Recently declassified 'Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972' contain a
wealth of information on what the then American President Richard Nixon and his
assistant for NSA Henry Kissinger thought of India, and provide a fascinating
insight into how the duo sought to play the Russians and the Chinese in those
crucial days of 1971
135. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 26, 1971, 10:38-10:44 a.m.
Kissinger: Indira Gandhi has written you a letter.
Nixon: I know about—
Kissinger: Well, no. We should answer it. Let me say one other thing.
Kissinger: Well you can tell her—you can use it to bring pressure on
her not to take military action. Also, I talked to the Pakistan Ambassador. He
said that Yahya might appreciate a letter, which would give him an excuse to
answer all the things by saying, listing all the things he's doing because he
can't get any publicity here.
Kissinger: And conversely, Indira Gandhi, I checked with the Indian
Ambassador, they're getting so devious now—
Nixon: She wants—
Kissinger: She would like to be able to say that one result of her letter
Kissinger: —that you've written to Yahya. So everybody's happy. The
Nixon: But we don't say anything against Yahya?
Kissinger: No, no. You just say you hope the refugees will soon be able
to go back to East Pakistan. He will then reply to you that's exactly what he
wants. I've got it all arranged with the—
Nixon: Good. Go ahead.
Kissinger: —Embassy. Then you can take credit. You can tell the Indians
to pipe down—
Kissinger: And we'll keep Yahya happy.
Nixon: The Indians need—what they need really is a—
Kissinger: They're such bastards.
Nixon: A mass famine. But they aren't going to get that. We're going to
feed them—a new kind of wheat. But if they're not going to have a famine the
last thing they need is another war. Let the goddamn Indians fight a war
Kissinger: They are the most aggressive goddamn people around there.
Nixon: The Indians?
136. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 4, 1971, 9:42–9:51 a.m.
Nixon: I told Keating that I would see him—he was there last night at this
little party we had—and I told him I would see him when he came back, late and
in the middle of June, just before the Foreign Minister came. And I think
we'll just have him for a half hour and then have him—
Kissinger: I saw him leaving.
Nixon: I also told him that, I said the problem here is that we just got to be
sure we don't get involved in an internal conflict, be pulled one way or
another, so forth and so on.
Kissinger: He's almost fanatical on this issue.
Nixon: Well what the hell does he think we should do about it?
Kissinger: Oh he thinks—I tell you, he thinks we should cut off all military
aid, all economic aid, and in effect help the Indians to push the Pakistanis out
Nixon: Push—I don't want him to come in with that kind of jackass thing with
Kissinger: Mr. President, actually we've got to keep Yahya, we have to keep
Yahya [unclear] public executions for the next month.
Nixon: Look, even apart from the Chinese thing, I wouldn't do that to help the
Indians, the Indians are no goddamn good. Now Keating, like every Ambassador who
goes over there, goes over there and gets sucked in. He now thinks the—
Kissinger: Those sons-of-bitches, who never have lifted a finger for us, why
should we get involved in the morass of East Pakistan? All the more so, I quite
agree with the point, if East Pakistan becomes independent, it is going to
become a cesspool. It's going be 100 million people, they have the lowest
standard of living in Asia—
Kissinger: No resources. They're going to become a ripe field for Communist
infiltration. And then they're going to bring pressure on India because of
West Bengal. So that the Indians in their usual idiotic way are playing for
little stakes, unless they have in the back of their minds that they could turn
East Pakistan into a sort of protectorate that they could control from Calcutta.
That they may have in the back of their mind.
Nixon: Oh, what they had in the back of their mind was to destroy Pakistan.
137. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador to India (Keating),
Washington, June 15, 1971, 5:13-5:40 p.m.
Nixon: Like all of our other Indian ambassadors, he's been brainwashed.
Completely throw in [unclear]. Anti-Pakistan.
Keating: All right, now let me—
Nixon: Where are your sandals?
Keating: Give me—
Keating: Give me 5 minutes.
Nixon: I hope you haven't turned the Embassy over to those hippies like your
predecessor. [unclear exchange]
Keating: Let me have 5 minutes to—
Nixon: Go ahead.
Keating: —just give you a little background. Then you want to ask me some
questions about the Foreign Minister.
Nixon: Go ahead. No, I—he should meet with the Foreign Minister, don't you
Kissinger: Yeah. Are you going to leave—
Keating: Yes, I'll be—
Nixon: I think he ought to come in with him. [unclear]
Nixon: The point is, the point is it's best to get you with the Foreign
Minister. If he wants to talk to us, talk to the Ambassador. We don't normally
have ambassadors in. I'd get some iced tea? Would you like iced tea?
Keating: No, no.
Keating: No, nothing.
Nixon: Maybe coffee.
Keating: Now in all seriousness—
Nixon: India thinks that they're [unclear], you're a good Ambassador, I
Keating: They are difficult.
Nixon: I listen to it all the time.
Keating: The Indians are—
Nixon: [unclear exchange]
Keating: Let me say personally, I'm delighted that you're starting off that
Nixon: I'm not [unclear].
Keating: Don't let any of these bastards get you down. And you're not,
that's great. That—I don't mean any.
Keating: The Indians are difficult, and time after time I've had to talk to
them, to have stood up to them on Vietnam and many other things. Since this
election, and that tremendous majority she got—350 out of 520 members—the
next party to her is 27, which is the left-wing Communists. The next party is
the right-wing Communists, 25. Because you expect India to—
Keating: But the rightist parties were completely wiped out. And since that time
there has been evidence of greater stability and a better relationship with us.
Nixon: That's good.
Keating: Let me give you chapter and verse of two things. Remington Rand and
Union Carbide have big interests there. Union Carbide very big. They've been
trying for several years to get a license to extend their activities. All
bureaucrat stuff from one ministry to another. Three weeks after the election
they were called in and said we're going to approve your license. Get going.
We need employment. Have as much of your product as possible, export oriented,
but get going and there will be no delay. And the presidents of the Indian
companies of those two concerns came in to see me. And we've been trying to
help. Just delightful, and they are. I went to call on the new Minister of
Industrial Development, Choudhury [Moinul Haq], who succeeded my friend Mr.
Dinesh Singh, the son-of-a-bitch, and he is a top notch. Just top notch. And I
had a conversation with him that I have never had since I've been in India. He
said, now Mr. Ambassador, we have a list, as you know, of things in the public
sector. We have things in the private sector. We have a big list of things that
can be either public or private sector. And, by the way, he said with a smile,
"I might point out to you that the percentage of our gross national product
in the public sector is about half of what yours is in America." I said,
"I'm aware of that." And he said, "in this 146 items, which are
in the private sector, there are some that we can't possibly fix, where we
need foreign investment. The impression has gotten abroad that we don't want
foreign investment. I want to disabuse your mind of that. We want, and let me
say something else to you, if you have a business group from America come in
there and they want to, there is something that isn't on that list, you come
and see me and we'll work it out." Now, I have never had a conversation
like that with any Indian since I've been there. He's top notch. He wants to
work with us.
Next, Mrs. Gandhi. Our relations have always been pleasant. She has never turned
me down when I wanted an appointment. But since then, they're more cordial
since her election. Now part of it is because she's got this weight off her
mind. She was trying to run a government with a minority party. And now she can,
if she has the will, can do the things that she thinks ought to be done. I
escorted her to a concert that Mahalia Jackson gave her; if I had the time I'd
tell you about it, it was the most fantastic performance and she just loved it.
And she couldn't be nicer in her dealings with me. So that I consider that
there is a change in the situation. And I sent two cables to the Department.
Henry, the numbers are 5311—New Delhi 5311—and 6031.
Keating: One was sent shortly after the Army went in and started the killing in
Kissinger: Yeah, I've read it.
Keating: You know, it was the result of a lot of talk. It represents my—
Kissinger: The basic principle is that [unclear].
Keating: Yes. [unclear exchange] The main thing is to... I'm convinced there
is a change in the subcontinent. And that India should not be equated with
Pakistan. India is a strong, stable power now while Pakistan is having all this
difficulty. The other one, the second one, had to do with the aid program and my
recommendations as to what should be done about aid. And both of those I stand
on as my recommendations, which—
Kissinger: No, I didn't see that.
Nixon: Is it something to act on now?
Keating: No, no. They represent in further form my views, and they're the
consensus of my staff that is super. I have a wonderful staff, I think, and
they're so loyal, and they're just great.
Nixon: That's good.
Keating: Now, I presume you're interested in knowing what the Foreign Minister
is going to say to you. And I can only guess, but I have talked—
Nixon: What does he want? Does he want to talk about—I suppose he wants to
talk about Pakistan.
Keating: Yes, that's it. Because—
Nixon: What do they want us to do?
Keating: Well this—
Nixon: Break up Pakistan?
Keating: No. No. In the beginning they were, just as we were, for a single
Pakistan after that election, because this sheik, Mujibur Rahman, was Pro-Indian
and Pro-American. He was—they envisioned a different picture in that they were
going to be friends with Pakistan. And then when the army walked in and knocked
out the elections of course they were upset. There were two reasons they were
upset. That was one. The other was that there are Bengalis on both sides of the
border and they have family ties and all that. Now I went to see him to tell him
about the aid we're to give him. And it's greater now. And I think he'll
express his appreciation for that, he should. I believe he will.
Nixon: What are we up to now?
Keating: Seventeen and a half million.
Nixon: The first one was two and a half million.
Keating: Yes, it was two and a half million when I went in.
Kissinger: The C–130s.
Keating: And the C–130s. That's all a new—we're doing quite a little.
And he should be, I believe will be grateful. He's a very nice fellow; I
don't know that you've met him.
Keating: Very kind fellow. Now, beyond that, he will say, as he did to me:
"This aid is great. We appreciate it very much." But he said the basic
problem is to try to get these refugees back into Pakistan. We cannot stand this
drain on India, which, if it lasted for a year with the present numbers would
cost $400 million—
Nixon: What is it, 300,000?
Kissinger: No, it's about—
Keating: Five million. And add that it's in a crowded part of India.
Nixon: Sorry, it was 300,000 we were feeding.
Keating: That's right. That's correct. About five million, and of that about
three of them—
Nixon: Why don't they shoot them?
Keating: About three of them are in Calcutta. Calcutta is the size of New York.
It'd be like dumping three million people into New York, except that Calcutta
is in much worse shape than New York. Not too much, but it's worse. And it's
a horrible problem. Now, he said they're still coming at that time at 100,000
a day—the latest I heard was 150,000 a day—because they're killing the
Hindus. And the thing that, in the beginning, these refugees were about in the
proportion to the population—85 percent Muslim, 15 percent Hindus. Because
when they started the killing it was indiscriminate. Now, having gotten control
of the large centers, it is almost entirely a matter of genocide killing the
Hindus. And the intellectual leaders, the leaders in the country that they want
to get rid of, primarily these Awami League people, they've killed them.
They've outlawed the Awami League that got 98 percent of the polls, elected
167 out of the 169 members of Parliament. And they arrested him as a traitor,
Mujib, and they have outlawed the Awami League. Now what he is going to plead
for, I have heard that even since I have left, they have come to the conclusion
that because of this horrible refugee problem, this is since I've talked to
you, they are for a political settlement of any kind in East Pakistan which will
get the people back. Now the Hindus, I don't think, will go back. But a lot of
the Muslims would go back if there was some kind of a political settlement. And
I think he will probably urge a political settlement there. The thing that—two
things: he wants to stop the refugees coming, which means stop the killing. And
two, get the refugees flowing the other way back into Pakistan.
Nixon: What does he think, Ken, we should do? What would we recommend?
Keating: He thinks—I think he thinks—
Nixon: We should pressure Yahya?
Keating: Yes. I think he feels that—what he said is Russia and the United
States are the only ones that can influence Yahya to stop the killing. And he
said in my judgment the United States has more leverage with him than Russia
has. And the only way is an economic way. Of course, I understand that there's
no plan to just go on as business as usual in economics. After this consortium
meeting, the Bank and the—this informal meeting that takes place next
week—the [World] Bank and the International Monetary Fund sent this Peter
Cargill [Director of the South Asia Division of the World Bank] up there. And he
is going to make a report to them on what he has found and what he feels should
be done. And the next thing they're going to consider it back here and take it
up at that time. No commitments, I believe, are going to be made at this Paris
meeting. But I suspect he will find that the situation in East Pakistan, which
Yahya says is normal, or practically normal, is far from normal and won't be
normal in a year. And what the political settlement is that he can bring about,
that I'm not able to get in my head because this Amin was the biggest leader
next to Mujib, he got one or two members of Parliament, and they tried to get,
Yahya tried to get him to head it up and he wouldn't touch it because he'd
get his throat slit. Now they had a few, I'm told, a few members of the Awami
League, about nine, who are ready to help form a government. But the bitterness
is so great that I believe, and indeed Joe Farland does, that the old Pakistan
is through. There will be—they cannot catch this together. Joe has said that
in his cable, and I feel it very strongly. And there's got to be a new
Now, I am conscious of the special relationship that you have with Yahya. And I
respect it and I don't to want to—
Keating: Personal relationship.
Nixon: Not only just that, but there are some other major considerations.
Nixon: Well, let me say this, when do we see Singh? Tomorrow?
Kissinger: Thursday, Mr. President.
Nixon: Thursday, fine. [Thursday was June 17. The meeting took place on June
Keating: There has been some suggestion that it will be possible for you to, I
don't think this has come to you yet, but it's something we've talked
about in the Department—
Keating: It will be so long before aid to Pakistan, in the way of developmental
aid, will be possible that a diversion, a certain amount of that, to help India
with its refugee problem. It might be possible for you to suggest that to him in
this meeting. That paper I don't know whether that's reached you yet or not.
Kissinger: No, no. I know about the—Connally told me about it.
Kissinger: That's a scheme they thought up of taking $25 million out of—
Nixon: The Pakistan aid—
Kissinger: The Pakistan aid and give it to India.
Nixon: I think we just better find the money to give to India.
Keating: I don't think any, I don't think any—I think they had about $80
million for Pakistan. And it will be some time before they—
Kissinger: Well they want to take—there's $70 million for Pakistan—well,
there are two issues here. One is whether they could use it, whether the
Pakistanis could use it if we gave it to them. The second is how Pakistan will
react if we take money from their budget for India.
[Omitted here is a discussion unrelated to South Asia]
Nixon: Let me say this, I don't want to give you the wrong impression about
India. There are 400 million Indians.
Nixon: 550? [unclear]
Keating: There are.
Nixon: I don't know why the hell anybody would reproduce in that damn country
but they do. But nevertheless, I know that country is trying to make it
[unclear] basically with some semblance of democracy—private enterprise, call
it whatever you want. And I know that looming over from the north are the
Chinese [unclear]. It's, therefore, very much in our interest to see that
India, we want them to succeed. Because there are 550 million people, we want
them to do well. And they always hate us [unclear] internationally, we know
Keating: Not always.
Nixon: Not always. But that's irrelevant. I mean [unclear] but what I'm
getting at is here, right now, you can be sure that we will play a friendly game
with the Indians. Particularly in view of the fact that the Government is more
stable, that is good, and you can take a more rational line on things like
Kashmir. But the other thing is that, I think we have to realize too, that it
would not be in our interest, maybe there is going to be a Pakistan collapse,
depends on what happens in the next 6 months. It may never be in our interest.
But it certainly is not now for reasons we can't go into. Under those
circumstances, what we have to do, Ken, is to find a way to be just as generous
as we can to the Indians, but also we do not want to do something that is an
open breech with Yahya—an open breech, an embarrassing situation. And that's
really the problem. You can reassure Mrs. Gandhi, [unclear] we want to help here
in every way we can [unclear].
Nixon: And let me say, the openness as far as the Congress is concerned, there
really isn't anything in it. [unclear] Not one goddamn bit. It's not a
popular country in this Congress.
Keating: No, I know that. I served there. I know that.
Nixon: But that is even less popular today because foreign aid is less popular.
Keating: That's right.
Nixon: But nevertheless—
Keating: But in the Congress there's a strong feeling on this
Nixon: I understand that, I understand that. [unclear] Hell, they had us
involved in a civil war in Biafra, and now they want us out of Pakistan. But
nevertheless, we've got to take up here for reasons that go far beyond
India-Pakistan relations another position. So we will be very, very conciliatory
with the Foreign Minister. But we must not do it in a way, I hope our Embassy
has our position on this [unclear] refugees in both Pakistan and India wherever
they are. But, on the other hand, not to allow the refugee problem to get us
involved in the internal political problems. You see that's our policy too. He
might, if he asks me about it [unclear].
Keating: And we also must avoid—if possible—any conflict, armed conflict,
between the two.
Nixon: Oh, God.
Keating: And the Indians, they're pressing Mrs. Gandhi so hard, and Parliament
is now in session, the politicians are—
Keating: And up to date I must say she's been a [unclear]. They're pressing
her very hard that we can't stand this refugee thing. We'll just go in and
take a little piece out of Pakistan where you can put these refugees. We can't
hold them here, so that means war. And he will probably bring that up.
[Omitted here is a discussion unrelated to South Asia. Nixon and Kissinger
continued their discussion after Keating left.]
Nixon: I don't know what the Christ we are up to.
Kissinger: The most insulting way we can—
Nixon: You have to go now?
Kissinger: I have an appointment with Rush but he can wait.
Nixon: [unclear] My God, does Farland, is he sending memoranda that he thinks
Pakistan is finished also?
Kissinger: Baloney. He's got this maniac in Dacca, the Consul General who is
in rebellion; the point is, Mr. President, first of all, I've talked to the
Indian Ambassador as I've said to you, I said you want to have a direct
communication through him with Mrs. Gandhi. That we need 3 or 4 months to work
it out. We will find them some money, we will gradually move into a position to
be helpful, but we've got to do it our way. Just to shut them up.
Nixon: Right. Right. You told him that?
Kissinger: I told him all of that.
Nixon: We don't tell the Foreign Minister that?
Kissinger: No, you can tell the Foreign Minister that above all. But in front of
Keating he'll blab it all over. Yeah, I'd say we have great sympathy, but
they must be restrained. And we'll try to find some money but we cannot take
it out of the Pakistan budget.
Nixon: Well the Ambassador will tell the Foreign Minister that.
Kissinger: Oh, yeah.
Nixon: But Keating will go blab it over to the State Department. What Keating
had [unclear] Pakistan—they're out of their goddamn minds. Of course we're
not going to take it out. That would bring down the Pakistan Government.
Kissinger: Well it would be considered such an insult by Yahya that the whole
deal would be off.
Nixon: I don't know what the Christ he's talking about.
Kissinger: I will, when I'm talking to the Chinese, set up a separate channel
so that we're not so vulnerable. I mean we can't be that—
Nixon: Of course, I don't know, Henry, it just may be that the poor
son-of-a-bitch can't survive. Five million? Is it that bad really or are they
Kissinger: Of course, I don't know how many of them they generate?
138. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Indian Foreign Minister (Singh), and
the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco),
Washington, June 16, 1971, 2:58-3:41 p.m.
Kissinger: Now on the Indian who's waiting; the basic problem is to give
him a combination of both sympathy, so that he can go home with—to Mrs. Gandhi
Nixon: That's right.
Kissinger: —and great firmness. Now I have, in addition to what you will say,
but with Sisco there you won't have much of a chance to. I've told Yahya
that he had a personal channel through me to you. I'm just trying to keep them
[the Indians] from attacking for 3 months. Now, if you could say that you are
directing, that $60 million be made available for refugee support after July 1.
Nixon: Do they know that yet?
Kissinger: No. This is why it would be very helpful.
Nixon: Does Sisco know?
Kissinger: No, but it's based on a recommendation from the State Department.
Nixon: That's all right.
Kissinger: Out from the Embassy there. They'll be delighted.
Nixon: Fifty thousand?
Kissinger: Yeah, and $20 million. You will see whether you can get $20 million
from other programs this month. Now, they wanted to take it out of Pakistan. I
Nixon: I know.
Kissinger: But we can take a little from Turkey and a little from Indonesia and
pay it back to them after July 1st. But if you could give those two figures,
then you'll get the credit for it and—
Nixon: And that we are concerned.
Kissinger: Well, he'll have a story. And that we cannot—that you think that
overt pressure on Pakistan would have a counter-productive effect, and that you
are working with Yahya in your own way. It's a little duplicitous, but these
bastards understand that.
Nixon: I must say I am not too damned impressed with Keating. I think he's
just gone overboard. Now I must say maybe there's a hell of a problem on which
the TV is starting to pick it up now.
Kissinger: Oh, it is a hell of a problem.
[Omitted here is a portion of the conversation unrelated to South Asia.]
Nixon: I don't want to see [unclear, them start war?] just now.
Kissinger: Because you saw harm on it from Pakistan.
Nixon: I know, but I don't want to see it more. You see? I just, they're
wasting my time. I just [unclear].
Kissinger: That really depends what we have to do. We have to keep them from
attacking for our own reasons.
[Pleasantries were exchanged as Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, Ambassadors Jha
and Keating, and Assistant Secretary of State Sisco entered the Oval Office. The
White House photographer was present at the beginning of the meeting.]
Singh:Our Prime Minister asked me to convey her warmth and greetings. She
greatly appreciates your letter, the United States [unclear] conveyed in that
and she asks me to convey her greetings to you [unclear].
Nixon: Sure. I appreciate that. Tell her that we were all very impressed by her
great political victory out there. It gave her the stability that she, that she
needs now. It's much, much better to look after a very successful election
like that. [unclear] There's a lot more to this. She has more confidence than
Nixon: Things are going well from what Ambassador Keating tells me.
Singh:Yes, she has always had confidence, but now she also has strength to—
Nixon: That's right.
Singh:—put them on [unclear]—
Nixon: Oh, I know. I know.
Singh:And, in fact, she was looking for a period when, as a result of this
Singh:—she'd have both peace and opportunity to implement the
socio-economic content of the program on the basis of which she won.
Singh:But suddenly she's confronted with a—
Singh:—type of situation not of her making.
Nixon: Oh. Yes.
Singh:Not to place blame here. . .
Singh:. . . [unclear] being subjected at this present moment.
Singh:[unclear] and she wanted to, wanted me to convey, Your Excellency, the
latest situation, as the present one has no [unclear] and we are coming and that
every second [unclear, refugees they come?]
Nixon: Every second?
Singh:Every second. So this is the type of situation that we face. And this has
caused a tremendous problem to us, because they come in an area that
traditionally is very dependent, both politically and economically.
Nixon: Would you like some tea or coffee?
Singh:Thank you very much.
Nixon: [aside] Ken?
Singh:I'm all right.
Nixon: [aside; whispering] Some tea perhaps, please. Thank you.
Nixon: No, I can't.
Singh:Politically, economically adept. And if another six million people are
ready to come in a state of anger, frustration, and destitute, that adds to the
[unclear] ability and the social-economic tension that all of them have created.
[unclear] We've reduced any financial [unclear]. In this situation, that we
seek your advice how we should achieve that objective. But perhaps most
important thing in that situation [unclear] will use this movement of refugees
which always [unclear]. Technically, on this issue, we gave a clear [unclear,
signal?]. We [unclear] the objective will be [unclear]. In this situation where
we [unclear] many field commanders that we called feel it's their own problem.
It ceases to be an internal problem and it should affect [unclear] tension
[unclear]. And it's the best end right now that we've got. Support for this
approach of ours and help with [unclear]. How to meet this objective, we believe
that if the building of the [unclear] can be seen [unclear] make up their minds.
[unclear] can be sure as he can be [unclear] security take [unclear].
Singh:And secondly, then, the condition that they are to be restored should
enable you to return that. In the statements we are prepared to take, we must
perhaps create this. [unclear] And for this, obviously some political settlement
is needed. You mentioned in your letter to the Prime Minister you are engaged in
this task in your quiet manner and tried to impress on them what you have done.
We believe that the return from [unclear] is possibility if the military actions
of trying to solve a situation [unclear]. Apparently those people who have now
demonstrated [unclear] that they enjoy the confidence of the people [unclear].
In the long range there are really two guys [unclear]. This will be a situation
in which [unclear].
Nixon: What do you think is the, what do you think is the benefit of [unclear]
being able to—East Pakistan will to have to become independent, or what
happens in the long run? This does not mean that your personal view, I
know—that's not what I meant. How do you see the historical process working
Singh:I have a feeling, Mr. President, that showing, telling the United Nations
that there's a very good chance of saving Pakistan and [unclear]. [unclear]
maintain central authority in an area of confrontation of the [unclear] can they
handle central authority?
