Separatist rebel groups in India's Northeast, except for those in the state of Manipur, have generally entered the 'talk mode', keen, or forced by circumstances, to try and evolve acceptable solutions to their demands through political dialogue with New Delhi. The recent past has, in fact, seen something of a chain reaction, with one insurgent group after another expressing its willingness to talk peace, cornering other recalcitrant allies and foes, leading to snapping of strategic alliances among many militant groups, and even forcing several rebel armies onto the road to negotiation.

Within less than two months after it responded positively to Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi's call for a ceasefire ahead of possible peace talks, a group of top leaders belonging to the outlawed National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) were reported to have traveled to New Delhi over the past few days, to hold talks with officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). Reports indicate that these militant leaders were charting out the modalities of a formal ceasefire agreement between the rebel group and the government, as well as other details, such as the setting up and location of designated camps where their cadres could be lodged safely till the time the talks lead to an acceptable solution.

Published reports on November 29, 2004, quoted NDFB 'president' Ranjan Daimary alias D.R. Nabla as saying his group was ready for unconditional talks with the Indian government on the basis of their 'ideology and principles.' But, rebel groups are known for hard bargaining with government negotiators, and the NDFB, too, won't be an exception. This was indicated by the NDFB chief when he said they were seeking a Bodoland which is going to be a 'heterogeneous state.'

Talks with the NDFB will lead to more problems than solutions, in the sense that New Delhi has already signed a deal with a rival Bodo rebel group, the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) in February 2003. According to the terms of that agreement, the Bodos were granted a Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), a politico-administrative structure with a 40-member elective body. What, now, could the NDFB get by way of concessions to persuade it to give up its demand for an independent homeland? Moroever, the chances of an open confrontation within the Bodo society are very significant, since both the NDFB and the 'disbanded' BLT would seek to occupy the same political space.

Within the theatre of insurgency in Assam, at least, the successful clinching of the agreement with the BLT in 2003 has led to a chain reaction. In addition to the NDFB, several rag-tag rebel groups active in the southern Assam hill districts of Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills are currently holding formal or informal talks with the authorities. This has also impacted on the proscribed United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) - by far the state's most powerful insurgent group with a huge fire-power and established trans-border linkages.

Developments over the past weeks indicate that ULFA is now looking for an honourable way to begin negotiations with New Delhi. The group began by withdrawing two of its three preconditions for peace talks with the Indian government - talks outside India and talks under the supervision of the United Nations. The only condition that ULFA is still sticking to is that its core demand of 'sovereignty' must be on the agenda of discussions as and when the talks with New Delhi begin.

ULFA's decision to endorse popular Assamese novelist Dr. Indira Goswami's efforts to act as a peace facilitator also indicates that the rebel group has at last come around to the need for negotiations as a tool for a solution to their demands. This is the first time since its formation on April 7, 1979 - in a quest to establish a 'sovereign, Socialist Assam' - that ULFA has backed someone who has taken up the role of mediator. Dr. Goswami has already met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and handed him a written 'peace appeal'. A response from the Prime Minister is now awaited before the peace process could move further forward.

The ULFA has also demonstrated that it takes Dr. Goswami seriously and was even ready to put violent activities on hold to honour her call. On November 25, 2004, the ULFA carried out four separate grenade and bomb attacks in eastern Assam, injuring six people, blowing up a crude pipeline, and bringing down an abandoned security tower within an Indian Air Force complex at Jorhat. Within 48 hours, Dr. Goswami told the media that ULFA 'commander-in-chief' Paresh Baruah had telephoned her in connection with the peace effort, and that she had urged him to put a halt to all violent activities until a response from New Delhi is received. ULFA has marked November 28 as 'betrayal day', commemorating the launch of the first organized military offensive against them - Operation Bajrang in 1990 - with a string of violent attacks each year. This time round, there has been no violence till noon of November 29, 2004 in the wake of Dr Goswami's appeal to them to exercise restraint.

ULFA, of course, continues to jockey for a favourable negotiating position, and has sought to question and confront present government responses. After the Prime Minister made it clear on November 22, 2004, that "Assam was an integral part of India and there can be no doubts on that," ULFA once again reiterated its demand for a plebiscite on the issue of a 'sovereign Assam'. "The Indian government has said it was not prepared to discuss our core demand for sovereignty during possible peace negotiations. Let them then hold a plebiscite in Assam and we shall abide by the verdict of the masses," ULFA 'Chairman' Arabinda Rajkhowa said in a statement e-mailed to journalists in Guwahati on November 27. He added: "The solution to Assam's problem lies with the people. They should be allowed to decide whether they want an independent homeland or not."

If ULFA is trying to put pressure on New Delhi to come up with a more 'acceptable' set of alternatives which could constitute a basis for honourable engagement in a peace process with the Indian government, the Isak-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) is also acting tough. The outfit, engaged in peace talks with New Delhi since August 1997, suddenly called off its scheduled visit to India beginning November 28, 2004, accusing government agencies of arming one rival Naga group and trying to promote another. K. Padmanabhaiah, New Delhi's chief interlocutor for the Naga peace talks, however, denied these allegations and told this writer "We are neither arming any Naga rebel group opposed to the NSCN-IM nor showing any undue interest in any other Naga rebel outfit. These doubts need to be cleared through direct talks and we can investigate the charges if specific evidence is provided to us by the NSCN-IM."

The NSCN-IM came up with the charge that government agencies had started arming the rival Naga National Council (NNC) with self-loading rifles, and airlifting leaders of the NSCN faction headed by S.S. Khaplang (NSCN-K) to New Delhi, within about a fortnight of New Delhi and the NSCN-IM issuing a joint statement in Bangkok regarding the India visit. This is certainly extraordinary, and it is difficult to see why the government or a government agency would abruptly begin to arm or support rival groups, precisely at a time when top rebel leaders of the principal faction in negotiations with the government were due to arrive at Delhi for talks. These talks, moreover, were to be held on the invitation of none less than the Prime Minister. This, perhaps, is the way insurgent politics moves.

There can, however, be no doubt that negotiations are increasingly coming centre-stage in the political strategy of the rebels in India's Northeast. A number of factors have contributed to this trend. The transformed global environment and declining international 'tolerance' for violent anti-state groups, particularly within democratic societies, has made insurgency more difficult to sustain. 

Cooperative action by at least some countries in the neighbourhood has denied the insurgents important safe havens - Bhutan expelled all militants of the ULFA, NDFB and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) in military operations in December 2003. Current reports now suggest that the Myanmar Army has launched coordinated operations with Indian Forces to clear insurgent camps on Myanmarese soil. This leaves Bangladesh as the only surviving safe haven in the region. 

Counter-terrorism operations in parts of the Northeast have also secured particular successes, even as governments have framed liberal 'surrender policies' and vigorously promoted various peace initiatives. Moreover, as the NSCN case illustrates, a radical political agenda and sizeable armed forces can gainfully be sustained by insurgent groups even during peace talks. Negotiations, it seems, are a 'win-win' option for the beleaguered extremist factions in the Northeast.

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Wasbir Hussain is Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal