America has the largest number of universities in the world. Their teaching faculties are cherry-picked from the entire English-speaking world. Their libraries are the best stocked, and the most user-friendly. They churn out the largest number of PhDs, and win the lion's share of the Nobel prizes every year. The departments of commerce, state and defence, and the Congress, have an awesome number of specialised aides on their staff.

Iraq was reduced from first-world affluence to third-world poverty in 12 years, but it was still a functioning state.

Yet, when it comes to decision-making, especially in international affairs, America displays a lack of understanding and foresight that would make any third world government feel distinctly at home in its company.

Iraq is a case in point. The US and UK now claim that they waged a 'just' war to rid Iraq of an oppressive dictator and usher in democracy. Millions of those who opposed the war on other grounds have swallowed this claim. But the only blessings the Iraqis have received are chaos, anarchy, destitution and death.

During Saddam Hussein's reign, despite 12 years of sanctions, Iraqis had power, an abundant supply of gasoline, and thanks in part to the UN's oil for food programme, enough to eat. The streets were safe, the salaries assured, and the currency, although depreciated, was stable. Schools and colleges were open, and girls attended them as freely as boys. There was not a hint of Islamic fundamentalism and the State, for all its oppressiveness, was unflinchingly secular. In short, though Saddam's folly and the UN sanctions dragged Iraq down from first-world affluence to third-world poverty, Iraqis still had a functioning state. Above all, the system of financial circulation, the lifeblood of a market economy, was intact. People received their salaries and spent them. This created demand and income for others. The marketplace, in short, flourished.

All this is now 'history'. The queues for gasoline, even in Baghdad, are often three miles long; the waiting period 8-24 hours. Power supply is intermittent, more off than on. All the 158 government buildings in Baghdad have been looted bare, along with all the hospitals and thousands of private homes. The looting and destruction of the Baghdad Archaeological Museum, which rivals what the Taliban did to Bamiyan, is of course in a class by itself. The schools are closed. But what does that matter? After all, it is the summer vacation. Something will be rigged up before September. But what about public safety? Well, in the last week of May there were 70 murders—ten a day!

But aren't these only the pains of transition? After all, a hated regime has been thrown out. It will take some time to get another in its place, especially a democratic one. Right? Wrong. First this collapse was not inevitable. Second, there is no certainty that the US will be able to set things right and usher in the much promised democracy.

The collapse occurred because the Americans did not know how to run a city, much less an occupied country. As Benjamin Barber, author of Jihad vs McWorld, said in London last week, Washington believed that it had only to clear away the dictatorial regime of Saddam for democracy to take spontaneous root. Living as they do in a never-ending present, they did not bother to check with history. The 'neo-cons' who backseat-drove the invasion were fond of citing MacArthur's transformation of Japan into a democracy. What they forgot was that Emperor Hirohito legitimised the American occupation for the Japanese people. In return the Americans left the Japanese State structure intact and worked through it to transform the country.

In Iraq, by contrast, the Americans did not omit a single mistake that they could have made.Instead of reassuring people that their jobs were safe, that they should come as usual to collect newspapers, they announced the Ba'ath party 'activists' would not be welcome, that up to 3,000 or 4,000 of their top echelons would be arrested as potential war criminals. In a country where the Ba'ath party had for 35 years been the only avenue to power, this spelt the end of the bureaucracy. The police were similarly the 'hated police of a despot'. End of police. Till three weeks ago the US authorities were running Baghdad with a mere 8,000 policemen.

As for the army, after two months of silence the administration now helmed by Paul Bremer announced that soldiers should collect $50 as severance pay and apply for reinduction. But when they turned up for their severance pay, there was no money. Protests were met with bullets and death.

By cutting off the bureaucracy and the army, the Americans disrupted the cash flow in the economy. Since they also did not peg the value of the dinar, no one knew whether to accept them. There was also almost nothing to buy. Even if the US had intended to make Iraqis pay for the damage the 'coalition' had inflicted on their country, the second thing it should have done was to announce a $10-20 billion loan to the country to meet essential needs till the oil revenues reappeared. This would have been a drop in the bucket compared to the Marshall Plan, and a short-term loan, not a grant. But the Bush administration had simply not thought of it.

As for democracy, it soon became clear that the US wanted its own brand. When it realised that the Iraqis had other ideas, it quickly lost interest. It seems not to have occurred to anyone that democracies are not imposed from top—witness Afghanistan—but built from below, witness the US. Till now no one has breathed a word about local elections in Iraq.