Singh:[unclear] There's a very good chance to have. Even the course of the
negotiations, with all that we know, would even the Awami [unclear] more than
contained in their six-point program in the direction. [unclear] without
direction of this nature, and we have authority to create [unclear], so it could
be saved. The Council has become most angered because they [unclear]. The
confidence has been very rudely shaken. When the military rulers in Pakistan can
still bring back the country themselves, those for the present moment who find
themselves in the [unclear].
Singh:[unclear] Then it appears that they're pushing them more and more into
the point of, the position of the point of no return. And it appears [unclear].
They must. We have an opposition quite clearly; it's developed between the
central authority of Pakistan and the leaders. So that [unclear] anything that
we want to. They do not realize that from our point of view is when they
separate from [unclear]. But we are bothered by the continuance of conditions of
instability. Continuation of the conditions there you will find [unclear];
continuation of conditions where the military rule is pitted against almost
united will of [unclear] people. [unclear] We'll do that to maintain control
of the situation. And that is something [unclear] from our [unclear]. [unclear]
from our point of view; certainly from our point of view and maybe even from
your point of view. Because it is a holy land, trying to resort to that. That
your country and ours, we can work together, work in a [unclear] manner. To that
extent [unclear] stability, so much in common. We should not.
Nixon: You don't, you don't have a feeling that the situation would be to
your interest to have a, to have an independent country? What would be in
India's best interest? To have it independent or under the central government,
Singh:No, we have—we have no fixed position on that.
Nixon: That's up to them, isn't it?
Singh:On this matter we leave it up to the Pakistanis and the leaders of the
Awami League to decide about their future in any manner they like. We will not
press one or the other solution, or [unclear] to it. We are interested in
observing the neutrality in [unclear] considering the situation.
Singh:That being our fixed position.
Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.
Singh:[unclear] silent spectators all [unclear] agreeing with what, to our
arrangement to [unclear] the people and until then, it seems to me, there will
be unstable conditions, at least.
Singh:And we are conscious of our responsibility and even when we were facing
this big trouble in the end with these people when we [unclear] did our best.
[unclear] All provisions are to be clear which were settled by [unclear]
extra-constitutional means. [unclear]
Nixon: Sure. First let me say that we, that you couldn't have a man more
[unclear] in so far as bringing this matter to our attention, than your own
Ambassador here. He's talked to our people and he's a very persuasive man
and has let us know what the position is. And, of course, he has—we have great
respect for him. And on our part we couldn't have a person who is more
vigorous in presenting this point of view which you have described. Of course,
you would describe it in a more precise way than, which you naturally can in
your position. It's obvious that Ambassador Keating, of course you know an old
friend of mine in the House and Senate. He lives here. We had a long talk
yesterday. We went over all these matters.
Nixon: He is, he is just—he is concerned as your Ambassador, and of course
we're aware of this. So I am keenly aware of the problem. I'm aware, too, of
the enormous agony that must be caused—I have not been, Rogers has been only
once. [unclear] I have not been to Dacca, but I know that part of the
subcontinent, that the problems of poverty are serious, very serious. And added
to it is this instability. However simple their homes may be, they are their
homes. And pouring into an already overcrowded city. This must be a terrible
agony for a country to go through. We're aware of this thing. Also imposed
upon your country, big as it is, 600 million people. Nevertheless, five million
people is a lot of people, because. . .
Singh:We count six, Mr. President.
Nixon: Six million. Yeah, that's right.
Nixon: One every second, that's 60 every minute.
Nixon: [unclear] That's over 600 an hour.
Nixon: Yes, yes, yes, yes. Now the, the—I am sure you realize, too, that what
we can do, you know, what we feel is one thing; what we can do is another. We
have the deepest sympathy and we will try to do as much as we can. We don't
want to do anything that would be, that has the opposite results from what we
want, you know. Naturally, our—with regard to the Government of Pakistan, we
of course have our contacts with them, our relations with them, with the
President, of course. It's terrible. The question is how we can discuss this
matter with them in a way that will maybe, may bring about action that would
lead to amelioration of the situation. Or how we, or—and avoiding [unclear,
the woodshed?] might set up, as often is the case when such things are done too
publicly, which would set up an antagonistic attitude. I'm not speaking
personally from the standpoint of those who would look for something to be
antagonistic about. That might just upset it all. We, I would like to say this:
that we, I think that under best course of action—I'd like to talk first of
all what would we need your advice with regard to what we can do with the
meeting situation—the best course of action we think as a Government is for us
to, is for you to have confidence, and I want you to convey this to the Prime
Minister, on a completely off-the-record basis. Discussions that are publicly
talked about would have exactly the opposite effect on that. You've got to,
you must have confidence that one, I am acutely aware of the problem. I am
deeply concerned about the problem for humanitarian [unclear, reasons?] and I am
concerned about it for its foreign policy implications, for all this could erupt
into some armed conflict. We know that. Now—therefore, we, I will use all the
persuasive methods that I can, but I must use them in the way that I think is
the most effective, in a way perhaps that, say, she might never use, in a way
that any nation would want used when we talk with their leader and so forth. But
I am aware of the problem, I shall try to use my influence as effectively as
possible at least if effectively means not using it in a public, blunt way. And
I [unclear] such and such is, had been. Not only has our concern been expressed
but that you will have this in mind in future discussions that we have that we
have to do it this way. And that has to be answered. The second thing is, of
course, looking at the immediate problem that you need more funds; the
Ambassador has discussed with us the various options that we have. We have an
immediate problem between now and July 1st, and it's just for here [unclear,
'til then?] And, but on the other hand, but because, you know, we've run out
of money because it's all been spent with only 15 days left. On the other hand
we have out of other aid programs that won't need any [unclear] because that
would cause problems for where they came from. But we have been able to acquire
$20 million that we will, we will find immediately available. And then in
addition to that, on the July, on July 1st, we will be able to apply $50
million, so which will give you a total of $70 million to relieve them, the aid
problem. We'd give you more, but that's, that's as much as we can find.
You see, we have to take from various other commitments that have been made. So
you get $20 million between now and the first of July, $50 million more on the
first of July or just as soon as the fiscal year begins.
Nixon: And that your Government can count on. Is that correct, roughly speaking,
or is the 20—?
Kissinger: The difference is that we had to piece together the $20 million, Mr.
President, out of other programs.
Nixon: Right. The point is we'll find the $20 million. You can count on it.
The $50 million—
Kissinger: That's right.
Sisco: We've got that.
Kissinger: Including the lowest parts of your supplemental appropriations
Nixon: Right. And we've got to look down towards that, but on the other hand,
I'm aware of the fact that this will take care of how many? Six million
people. For how long? Not long. It'll help. On the other hand, I realize that
that does not get at the long-range problem. The long-range problem is how do we
stop this inflow of people? How—maybe you'd start having them turn around,
start outflowing them. That's what we're getting at. I think you, you first,
you brought it to my attention when you met me. The Prime Minister and you heard
this conversation with our Ambassador, Ambassador Keating. All brought it to my
attention and I'm convinced of the seriousness of the problem. I will, I will
try to find the methods that I think will be effective. I think it will protect
[unclear] can't do that. [unclear] effective. There may be other ways for this
to be effective. But I think we have to, I think it must not be in a way that
appears that we're, that what has happened here is that the United States is
inserting itself into basically an internal situation in an open way. That is we
have to—we can be most effective by persuading the parties involved to come to
a decision of theirs rather than one that's imposed upon them. That's at
least my [unclear, instinct?] telling the individual players and so forth.
That's the way I see it at this time. And we will—the results will tell us
whether we're right or not. And also after trying that method for a while
we'll have to see the situation, but in the meantime, I think, and to the
extent that we can, to keep as cool as possible, in terms of charges and
counter-charges and all that sort of thing. We'll—You can count on our
financial assistance to the extent that we are able. And this—we will find
this money. [unclear] Second, you will have the, on other side which is far more
[unclear, important?] the governmental side. Let us, if you will, let us do that
in our way, in the way we think will be more effective. That's the way I would
like to do it. You're, do you approve or do you think there's a better way
to do it?
Singh:We greatly appreciate your sentiment and [unclear] in coming to a
concrete conclusion in a short time. [unclear] This is an international
responsibility. [unclear] We appreciate it, yes. [unclear]. You yourself
mentioned it. [unclear] The question, one, how to stop it, and how to create
Nixon: This is the fundamental question now.
Singh:This is the fundamental question. [unclear]
Nixon: I know. I am aware of that. I am aware of the, I am aware of the fact
that the funds, while essential, [deal] with a temporary problem do not
handle—I am not suggesting at all, or have any illusions, that if we found
$700 million to put into this thing that would simply buy the problem away. The
problem is going to go away only as the deeper causes are resolved. And I am
aware of that. How we get at those deeper causes is a very sensitive problem as
you well know, and the Foreign Minister has to be highly sensitive to how people
feel and approach us and so forth. And how other governments may feel about
this, how they react. One way the public pressure, another way the private,
shall we say persuasion. I have always believed in the latter myself as the most
effective way, particularly when I know the individuals fairly well.
Singh:That we are agreed. Perhaps the whole problem can be divided into two
parts. There are some aspects, which could [unclear]. France has agreed to make
a statement to that effect. [unclear] in Moscow. And also the necessity of their
returning. I agree that that's a question to how [unclear]. We know what is
actually happening. [unclear]
Nixon: We will then proceed on that basis . I don't think anything, however,
certainly at this point, would be served by any indication of the United States
putting public pressure on Pakistan. That I know would be wrong if we want to
accomplish our goal. On the other hand, something might be, something might very
well be accomplished in other directions. I am aware of that. I would like to
try it this way. We will, you can be sure that we're as totally concerned
about it as we can be, not being there. Incidentally, how much did the Germans
provide? How much are they providing?
Singh:The German money, I honestly—
Nixon: How about the French?
Sisco: I looked at a figure today, Mr. President, I think the Germans are
somewhere around two million, and the French are something a little less than
Nixon: That's not enough.
Sisco: That's not enough.
Nixon: All right, that's not enough. The French and Germans have just as great
an interest as we have. Here they are making all sorts of big statements and
doing very little. Now, you head over to the French and Germans and their
colleagues formally, that clear? The same with the low countries that talk big
and don't help much. I have no sympathy for them. [unclear] made a statement
when he was here. The Germans can afford—if we can afford $70 million, the
Germans can afford 10, easy—or 15.
Kissinger: We've already given 17.5.
Nixon: That's right. We'll, we've put in 100 so the Germans should put in
25. That's the way it ought to be. Because you know, we don't believe in
this office of talking big and doing little.
141. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador to Pakistan (Farland),
Washington, July 28, 1971, 4:21-4:54 p.m.
Nixon: You know, the thing that really concerns us, naturally, as we all
know, the miserable campaign, I don't know what you can do about it while you
are here, against Pakistan. Do you think he's doing—Keating was over here
lobbying for the Indians when he was here—do you think he ought to try to say
anything good about the Paks while you are here? Could you?
Farland: I can..
Nixon: Would it be useful?
Kissinger: I think it would be useful to put out [unclear].
Farland: I agree, although I was trying to maintain a relatively low profile
because I didn't want to get questions about particulars to the China trip.
Nixon: On that you have a perfect thing, you just say I'm not saying anything.
Farland: I saw Chuck Percy today at a luncheon that Frank Kellogg gave at the
State Department. And several Congressmen, and they all wondered why my presence
wasn't known, why could I appear before a committee and I had no comment to
make. I said I don't know. I had a conversation with [unclear] this morning
and he was quite hopeful that I could appear before one of the committees. I
agreed with Charles Bray over at the State Department to give a backgrounder to
the press on Friday afternoon.
Kissinger: That's better than testimony [unclear].
Nixon: Good. The press likes backgrounders much better. That's where it
counts. The hell with the damn Congress.
Farland: There is another side to this picture, and I can say with complete
candor that if we push Yahya to the point where he reacts, the reaction will be
such that the entire subcontinent will be [unclear]. I mean he'll fight.
He'll fight, and he may go [unclear]. If he goes out, and he may go [unclear]
it's going to be [unclear] that ever mankind has seen, in our lifetime. The
Chinese will come right down through Assam. [unclear] Furthermore, the Chinese
will come across the Mintoka Pass and start guerrilla warfare in Kashmir. And
they'll have everything surrounded. And the vociferous forces in India today
[unclear]. That's a very stark picture but it's one that's not overdrawn.
Nixon: What do you think our position should be?
Farland: I think we are doing what we should. This is a policy that I joined in.
I don't think we can overplay our hand, but I don't think we are looking for
vociferous, positive action. Mr. President, as I was telling you this morning,
that as a matter of actual fact this problem goes back to about the year AD 712,
when the Muslims first invaded the Sind. There's been no peace on the
subcontinent since that time because the Hindus and the Muslims have nothing in
common whatsoever. Every point of their lives is diametrically
opposed—economic, political, social, emotional, despite their beliefs. One
prays to idols, the other prays to one God. One worships the cow; the other eats
it. Simple as that. And last year there were 521 communal riots in India,
Nixon: Miserable damn place.
Kissinger: And what the Indians are really after, that became clear to me on my
trip [unclear]. Their thoughts are about East Pakistan because they think that
[unclear] West Pakistan. They think that by, well, if they can undermine East
Pakistan then in West Pakistan so many forces would be, will unloosen, will be
turned loose that the whole Pakistan issue will disappear. The Indians and West
Pakistanis they hate each other–
Nixon: Oh sure, that's what they fear. East Pakistan [unclear]. The thing, the
bad thing is you are convinced, though, that Yahya will fight?
Farland: Oh, he will.
Nixon: He will commit suicide.
Kissinger: I agree completely. He will fight. Just as Lincoln would have fought.
To him East Pakistan is part of Pakistan. [unclear]
Farland: Because of their sense of defeat, the possibility of defeat is a minor
consideration as opposed to their sense of national unity. Remember, almost
every [unclear] over there recalls the time of partition, back when they had–
Nixon: Horrible slaughters?
Farland: The acknowledged figure is over half a million. The figure that most
people believe is way in excess of a million people. Fifteen million refugees
were on the road.
Nixon: What is the situation, I really, of course there are always two sides to
everything, but with the Indians [unclear]? Terrible stories [unclear] and so
Farland. They are past masters of propaganda. The Pakistanis don't—
Nixon: How can you, can you perhaps put a little of that [unclear]. Well anyway,
I think if you could, if you could–
Nixon: Yeah. Okay.
Farland: This matter of arms to Pakistan.
Nixon: Uh, huh.
Farland: Since March 25 we have sent over 2,200 rounds of .22 ammunition for
survival rifles for down there, that's all. This part of our arms deal is
just, in guns and the story hasn't properly–
Nixon: You tell them that's good. That's good.
Farland: Forty to fifty percent of what's in the pipeline is for spare parts
for trucks and for communication equipment without which the starving refugees
could not be fed.
Nixon: Good. Good. Good.
Farland: So these are—
Nixon: You ought to lay it right out. And also, I guess everybody's concerned
about [unclear]. Let's not aggravate the problem; let's try to help on the
problem—East Pakistan. And the main thing let's not stir it up. It's
stirred up too much. Inevitably it will be a bloodbath down there.
Farland: It will be. It will be all over the subcontinent.
Nixon: We warned the Indians very strongly that if they start anything—and
believe me it would be a hell of a pleasure as far as I am concerned—if we
just cut off every damn bit of aid we give them, at least for whatever it's
Farland: Yahya told me that they had pinpointed 29 camps within India where
guerrillas were being trained. Now I hate to tell you this, Mr. President, but
the guerrilla threat is growing by leaps and bounds. They're averaging 18
Pakistanis a day now; they are averaging two bridges a day. Killing that many.
And this is [unclear]. And once the refugees get there, they are being
prohibited, are prevented from coming back by Indira's own statement.
Political accommodation in her book means Bangladesh. This is bad.
Nixon: Well, I think we just continue on our line. We, as you know, we're
having a hell of a time keeping the State Department bureaucracies hitched on
this thing. They're basically pro-Indian. When I say “they,” not all. But
a lot of them. And they want to believe what the American press is writing. And
the Indian press, of course, the American press is the same as the Indian press,
follows everything they say.
Farland: Well, my Consul General over in Dacca—
Nixon: He's no good.
Farland: blew the whistle on the whole thing.
Nixon: He's bad, isn't he?
Farland: Well he's gone. He's here in the Department now. And the head of
the USIS was just as tendentious in his reporting. Got rid of him. Shakespeare
got him out.
Farland: The one remaining, who is a very critical situation, this fellow Eric
Griffel, who is the head of AID [Griffel was the associate director in charge of
AID operations in Dacca], he will be out in September. I wish he were out now. I
don't think you could pull him out without—
Farland: –repercussions on the Hill. And my guess is that he has been
instrumental in leaking some of this information.
Nixon: Sick bastards. You just keep right after it on this thing.
146. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the British Foreign Secretary
(Douglas-Home), and the British Ambassador (Cromer), Washington, September 30,
1971, 4:10-5:31 p.m.
Douglas-Home: This India thing we have here is really very serious, indeed.
The guerrilla warfare we have now is really operating in a very wide area of the
countryside in East Pakistan, and it is [unclear] refugees out of East Pakistan,
which is still not prepared for 4,000 a week, or even more than that. They'll
take [unclear] to run through there. In the last 3 weeks or so, 11 trips taking
food and supplies to East Pakistan have helped a lot so far. And one of our
shipping lines is now refusing to take any more stuff to East Pakistan and
Chittagong. And, third, this is all going through that particular situation
where I don't know [unclear] however much the United Nations wants to rebuild
communications to help all that. It's not going to be possible with this
guerrilla stuff going on.
Douglas-Home: We've done what we can, and then what you'll do what you can
to get Yahya Khan to move that quickly, on a visible front . And I just don't
know if he can make contact with the Bangladesh people in Bengal. And if he
could, I think he will get more substantial people to cooperate than he is able
to get now because the Indians have them, and the people he's talking to in
the civil administration now are people of no consequence. And they will all
still be. Now this entire notion—but I suspect—
Kissinger: Speaking here in this room with the [unclear] for you [unclear]. We
have been in touch with Bangladesh people in Calcutta. And we were trying to set
up a meeting between the Bangladesh people and the West Pakistanis outside of
India. And we had Yahya's agreement to that. And the Indians have now totally
thwarted it. They made it impossible for these people to deal with us; they're
forcing them to check everything with them, they are padding demands, which are
totally incapable of fulfillment.
Nixon: We've really got a crisis. [unclear] They're so—smug is the word,
Kissinger: It's really hard to believe. Even I could get relief in there.
Douglas-Home: That's very bad news.
Kissinger: They've cut, they've cut the supply lines into the food deficit
areas you pointed out. We have offered them guarantees that the convoys or ships
that go in there will not carry troops out, which is really a tremendous
invasion of sovereignty, just to make sure there will be no additional refugees
produced by another [unclear]. They refuse to cooperate with that.
Nixon: The Indians did insist there's this, and, you know, they're
hypocrites and sanctimonious about this. Now there's no question that Yahya
has handled it really in a stupid way. I mean, and the only way you would expect
in [with?] all the military backing. He's a very decent man, but it's just
been handled badly. And in any case that the country is inevitable, as it's
inevitable this country will tear part, come apart. But the Indians, the Indians
are playing—I'm afraid from all reports, they're playing a game here that I
think is wrong. I think they're deliberately trying to make it insoluble. And
if it becomes insoluble what happens? Well, what happens is you have India,
which can't even digest what they already have, probably—how the hell are
they going to run that place? The other thing is that there is the danger, and
there is the danger that a West Pakistani with a suicidal attitude will decide
to have a fight.
Douglas-Home: Through Kashmir?
Kissinger: We've had an intelligence report today—I don't know that
[unclear]—Well, that they're thinking of going into Kashmir because this
situation, as the Foreign Secretary is pointing out, is getting unmanageable.
Nixon: What can we do? What can be done?
Kissinger: Well, we haven't totally failed with the Indians because the
Bangladesh people, as you correctly point out, are actually quite eager to talk.
Nixon: They are?
Kissinger: Yeah, but they—At first, they were willing to settle for autonomy,
and as we all know autonomy would produce independence, there is no other way it
Kissinger: Now the Indians have escalated their demand into total independence
immediately. Well, that Yahya will never agree to. There has to be a face-saving
formula and a transition period.
Douglas-Home: That's right, and I think it will. I think two [unclear] with
regard to everything. You've got to have it.
Kissinger: We told the Indians that if they could separate the political process
and if they could give a little more time to that and to the relief process we
think everyone could achieve this objective.
Douglas-Home: Mrs. Gandhi is coming to see us quite soon, and if you could—
Nixon: She's seeing you?
Douglas-Home: She did stop by in London. She's coming back.
Nixon: [unclear] and after that comes here, doesn't she?
Kissinger: She's coming in November [unclear]—
Douglas-Home: Well, if you could tell us, if you could, you know, keep us
informed before she comes, we can all [unclear]—
Nixon: So that she doesn't come in here and, frankly, pull our legs. I mean,
let's be sure we're in contact on this thing. Can you tell us too?
Douglas-Home: And we'll tell you [unclear]
Nixon: Now I raised this subject with Gromyko. And I was very tough with him. I
said, “Now if there's a war”—I said “We just can't have a war. You
can't encourage the Indians because then Pakistan might—” He said, “Oh,
we don't want a war, and it's what we're, we have—” And he said they
had told her that in Moscow. Right?
Kissinger: Yeah, but–
Nixon: I don't know whether he was telling the truth or not.
Kissinger: But what the Indians are doing now is the, are equipping these
guerrillas with really very advanced weapons and wanting them to
[unclear–advance to this area?]
Douglas-Home: The only thing apparent in my mind as a part of this thing, is he
is ranting about this thing. He can't see any sense—
Nixon: You remember when he came in to see us. I told you that I didn't like
the way he handled himself.
Douglas-Home: [unclear] what can we do?
Kissinger: Well, I think that if we could shock the Indians we would—because
our judgment is that Chinese almost certainly come in at the Indians—
Nixon: That's the other thing.
Kissinger: And whether the Soviets then will forgo the opportunity to settle
scores with the Chinese is ultimately—I think if the Indians could be shocked
into being reasonable, if that's possible the problem is soluble. But if
they're really concerned about East Bengal that problem is soluble. If
they're concerned with using East Bengal to disintegrate all of Pakistan, to
say it never should have existed then that, I think, is in the back of this
complicated Indian mind.
Douglas-Home: What I wanted to say, to maintain [unclear] above all things, is
that they ought to be encouraging Yahya Khan in his political moves. [unclear]
Kissinger: That's right.
Douglas-Home: Political realism.
Kissinger: And my judgment, I had a long talk with Yahya when I was on the way
to China. And he's really [unclear]. He's not very bright, but he has tried.
Nixon: He's a decent man, an honorable man.
Kissinger: He needs some face-saving formula to go to autonomy.
Douglas-Home: That's right.
Kissinger: Given the difference in culture and in public leaning, autonomy must
be the answer. There's no other way it can go.
Nixon: Now let's—this could be one, this could be a parable. This could be
[unclear]. Wouldn't that be something to have a [unclear] in that visible
place? All that I can say is that I think the British got out too soon. Really,
Nixon: I've been down that area, you know, the—I was there, I forget the
last—but, and I know it's inevitable. But when you think of India and
Pakistan they just aren't ready. They just aren't ready, that's all.
[Omitted here is concluding conversation unrelated to South Asia.]
Part I ! Part
II ! Part
III ! Part
For more declassified documents and originals of telegrams and background
papers, please visit the Office
of the Historian, the US Department of State.
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7. There is no particular outlookindia.com line on any subject. The views expressed in our opinion section are those of the author concerned and not that of all of outlookindia.com or all its authors.
8. Please also note that you are solely responsible for the comments posted by you on the site. The comments could be deleted or edited entirely at our discretion if we find them objectionable. However, the mere fact of their existence on our site does not mean that we necessarily approve of their contents. In short, the onus of responsibility for the comments remains solely with the authors thereof. Outlookindia.com or any of its group publications, may, however, retains the right to publish any of these comments, with or without editing, in any medium whatsoever. It is therefore in your own interest to be careful before posting.
9.Outlookindia.com is not responsible in any manner whatsoever for how any search engine -- such as Google, Bing etc -- caches or displays these comments. Please note that you are solely responsible for posting these comments and it is a privilege being granted to our registered users which can be withdrawn in case of abuse. To reiterate:
a. Comments once posted can only be deleted at the discretion of outlookindia.com
b. The comments reflect the views of the authors and not of outlookindia.com
c. outlookindia.com is not responsible in any manner whatsoever for the way search engines cache or display these comments
d. Please therefore take due caution before you post any comments as your words could potentially be used against you
10. We have an online thread for our comments policy:
You are welcome to post your suggestions here or in case you have a specific issue, to directly email us at Mail AT outlookindia DOT com with the subject header COMPLAINT