the uncertainties of doing business. Moreover, the dependence of the present Government on the communists for its continuance in power has further distorted the economic decision-making process.

The business community not only in the US, but also even in Japan and South-east Asia shares the uncertainties and negative perceptions of India as an investment destination. When we opened up our economy and started introducing economic reforms in 1991 and called for foreign investment for improving our infrastructure, there was enthusiasm in the US, Europe and South-East Asia. Offers for investments in the power sector poured in from the West, for investments in civil aviation and airport modernisation from Singapore and in road construction and ports modernisation from Malaysia. Now, all of them have lost interest because of their disappointing experience of dealing with Indian policy-makers.

How to correct these negative perceptions of the US business community? The answer to this lies in New Delhi and not in Washington. There is tremendous scope for bringing India and the US together economically and it is this which should receive the priority attention of our policy-makers.

Before 1978, the Chinese believed that power comes out of the barrel of the gun. Now, they have realised that power actually comes out of the money purse.

While China's purse is more and more bulging, ours is still thin. How to make it bulge? That should be the most important question before our policy-makers. 

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B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter.