T. Narayan
It was just as Narendra Modi had promised. When he took over the reins of a beleaguered BJP in October 2001, he had said he was here to play a 'one-day match'. Now it's clear why. Trampling on poll surveys and using a communally polarised populace to full advantage—with a lot of assistance from a motivated organisational structure that raised the Hindutva pitch to a new high—the former RSS pracharak turned the Gujarat elections on its head, winning in a style that none predicted.
The sole reason that enabled the BJP to turn the palpable anti-incumbency tide and win a lot more seats than it had in the 1995 and 1998 elections seemed to be the sharp communal divide constructed and heightened by Modi and the VHP's groundwork.
With the benefit of hindsight, the chips now seem to be falling in place.
| | | | Vaghela's belated exertions made no dent in the face of the BJP's constant hammering on the issue of terrorism. | | | | |
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The action happened in Godhra, the reaction was visible in Ahmedabad and in all Congress-controlled regions, the commentary continued till December 10, 2002—the last day of campaigning. Finally, Modi won both, the match as well as the Man of the Match award.
Recent political history in Gujarat signalled that the BJP was going downhill with every small and sundry election and the results to the last assembly by-elections on February 24, 2002—three days before the ghastly Godhra train carnage—established the party had hit rock bottom. It began from the last quarter of 2000, which saw the BJP losing badly to the Congress in the elections to the district panchayats and the municipal corporations.
The writing was on the wall. The municipal corporations of Ahmedabad and Rajkot had been with the BJP for 15 and 25 years respectively, before they lost both. The downslide continued through late 2001, with the party losing the by-elections to the Sabarmati assembly and the Sabarkantha Lok Sabha seats.
And nearly five months after Modi took over, the trend continued. Modi, despite being a sitting chief minister, won by only half the margin with which the BJP had retained Rajkot-II.
Three days later, Godhra happened and the reaction came thick and fast. For everyone else, the campaign started and ended in the past one month. But Modi's campaign had started way back in April with the gaurav yatra.
Any question from the media about the post-Godhra violence was deflected by counters like, "What about Godhra? Had Godhra not happened, the rest would not have happened." The election results have now doubtless established Godhra's criticality to it.
Even Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's advice, not to have Godhra as an election plank, was converted into an effective talking point by Modi's practised rhetoric. "No friends, please don't give me votes in the name of Godhra. I don't play politics over the dead. Please don't give me votes on Godhra. But please, friends, don't ask me to forget Godhra."
What prompted him to stick to this high pitch was a spirited Congress campaign, which, on the one hand, questioned the BJP's claim to be the saviour of the Hindus, and on the other, worked on the party's poor performance, fusing it with caste considerations. Still, it could not perform as well as it had thought it would in Saurashtra and Kutch, though it improved its tally in that region and even trounced big names like former CM Suresh Mehta, Speaker Dhirubhai Shah and chairman of gmdc Mukesh Jhaveri in Kutch. Its marginal gains in north Gujarat were almost completely neutralised by major losses in central Gujarat and the tribal tract, the Congress domain.
There are two reasons why the Congress could not make it. One, it couldn't see the beginning of a BJP campaign way back in April and could not stop the BJP from capitalising on Akshardham, leave alone blame it for slackness. By the time it got its act together to challenge the BJP's claim that only it could combat terrorism, or that the Congress was on the side of Muslims (and therefore Pakistan), it was too late.Another reason was the VHP capitalising on an appeal on Id-ul-Fitr by clerics to the Muslims to vote Congress. This was converted by Modi into a 'fatwa' and ads to this effect were put in local papers, with Modi appealing to the people to vote "100 per cent". In less than 48 hours, thousands of photocopies of this 'fatwa' were distributed by the VHP in the villages, creating a scare that "the Muslims will get a victory for the Congress and then rule over the Hindus". It worked, with traditional Congress voters at many places voting for the BJP.