RIDING the Nuclear Tiger was published in May ’99. Normally, this would’ve been recent enough to remain topical. But the book’s been overtaken by events— the flashpoint in Kargil and the lesser incursions that continue along the Indo-Pakistan border.

These developments confirmed that Pokhran-II, followed by the Chagai nuclear blasts in Pakistan, have contributed nothing to India’s security. Rather, they’ve created insecurity. Fears that nuclear parity may tempt Pakistan to create sustained border tension to keep the Kashmir issue alive have come true since its strategists are confident that India will be deterred from hitting back. This evidence on the counter- productive nature of nuclear weapons for India would’ve helped strengthen N. Ram’s demolition of the case for such expensive weapons.

Although Kargil’s helped demonstrate the strategic insecurities of trying to straddle the nuclear tiger, its political repercussions have turned out to be diff e rent from those visualised by Ram. He paints India as isolated, and fearful of sanctions, which it was after Pokhran- II. The picture ’s changed today. Never have the industrialised nations, led by the US, supported it so openly. Even Beijing, despite the anti-China flavour given by New Delhi to Pokhran-II, hasn’t supported Pakistan. Here the nuclear factor seems to have gone in India’s favour. The big powers seem to have been primarily influenced by the desire to oppose any action that could lead to a nuclear confrontation. In Kargil, Pakistan was clearly the offender.

Thus we have a strange situation, which few had anticipated. On the one hand, the strategic justification of Pokhran-II’s been exposed as hollow. It’s deterred India more than Pakistan. On the other, the international consequences have favoured India. The great powers have shown themselves keen to display their opposition to military moves which could upset the status quo in the subcontinent and such moves usually emanate from Pakistan. International interest, of course, carries the risk of intervention, which has gone against India in the past, but may not do so now.

Ram’s is a black-and-white thesis. He is at his best describing the immorality of nuclear weapons, exposing the flaws and high cost of nuclear deterrence, backed by convincing documentation. But the thesis is marred by his desire to blame the "Hindu Right" exclusively for last year’s tests. Yet Pokhran-II cannot but recall the Pokhran-I blast in May ’74. Even then, nobody was taken in by the excuse that its purpose was peaceful. The test was part of a continuing campaign to develop the military aspect of the nuclear energy programmes that India began in the ’50s, a process accelerated after China’s Lop Nor tests in ’64. Secret preparations in Pakistan and possible threats from China were used to justify Pokhran-I, but the need to refurbish Mrs Gandhi’s domestic image might have triggered the device.

Since then, every government of India has retained the "nuclear option". A large number of scientists and strategists has consistently supported a military programme , and received considerable government funds for the purpose. A fusion of the political needs of the Vajpayee government with the latent ambitions of the military - scientific establishment seems to have created the same critical mass that led to Pokhran-I. According to Ram, however, the Hindu Right’s Pokhran-II subverted India’s peaceful nuclear policy, but Pokhran-I didn’t. The continuing eff o rt by all governments to ensure that India remained a screwdriver turn from creating nuclear weapons is also not seen as subversion. I share his views on the immorality and the futility of nuclear deterrence, but its votaries are not limited to the Hindu Right. The main proponents of this pernicious doctrine are bureaucrats, scientists and serving and retired military officers. He should not forget to target them.